Beyond WEIRD witnesses:eyewitness memory reports in cross-cultural settings by Anakwah, Nkansah













This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Portsmouth 
 
     












Professor Lorraine Hope    University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom 
Dr.  Robert Horselenberg    Maastricht University, the Netherlands 
Professor Peter J. van Koppen   Vrije University Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
 
Assessment Committee: 
Professor Brent Snook      External Examiner 










This research is supported by a fellowship awarded from the Erasmus Mundus Joint 
Doctorate Program The House of Legal Psychology (EMJD-LP) with Framework Partnership 
Agreement (FPA) 2013-0036 and Specific Grant Agreement (SGA) 532473-EM-5-2017-1-
NL-ERA MUNDUS-EPJD to Nkansah Anakwah. 





Investigators will inevitably interview eyewitnesses from different cultures. Because 
eyewitnesses are not immune to the influences of their respective cultures, they may bring 
culturally determined reporting norms into the forensic setting. This thesis set out to 
determine whether there are cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports. Four 
experiments were conducted to examine this overarching aim. Based on the individualistic-
collectivistic cultural framework, mock witnesses were sampled from cultures representing 
the individualistic-collectivistic cultural orientations. In Experiment 1, cultural differences in 
the content and nature of eyewitness memory reports was examined. Mock witnesses (N = 
200) were sampled from Ghana and The Netherlands, representing collectivist and 
individualist cultures respectively, and provided memory reports about a stimuli event. 
Experiment 1 provided initial evidence of cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports 
such that individualistic mock witnesses reported more details about the event than did 
collectivistic culture mock witnesses. Experiment 2 examined whether migrating and 
adapting in a new cultural environment shapes the content and nature of eyewitness memory 
reports. Again, using a mock witness paradigm, participants (N = 107) were sub-Saharan 
African migrants in Western Europe and sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa. The results of 
Experiment 2 provided further evidence in support of the role of culture in shaping 
eyewitness memory reports, with sub-Saharan African migrants in Western Europe providing 
more elaborate details than did sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa. In Experiment 3, the 
role of culture in the susceptibility to misinformation effect was examined. Using a 
misinformation paradigm, participants (N = 127) from Ghana and the United Kingdom 
provided memory reports about a witnessed event. The results suggest that culture plays a 
role in the extent of the misinformation effect such that mock-witnesses with collectivistic 




cultural background endorsed misleading details more than mock witnesses with an 
individualistic cultural background. The final experiment conducted for this programme of 
research, Experiment 4, examined whether cultural differences in relating with authority 
figures play any role in the reports provided by eyewitnesses. Participants (N = 115) sampled 
from Ghana and the Netherlands provided memory reports either in an authority or a non-
authority witness reporting context. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that interviewer 
authority impacts eyewitness memory reports differently across different cultures, such that 
eyewitness memory reports of mock witnesses with individualistic cultural background was 
enhanced when reporting in an authority context, whereas eyewitness memory reports of 
mock witnesses with collectivistic cultural background was impeded when reporting in an 
authority context. In consolidating the findings across experiments, the methodological 
challenges in conducting cross-cultural applied research are examined along with the 
implications of the findings for the conduct of investigative interviews in cross-cultural 
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Laurent Gbagbo, former President of Cote D'Ivoire, together with his right-hand man, 
Charles Ble Goude, a former political youth movement leader, were charged with crimes 
against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2011. The pair were linked to 
post-electoral violence in Cote D’Ivoire during 2010-2011 that led to the death of over 3000 
people. The Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC commenced an investigation into the alleged 
heinous crimes. In the course of the trial, 82 prosecution witnesses from Cote D’Ivoire, a 
country in West Africa, were presented before the court (Goldstone, 2019; Rosenberg, 2017). 
Each of these witnesses had been interviewed by investigators in order to obtain an account 
of what they had seen or known about the defendants. As these witnesses had been socialised 
in a sub-Saharan cultural context, they may bring culturally determined reporting norms into 
the interview context. To date, no research has focused on cross-cultural differences that 
might emerge for eyewitnesses in this particular reporting context. Thus, a lack of insight as 
to how sub-Saharan African witnesses normatively report about such events may have 
impeded investigators’ efforts at eliciting memory reports.  
This challenge faced by investigators at the ICC is an emerging challenge for all 
investigators. Increasing trends in migration and globalisation (United Nations Population 
Division, 2019) have resulted in increased cross-cultural contacts in formal interviewing 
settings (e.g., law enforcement and immigration settings). This increase in cross-cultural 
interactions makes it more likely for legal professionals to interview an eyewitness, victim, 
suspect, or asylum seeker from a cultural background different from that of the legal 
professional. Such interviewees may have been socialised in their respective cultures, hence, 
they are likely to bring into the criminal justice setting, behaviours consistent with their 
cultural norms.  




Without insight into how their cultural backgrounds impact their report from memory 
about witnessed events, efforts at eliciting eyewitness memory reports in such cross-cultural 
contexts may be impeded. That may have implications for legal decision-making and justice 
delivery. There is, therefore, the need for an increased understanding of how culture shapes 
eyewitness memory reports among legal professionals. For example, within the healthcare 
context, research shows that expression of pain and other behaviours vary between cultures 
(Liao, Henceroth, Lu, & LeRoy, 2016). Therefore, it has been suggested that healthcare 
providers need to understand cultural influences on pain and behaviours of patients better in 
order to deliver efficient healthcare (Callister, 2003; Sowattanangoon, Kotchabhakdi, & 
Petrie, 2009). Similarly, an increase in cross-cultural understanding would enhance the 
efficiency of legal and investigative professionals (Giebels, Oostinga, Taylor, & Curtis, 
2017). Specifically, understanding of cultural influences on behaviour and psychological 
functioning would be beneficial for legal and investigative professionals working in diverse 
areas such as asylum seeker contexts, international criminal justice settings, law enforcement 
contexts, and counter-terrorism settings (Beune, Giebels, & Taylor, 2010; De Bruïne, 
Vredeveldt, & Van Koppen, 2018; Hope & Gabbert, 2019; Kleinman, 2006; Van Veldhuizen, 
Maas, Horselenberg, & van Koppen, 2018).  
Beyond WEIRD witnesses: Eyewitness memory reports across cultures 
Despite the fact that eyewitnesses have been socialised in their respective cultures and 
that psychological processes may not be universal, the vast majority of research on 
eyewitness memory has relied on western samples. In fact, over 94% of psychological 
research published in top psychology journals used western samples (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010; Rad, Martingano, & Ginges, 2018). What we know about eyewitness 
memory reports is mostly conclusions drawn from WEIRD (Western, Educated, 




Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) samples. Such 
conclusions have usually been generalised to witnesses from less WEIRD populations. 
Generalising findings from studies on eyewitness memory conducted with individuals from 
western cultures to other cultural groups may be problematic. Overreliance on WEIRD 
samples may result in missing other important variations in psychological processes (Henrich 
et al., 2010). Given this important shortcoming, there have been a number of calls for 
improvement in psychological science by understanding the psychological functioning of less 
WEIRD cultures (Brady, Fryberg, & Shoda, 2018). Gelfand, Harrington, and Jackson (2017), 
for example, have recently called for psychological research to go beyond western borders, to 
enhance understanding of cultural variations in behaviour. 
Currently, there is a particular dearth of research on whether a witnesses’ culture of 
socialisation impacts their eyewitness memory reports. To date, knowledge about how 
individuals socialised in non-western cultures formulate their eyewitness memory reports is 
almost entirely absent. As a result, investigative professionals eliciting memory reports in 
cross-cultural contexts have limited understanding of cultural factors that may impact 
information elicitation. An insight into the eyewitness memory reports of individuals from 
non-western cultures may help improve the effectiveness of investigative interviews in cross-
cultural contexts. For example, insight into how culture shapes eyewitness memory reports 
could help in developing culturally sensitive techniques when eliciting memory reports. 
Research on how witnesses from non-western cultures formulate their eyewitness memory 
reports may be beneficial in developing techniques based on findings from such research, as 
current techniques used in obtaining memory reports were mostly developed based on 
research with western samples.  
Aims of the current thesis 




The overarching aim of this thesis is to examine the content of memory reports 
provided by witnesses from different cultures. The first aim of the thesis was to examine 
whether individuals socialised in different cultures differ in the content of their eyewitness 
memory reports. The second aim of the thesis was to examine whether adaptation in a new 
cultural environment would impact the content of eyewitness memory reports. The third aim 
was to examine whether cultural background plays any role in susceptibility to the 
misinformation effect. The final aim of the thesis was to examine whether cross-cultural 
differences with respect to relating to authority figures play any role in the content of 
eyewitness memory reports.  
In this introductory chapter, I provide a general overview of this research area and 
discuss key concepts and frameworks in cross-cultural psychology relevant to the current 
programme of work. Drawing on these concepts, I examine how socialisation in different 
cultures shape behaviour and psychological functioning. I also consider the implications of 
these cross-cultural differences for cognition and eyewitness memory reports.  
The concept of culture 
Culture involves the collective programming of the mind of a people group, that 
distinguishes them from members of other groups (Gyekye, 2002; Hofstede, 2011). In his 
seminal work Primitive Culture published in 1871, Edward Tylor defined culture to be a 
complex whole embodying belief, knowledge, custom, arts, morals, and any habits and 
traditions that members of a society acquire (Altarriba, 1993). These knowledge structures 
arise from the histories and experiences of the cultural group. Thus, the histories and 
experiences of a people group evolve into norms and values over the years (Bhugra, 2004; 
Brady et al., 2018; Triandis, 2001). Such norms and values then shape social relationships, 




family systems, and other social practices within that cultural group (Amos, 2013; Istomin, 
Panáková, & Heady, 2014; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003).  
The manifestations of a group’s culture include their symbols, heroes, rituals, and 
maxims (Hofstede, 2010). For example, present at a museum in Ghana, West Africa, are 
artefacts depicting the cultural values of the Akan ethnic group (Hess, 2003). Among the 
artefacts present at this museum is an emblem of two crocodiles called funtunfunafu ne 
denkyemfunafu (conjoined crocodiles), lying perpendicular across each other with a 
conjoined stomach. Popularly called Adinkra symbol, that artefact is said to signify the 
communal orientation or oneness of the people (Kuwornu-Adjaottor, Appiah, & Nartey, 
2016). More specifically, the significance of that artefact to the ethnic group is to highlight 
the fact that as individual members of the society, they are intricately connected to each other 
and interdependent (Quaynor, 2018). Also exhibited at the museum is another artefact 
showing a group of individuals carrying the same bowl together called abusua ayowa (clan 
bowl), signifying the togetherness and the collective spirit of the Akan people (Boakyewaa, 
2008). These artefacts capture a particular set of cultural values and, specifically, depict the 
importance the ethnic group places on communal living. Such communalism has been 
illustrated by an Akan maxim ‘a person is not a palm tree that he should be self-complete’ 
(Gyekye, 2002, p. 300).  
The communal lifestyle of the Akan ethnic group in Ghana is typical of many sub-
Saharan African societies. In his influential work profiling the culture of the Igbo ethnic 
group of Nigeria, for example, Uchendu (2007) described the Igbo people as having a holistic 
culture, with complex social relationships. Individuals from such cultures mostly remain 
loyal to the extended family system, and the raising of a child is traditionally a collective 
responsibility of the community (Amos, 2013). Marriage in such societies is considered an 




arrangement that does not only bring two individuals together but their families or clans as 
well (Kalule-sabiti, Palamuleni, Makiwane, & Amoateng, 2007). Uchendu (2007) argued that 
such social structure shapes and conditions their worldview. Also writing on African 
personhood, Gyekye (2002) noted that members of the Gikuyu ethnic group of Kenya, East 
Africa do not consider themselves as isolated individuals but rather a relative of several 
people and that the personal pronoun ‘I’ is rarely used in social gatherings. The sub-Saharan 
African view of the person is summed up in the maxim ‘I am, because we are; and since we 
are, therefore I am’(Menkiti, 1984, p. 171). The social complexity observed in cultural groups 
in sub-Saharan Africa is less evident in other cultures, such as Western Europe where, for 
example, the nuclear family system rather than extended family model, tends to dominate.  
In light of broadly observable cultural differences, Hofstede and colleagues proposed 
a useful framework for the consideration and exploration of such differences (Hofstede, 1983, 
2011; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). This framework of national cultures provides a theoretical 
foundation for exploring cross-cultural differences among people groups, and cultural 
differences in the complexity of social structures features prominently. The work on the 
classification of national cultures was based on extensive research on attitudinal surveys in 
over 70 countries across the world (Hofstede, 1983; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010).1 
Based on similarities that emerged consistently across countries, six dimensions of national 
cultures (Power distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-
femininity, long term orientation, and indulgence-restraint) were distilled, with countries 
ranking from high to low on these dimensions (Hofstede, 1983, 2011; Hofstede & Bond, 
                                                          
1 Data on Hofstede’s dimensions has been updated to 111 countries as at 2016. See Hofstede’s insight database 
at https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/ 




1988). In this thesis, I draw on two of these cultural dimensions – power distance and 
individualism-collectivism – and examine their implications for eyewitness memory reports.  
Power distance: Cross-cultural differences in relating to authority figures 
The power distance (PD) dimension concerns the extent to which the less powerful 
members in society expect and accept the unequal distribution of power, with regards to 
social status, wealth, rights and privileges, and respect (Hofstede, 2001; Sharma, 2010). In 
low PD cultures, there is less emphasis on hierarchy in social relationships and those in 
authority mostly treat other members of the social group as equals. For example, within an 
organisational context, subordinates in low PD cultures actively participate in decision 
making and there is less gap in communication with authority figures (Khatri, 2009). In high 
PD cultures, however, hierarchy in social relationships is mostly emphasised. For example, 
high PD cultures value respect and deference to people of higher status, and decisions are 
mostly made by those at the top hierarchy (Basabe & Ros, 2005). The hierarchy in high PD 
cultures extends into familial relationships. For example, in the upbringing of children, 
parents in high PD cultures emphasise obedience, respect, and fear for the elderly and people 
in authority. Research suggests that children in such cultures are more likely to receive 
physical punishment, more directives, and are less likely to be engaged in conversation with 
adults (Henrich et al., 2010; Wang, 2006). Hence, people socialised in high PD cultures 
become more predisposed and sensitive to hierarchy and status in their social relationships, 
than people socialised in low PD cultures.  
The extent of power distance may determine the amount of information provided to 
authority figures in social interactions (Białas, 2009; Rhee, Dedahanov, & Lee, 2014). 
Specifically, for individuals socialised in high PD cultures, interacting with authority figures 
may impede spontaneous provision of information than individuals socialised in low PD 




cultures (Ghosh, 2011). Individuals socialised in high PD cultures have been shown to 
engage more in mitigated speech, are less direct and less explicit, and are more apprehensive 
when communicating with authority figures (Koc, 2013; Madlock, 2012). It may be the case 
that sensitivity to power differentials by witnesses with high PD cultural backgrounds may 
hamper reports made in forensic contexts. That is because investigative interviews with 
witnesses are conducted by an interviewer (e.g., police detective) who assumes an authority 
status. In cross-cultural settings, sensitivity to such power differentials may have implications 
for eliciting eyewitness memory reports during investigative interviews. The cultural 
dimension of power distance is related with the individualism-collectivism cultural dimension 
(Basabe & Ros, 2005; Hofstede, 2011; Minkov et al., 2017). Specifically, these previous 
research suggest most collectivistic cultures have a high-PD whereas most individualistic 
cultures have a low-PD. Both dimensions are the most important cultural dimensions 
regarding social relationships (Basabe & Ros, 2005). This is because, among the dimension 
of national cultures, power distance and individualism-collectivism are those directly related 
to social interactions.   
Individualism-Collectivism 
The individualism-collectivism cultural dimension is the degree to which individuals 
in a society are integrated into social groups (Hofstede, 1983; Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Essentially, that dimension entails the extent to which individual members of a society are 
embedded in social relationships. According to Hofstede (2001), the relationship among 
individuals is loose in individualistic cultures, as individuals from such cultures are less 
embedded in a web of social relations. He argues that in such cultures an individual is 
expected to look after his or her own self, and to an extent his or her immediate family. 
Individualistic cultures include cultures in North America, Australia, and Western Europe 




(Basabe & Ros, 2005; Piyush Sharma, 2010). People in collectivistic cultures, however, are 
socialised into a strong cohesive in-group right from birth. According to the framework, they 
tend to be more embedded in a web of social relationships, and relationships among 
individuals are tight. Individuals in collectivistic cultures are born into an extended family or 
clan and the raising of a child is seen as a communal responsibility. That has been typified by 
an African proverb ‘it takes a village to raise a child’ (Seymour, 2013). Individuals remain 
loyal to the cohesive in-group right from birth, in exchange for unquestioning loyalty in 
return (Hofstede, 2011; Sharma, Zhan, & Su, 2016). Thus, in such societies, it is expected 
that members prioritise the opinions, interests, and preferences of the group above their own 
(Amer, Ngo, & Hasher, 2017; Basabe & Ros, 2005; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
Collectivism is related with values such as tradition and conformity (Piyush Sharma, 2010). 
Asian, South American, and African cultures are examples of collectivistic cultures (Basabe 
& Ros, 2005; Hofstede et al., 2010). The individualism-collectivism cultural dimension has 
been used extensively in research in cross-cultural psychology to describe, explain, and, 
predict cultural differences in socialisation, values, attitudes, communication, self-construal, 
and cognition (Green, Deschamps, & Páez, 2005; Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). 
Self-construal: The independent-interdependent view of the self 
The individualism-collectivism cultural dimension has been proposed to 
systematically shape the construal of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Self-construal 
refers to the meaning individuals ascribe to the self in relation to others (Cross, Hardin, & 
Gercek-Swing, 2011). Through interaction with others and the cultural environment, one 
develops a schema of the self that is consistent with the cultural context (Markus & 
Kitayama, 2003; Pilarska, 2014). Markus and Kitayama (1991) developed a comprehensive 
theory describing this phenomenon presented in their seminal paper about how culture shapes 




self-construal. Self-construal theory is currently the dominant framework for studying culture 
and memory (Gutchess & Sekuler, 2019). In self-construal theory, Markus and Kitayama 
(1991) argue that depending on the social context an individual is socialised, the individual 
develops either an independent or an interdependent construal of the self. Specifically, they 
argue that individuals socialised in individualistic cultures develop an independent self-
construal, whereas those socialised in collectivistic cultures develop an interdependent self-
construal.  
According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), the notion of an independent self is 
grounded in the belief that each individual in the society is whole and unique. They argue that 
an individual socialised in an individualistic culture develops a schema of the self as 
inherently and separately distinct from others and the social context (see Figure 1.1A). 
Consequently, the self is viewed as more autonomous, independent, and possesses unique 
dispositions and attributes. Due to that, proponents of the self-construal theory also argue that 
for individuals with an independent view of the self, life is organised and made more 
meaningful by focusing on one's own feelings, thoughts, and actions. Markus and Kitayama 
(1991) further assert that the independent self is responsive to the social environment and that 
this social responsiveness stems from the need for individuals with the independent self-
construal to look for avenues or best ways to express their unique dispositions. As a result, 
they argue individuals with independent self-construal become more self-assertive, 
expressive, and less restrained (Takata, 2003; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008), a 
phenomenon referred to as self-enhancement. Self-enhancement is judged as more desirable 
in individualistic cultures, as individuals are seen in a more positive light when they self-
enhance and express themselves confidently (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Takata, 2003). 





Figure 1. 1. Conceptual representation of the self (A. Independent construal, B. 
Interdependent construal; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) also argue in their theory that individuals socialised in 
collectivistic cultures develop an interdependent self-construal. According to the model, 
individuals socialised in collectivistic cultures develop a schema of the self as inherently 
connected to or interdependent with others in the social context (see Figure 1.1B). They argue 
that interactions with others in collectivistic cultures are guided by culturally prescribed tasks 
that require adjusting to others, fitting in with others, and using others as a reference for 
actions. As a result, they assert that the behaviour of individuals socialised in such cultures is 
based to a large extent on the feelings, thoughts, and actions of other people in the social 
context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). Markus and Kitayama (2010), however, note that 
an interdependent construal of the self does not necessarily mean that individuals cannot 
express their unique attributes or function effectively without being in the company of other 
people. Rather, they argue it takes a high degree of self-control in restraining one’s unique 
attributes, dispositions, and preferences. They argued that in cultures that emphasise the 
interdependent view of the self, individuals are seen in more positive light if they do not self-
assert their unique traits and dispositions (Masuda, Ellsworth, et al., 2008). As a consequence 




individuals from such cultures are more likely to emphasise modesty in self-presentation, a 
phenomenon referred to as self-effacement (Suzuki, Davis, & Greenfield, 2008; Takata, 
2003).  
Cross-cultural differences: Implications for cognition  
The independent-interdependent self-construal has implications for cultural 
differences in cognitive processes (Gutchess & Sekuler, 2019; Kurman, 2010; Norenzayan & 
Nisbett, 2000). Specifically, it has been argued that individuals with independent self-
construal develop an analytic perception. Analytic perception has been defined as the 
tendency to focus on the attributes and characteristics of an object to assign it to categories or 
a tendency to engage in context-independent perceptual processes (Nisbett, Choi, Peng, & 
Norenzayan, 2001). Conversely, it has been suggested that individuals with an interdependent 
self-construal develop a holistic perception (Nisbett et al., 2001). Holistic perception is the 
orientation to the context of an event, where individuals become predisposed to focus broadly 
on contextual details (Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006; Uskul, Nisbett, & Kitayama, 
2008).  
Research in cross-cultural cognition has provided evidence consistent with the 
analytic-holistic cognitive styles (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Park & Huang, 2010). 
Specifically, it has been suggested in those research that cognitive processes across cultures 
may vary. In a classic study, the rod-and-frame test (RFT) was used to examine cross-cultural 
differences in analytic-holistic cognition (Peng, & Nisbett, 2000). The rod-and-frame test is 
an apparatus that has a frame as well as a rod that is located inside the frame, which can be 
rotated independently of the frame. The rod was turned around in the frame and participants 
were asked to indicate when the rod appears vertical. Participants are considered field-
independent if they accurately judge the verticality of the rod when it is turned around in the 




frame. Similarly, participants are regarded as field-dependent if they make errors in judging 
the verticality of the rod when turned around in the frame. The authors found that Americans 
were more accurate on the RFT, showing they were less field-dependent than East Asians, 
who made more errors on the task.  
That finding on cross-cultural differences in analytic-holistic cognition has been 
corroborated in research using a different paradigm. For example, in a research using the 
classic framed-line test (FLT), participants were shown a square frame within which a 
vertical line had been drawn (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). Participants 
were later shown another square frame that was either of the same size or different size to the 
original frame, in which they were requested to complete an absolute and a relative task, 
respectively. For the absolute task, participants were asked to draw a line in the new square 
(i.e., the square similar in size to the original one), so that the new line was equal to the one in 
the original square in absolute length. For the relative task, participants were asked to draw a 
line in the new square (i.e., the square different in size to the original one), whose proportion 
to the size of the new square frame was similar to the proportion of the original line to the 
size of the original square frame. The authors reasoned that because individuals with analytic 
perception engage in context-independent perceptual processes, they are more likely to ignore 
both the original frame (in their assessment of the length of the line in the original frame) as 
well as the new frame (in their reproduction of the line in the new frame). Similarly, they 
argued that because individuals with holistic perception are more oriented to the context, they 
are likely to incorporate contextual information such as the height information of the 
surrounding frame in their encoding and reproduction of the line in a different sized frame. 
Consistent with that proposition, they found that compared to East Asians, North Americans 
were more accurate on the absolute task, showing they were less context-dependent. East 




Asians were also more accurate on the relative task than North Americans, showing East 
Asians were more context-dependent.  
Kitayama et al. (2003, Experiment 2) further provided evidence suggesting that when 
adapting to a new culture, individuals tend to develop cognitive styles consistent with the 
host culture. Specifically, using the framed-line test paradigm, they showed in another 
experiment that North American migrants in Japan showed cognitive style consistent with the 
predominant cognitive style in East Asia (holistic cognition). Similarly, Japanese migrants in 
North America showed cognitive style consistent with the predominant cognitive style in 
North America (analytic cognition). Their findings show that the cultural environment in 
which individuals are socialised can have implications for holistic-analytic cognition.  
Culture and memory 
The cultural difference in holistic-analytic cognition may lead to cultural differences 
in memory for event details (Chua et al., 2005). That is because as individuals’ cultural 
orientation makes them more inclined to prioritise particular type of details (i.e., central vs 
contextual detail), there is the likelihood that specific type of detail would dominate in the 
content of memory reports of individuals from the respective cultures. Evidence from 
previous research shows cultural differences in the content of memory reports in line with the 
proposal on holistic-analytic cognition ( Gutchess & Sekuler, 2019; Istomin et al., 2014). 
Essentially, it has been suggested in previous work that whereas account of events by people 
from individualistic cultures is not context-dependent, accounts by those from collectivistic 
cultures are context-dependent (Amer et al., 2017; Boduroglu, Priti, & Nisbett, 2009; 
Miyamoto et al., 2006). Systematic reviews show that people from western cultures are more 
inclined to attend to and remember more focal (central) information, whilst those from 
Eastern cultures are more inclined to attend to and remember more contextual (background) 




information (Gutchess & Indeck, 2009; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003). Indeed laboratory 
experiments with individuals from individualistic and collectivistic cultures show an 
individual’s cultural orientation can influence memory. For example, in one study, Japanese 
and American participants were exposed to images of underwater scenes and later given a 
recall task asking them to describe what they saw (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). The participants 
were then given a recognition task which consisted of objects they had earlier seen in the 
underwater scenes, presented either in their original backgrounds or novel backgrounds. The 
results showed that when describing underwater scenes from memory, Japanese participants 
provided more contextual information than American participants (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). 
Japanese participants in that study were also more accurate in recognizing previously seen 
objects when those objects were presented with their original backgrounds. However, when 
the objects were presented with a novel background, Japanese participants’ memory for the 
previously seen objects was more disrupted than that of American participants.  
Research using the change blindness paradigm has provided evidence consistent with 
previous research showing cultural differences in memory for focal and contextual details 
(Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). Participants were presented with 30 different pairs of images and 
later asked about the difference between the images. For example, participants were first 
presented with a scene of a township consisting of a focal object (e.g., bicycle) and other 
contextual objects (e.g., buildings at the background). They were later presented with a 
similar image with an alteration to the focal object (e.g., change in bicycle’s front wheel) or 
the contextual object (e.g., change in the shape of the building in the background) and asked 
to indicate when they recognise a change. East Asian participants detected changes to 
contextual details faster than did American participants, who identified changes to focal 
objects faster than they did contextual details. In a second experiment using a similar 




paradigm, participants viewed five pairs of vignettes and requested to describe the changes 
they saw on a sheet of paper. Again, East Asian participants identified more contextual 
changes than American participants. American participants also identified more focal 
changes than East Asian participants.  
Research on cultural priming has provided evidence that the independent-
interdependent self is linked to cognitive styles (Miyamoto et al., 2006; Mok & Morris, 2012; 
Oyserman, 2006; Peng & Knowles, 2003; Wang & Ross, 2005). Cultural priming is a 
technique that involves using situational cues to activate a cultural schema in individuals 
(Sanchez-Burks et al., 2003). When presented with a book of a cartoon story and later asked 
about what they saw, Americans and Asian Americans recalled more details about personal 
autonomy, when the independent-self was primed (Wang & Ross, 2005). Priming the 
interdependent self resulted in more recall about other characters, social interaction, and other 
contextual information. Participants’ self-construal in that study was primed by asking them 
to describe their unique attributes or their collective self. Thus, priming the interdependent-
self leads to holistic cognition, whiles the independent self leads to analytic cognition. Hence, 
in cultures where the social structure leads to the development of an independent or 
interdependent self-construal, members of that cultural group may develop cognitive styles 
consistent with the predominant norm for self-construal. Indeed that study also showed that 
American participants provided more focal details than Asian American participants, who 
also provided more contextual details than American participants (Wang & Ross, 2005). 
Although research shows culture may shape memory, findings from other research is 
somewhat inconsistent with previous studies. For example, in a study on cultural differences 
in memory for focal and background details, the authors found that Canadians had better 
memory for background objects than did Chinese (Wong, Yin, Yang, Li, & Spaniol, 2017). 




They also did not find a cultural difference in memory for focal objects. Participants viewed 
60 pictures (each consisting of focal and background details) and later identified the 
respective images that were present in the pictures in a recognition test. The authors argued 
the reason for Chinese participants' poorer memory for isolated background scenes on the 
recognition test could be because they might have bound those background scenes with their 
corresponding focal objects when viewing them in the pictures. Hence, separating those 
background scenes from the corresponding focal objects in a recognition test becomes more 
difficult for Chinese participants to identify them, due to their tendency to engage more in 
holistic processing.  
It may also be that cultures do not differ at encoding but rather differ at reporting. For 
instance, in some of these studies, participants did not provide a narrative from memory about 
what they perceived on the stimulus. Indeed some research suggests that cultures do not 
differ at the stage of encoding, but instead at the stage of reporting (Senzaki, Masuda, & Ishii, 
2014). In that study, Japanese and Canadian participants were exposed to images of 
underwater scenes and their eye movements measured. It was found that Japanese and 
Canadian participants did not differ in visual attention to both central and contextual details. 
In a follow-up experiment, Japanese and Canadian participants were exposed to the same 
stimuli and asked to construct narratives about their observation. The results showed that 
Japanese participants provided more contextual details than Canadian participants, who also 
provided more focal details than Japanese participants. Thus, when reporting from memory 
about witnessed events, cultures may differ in what details they prioritise.  
The independent-interdependent self-construal also has implications for more 
elaborate memory reporting (Ross & Wang, 2010; Wang, 2001; Wang, Song, & Kim Koh, 
2017). Research shows that individuals from cultures that emphasise the independent self-




construal tend to be more elaborate and specific in their memory reports than individuals 
socialised in cultures that emphasise the interdependent self-construal (Wang, 2001, 2004). 
When asked to narrate earliest childhood memories, it was found that the autobiographical 
memory reports of Asians were less specific and included fewer details than those of 
Americans (Wang, 2001; Wang & Ross, 2005). According to Hall (1976), communication in 
individualistic cultures (low context cultures) is more explicit and direct, whereas in 
collectivistic cultures (high-context cultures) communication is not explicit, as individuals 
rely on the context to communicate what is implied. Hall (1976) argues that in high context 
cultures, most of the message is not communicated but internalised. Indeed research within 
the forensic context shows cultural differences in detail provision between individuals 
socialised in individualistic cultures and those socialised in collectivistic cultures. For 
example, recent deception research suggests interviewees with an individualistic cultural 
background report more details than those with a collectivistic cultural background (Leal et 
al., 2018; Taylor, Larner, Conchie, & Menacere, 2017; Vrij et al., 2020).  
To date, little is known about eyewitness memory among non-western populations. As 
the individuals that legal and investigative professionals encounter have been socialised in 
their cultural contexts, an appreciation of whether cultural factors impact their memory 
reports is essential. Cross-cultural factors may impact the nature of reporting during 
investigative interviews (Hope & Gabbert, 2019). However, research in the field has largely 
been conducted with western samples. Also, research on cross-cultural cognition has largely 
compared Asian and Western cultures. Although sub-Saharan African cultures are regarded 
as collectivistic, not much comparative work in cross-cultural cognition has been done with 
samples from sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, even though non-WEIRD cultures are least 
represented in psychological research, it is worth mentioning that even among the least 




represented, sub-Saharan African populations have rarely been examined. Indeed, cross-
cultural research on self-construal and cognition has not paid much attention to the entire 
African continent (Eaton & Louw, 2000). Consequently, there have been calls for cross-
cultural research to go beyond Western and East Asian comparisons (Ji & Yap, 2016). 
In recent work within the forensic context, object recognition has been examined 
among asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa (De Bruïne et al., 2018). While such research 
provides valuable initial insight into cross-cultural cognition within a forensic context, its 
focus was on recognition performance that involved transforming a two-dimensional 
representation to a three-dimensional representation and vice versa. Hence, that study does 
not tell us much about the nature or the content of the memory reports of sub-Saharan 
Africans. Secondly, because the target sample of that study was sub-Saharan African asylum 
seekers, it may be that adapting to the new cultural environment might have had some impact 
on their cognition. Indeed in other research on cross-cultural cognition, collectivistic cultural 
participants are often migrants who were compared with indigenes from the host culture (e.g., 
Wang, 2009). In view of research showing adapting to a new cultural environment might 
impact cognitive processes (Kitayama et al., 2003), sampling individuals from collectivistic 
cultures who have been raised and living in their native culture may give us a clearer picture 
of how socialisation in the native culture might impact reporting from memory. The current 
programme of research builds on previous work by examining cultural differences in the 
nature and content of eyewitness memory reports. This programme of research goes beyond 
the North American – East Asian comparisons by sampling participants from Western Europe 
and sub-Saharan Africa, representing the individualistic and collectivistic cultures 
respectively. The experiments conducted for this programme of research mostly draw on 
participants that were born, raised, and living in their native cultural context.  




In view of the fact that the current programme explores the content and nature of 
eyewitness memory reports, free and cued recall tests were mostly used. Free recall is more 
likely to be affected by reporting norms, as it allows for an unlimited free narrative from 
interviewees (Hope & Gabbert, 2019). Thus, free recall made it possible to assess cultural 
differences in elaborate reporting. However, because cued recall has to do with specific 
responses, it is more likely to reflect what interviewees might be able to report. Nevertheless, 
mock witnesses might also be able to elaborate their response cued recall questions. For 
example, in response to such the question ‘What was the man doing’, mock witnesses might 
be more explicit and provide elaborate details regarding what the man in question was doing. 
Thus both recall domains made it possible to assess cultural differences in the nature and 
content of memory reports 
 
Overview of the current thesis 
Despite evidence showing an individual’s culture of socialisation may shape 
behaviour and psychological functioning, research in eyewitness memory reports has not 
made much progress in examining cultural differences in the nature and content of 
eyewitness memory reports, warranting further research in this area. In the remaining 
chapters of the thesis, I present experiments conducted to address the overarching aim of the 
thesis: Whether there are cultural differences in the nature and content of eyewitness memory 
reports.  
In Chapter 2, the results of a preliminary experiment where I examined whether 
individuals from different cultural backgrounds would indeed differ in the content of their 
eyewitness memory reports are reported. Using the individualistic-collectivistic cultural 




framework, I compared eyewitness memory reports of individuals socialised in collectivistic 
and individualistic cultures. Specifically, I sought to find out whether individuals differed in 
the reporting of central and contextual details from a crime scene depending on their cultural 
background. I sampled participants from sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana) and Western Europe 
(The Netherlands), representing the collectivistic and individualistic cultures, respectively.    
Chapter 3 builds on Chapter 2 by examining whether living in a new cultural 
environment other than one’s native culture shapes their cultural orientation and eyewitness 
memory reports. I specifically wanted to examine whether the eyewitness memory reports of 
migrants with a collectivistic cultural background now living in individualistic cultures would 
differ from those living in their native culture. I sampled sub-Saharan African migrants living 
in Western Europe and compared them with a control group of sub-Saharan Africans 
currently living in their native culture.  
In Chapter 4, I examined whether individuals from different cultures differ in their 
susceptibility to misleading information about central and contextual details. Mock witnesses 
representing the respective cultures were sampled from Western Europe (United Kingdom) 
and sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana).  
Chapter 5 explores whether cultural differences in relating with authority figures play 
any role in eyewitness memory reports. Based on the power distance cultural dimension, I 
examined whether the memory reports of individuals socialised in high PD cultures are more 
likely to be impeded by the power dynamics in the investigative context, compared to 
individuals socialised in low PD cultures.  
In Chapter 6, I synthesise from the previous chapters and discuss what has been 
learned so far from the current experiments with respect to cross-cultural differences in 




eyewitness memory reports. I also discuss theoretical considerations, methodological 
limiations and future directions. The implications of the findings, as well as challenges in 
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Increasingly, investigators conduct interviews with eyewitnesses from different cultures. The 
culture in which people have been socialised can impact the way they encode, remember, and 
report information about their experiences. We examined whether eyewitness memory reports 
of mock witnesses from collectivistic (Sub-Saharan Africa) and individualistic (Northern Europe) 
cultures differed regarding quantity and quality of central and background details reported. Mock 
witnesses (total N = 200) from rural Ghana, urban Ghana, and The Netherlands were shown 
stimuli scenes of crimes in Dutch and Ghanaian settings and provided free and cued recalls.  
Individualistic culture mock witnesses reported the most details, irrespective of detail type. For 
each cultural group, mock witnesses reported more correct central details when crime was 
witnessed in their own-native setting than a non-native setting, though for different recall 
domains. The findings provide insight for legal and investigative professionals as well as 
immigration officials eliciting memory reports in cross-cultural contexts. 
 













An international criminal tribunal, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, put Charles Taylor, a 
former president of the West African state of Liberia, on trial in The Hague. Taylor was 
accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of international human rights 
law during the civil war in Sierra Leone. He was alleged to have supplied arms to rebel 
groups in Sierra Leone in exchange for diamonds and also to have been involved in the 
massacre of many innocent people. In the legal proceedings that ensued in his trial, 
eyewitness evidence from sub-Saharan African witnesses was instrumental (Keith, 2012). As 
in the trial of Taylor, eyewitness memory reports in international criminal settings are crucial 
in prosecuting alleged atrocities. However, due to the cross-cultural context of international 
criminal settings, investigators who interview witnesses in such settings may find it 
challenging, particularly if insight into culturally determined reporting norms of the witnesses 
is limited. 
Aside from international criminal settings, the increase in international migration has 
made it more likely that legal and investigative professionals in different countries will need 
to obtain eyewitness memory reports in cross-cultural contexts. For instance, police 
detectives are increasingly likely to interview eyewitnesses from cultural backgrounds 
different to their own. In other contexts, immigration officials typically interview asylum 
seekers from different cultures about their recollections of events and locations in order to 
verify their claims (van Veldhuizen et al., 2018). Irrespective of the case type, such 
interviewees will have been socialised into their respective cultures, and embedded in these 
cultures are norms (Hofstede, 2001). Various cultural norms may have implications for how 
people view, remember, and report about their experiences, and how they behave in the 
course of cross-cultural interactions (Kastanakis & Voyer, 2014; Wang, Song, & Kim Koh, 




2017). Hence, it is entirely possible that witnesses, victims, and other interviewees reflect 
culturally determined reporting norms when being questioned in legal and forensic contexts. 
Therefore, an increased understanding of the impact of cross-cultural differences on 
interviews in forensic settings is vital (see Hope & Gabbert, 2019).  
The culture in which people have been socialised has been shown to impact both 
behaviour and psychological processes (Schwartz, Boduroglu, & Gutchess, 2014; Wang, 
2004). The individualism-collectivism cultural dimension has been particularly influential in 
research exploring cross-cultural differences across various social phenomena (Triandis, 
2001; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). Individualism refers to a cultural 
orientation where the ties between individuals in a society are relatively loose, whereas 
collectivism refers to a cultural orientation where a person is embedded in a complex web of 
social relationships (Hofstede, 1983). The individualism-collectivism cultural dimension may 
lead to biases in what is considered worthy and informative to report when people from these 
cultures are exposed to similar scenes (Boduroglu et al., 2009). For example, drawing on the 
individualism-collectivism dimension, Markus and Kitayama (1991, 2003) proposed 
independent-interdependent cognitive styles. According to Markus and Kitayama (1991, 
2003), an independent construal of the self is characteristic of individualistic societies, and 
features the self as having significant dispositional attributes, and as being more autonomous 
and independent. For that reason, individuals with an independent self-construal become 
more perceptually oriented towards the properties of an object than the context (analytic 
perception). Accordingly, they become more prone to attend to the properties and 
characteristics of an object and as a result, narrow their attentional resources to focal objects 
at a visual field (Boduroglu et al., 2009). In contrast, an interdependent construal of the self 
whereby individuals view the self as integrated with (i.e. not separate from) the social 




context, is proposed as a characteristic of collectivistic cultures. Markus and Kitayama (1991) 
argued that due to the interdependent self-construal, people from collectivistic cultures 
become more perceptually oriented towards a broader visual field (holistic perception) and, 
as a result, are more likely to allocate their attentional resources broadly. Applying Markus 
and Kitayama's (1991) framework, it might be predicted that reports about events by people 
from individualistic and collectivistic cultures may differ as their cultural background biases 
them to be either analytically or holistically oriented.  
Aside from an individual’s cultural background, it has also been suggested that the 
characteristics of a cultural setting could direct attention (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Miyamoto 
et al., 2006). Proponents of that perspective have argued that irrespective of their cultural 
background, individuals are likely to detect changes to focal objects of scenes from 
individualistic cultures than scenes from collectivistic cultures. Conversely, they argue that 
individuals, regardless of their cultural background, are more likely to detect changes to 
contextual objects for scenes from collectivistic cultures than scenes from individualistic 
cultures (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). According to that perspective, objects in a collectivistic 
cultural scene tend to be more complex and ambiguous than objects in an individualistic 
cultural scene. As a result, individuals may attend to contextual details of a collectivistic 
cultural scene than an individualistic cultural scene. On the other hand, it is argued 
individuals may attend more to focal objects in an individualistic cultural scene than a 
collectivistic cultural scene (Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006). Other researchers have 
observed a tendency for familiar environments to modulate the processing of visual stimuli 
(Epstein, Higgins, Jablonski, & Feiler, 2007). According to Epstein et al. (2007), people 
activate long-term representations of spatial structures of familiar environments to aid recall. 
Therefore, it is plausible that eyewitnesses are likely to have superior performance when 




attending to scenes in their native cultural environment (own-cultural-setting effect) than 
scenes located in a different cultural environment.  
Consistent with these perspectives, research suggests that individuals’ cultural 
orientation can bias their perceptual processing and content of their reports (Boduroglu et al., 
2009; Istomin et al., 2014; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). For example, in a study comparing 
children from three Siberian cultures, Istomin et al. (2014) found children from the two 
cultures with holistic perception included more contextual information in their drawings than 
those from the culture with analytic perception. They also found that children from a 
collectivistic cultural orientation tend to draw background objects before drawing focal 
objects, while the reverse was true for those from individualistic cultural orientation. Istomin 
et al. (2014) attributed these findings to differences in attention that the different cultures 
accord to contextual information.  
However, other results have been inconclusive with respect to cultural differences in 
memory reporting. For example, Wong et al. (2017) compared Canadian and Chinese 
participants with respect to memory for individual and background objects of picture scenes. 
Participants were exposed to picture drawings containing focal and background scenes and 
later reported whether they attended to the focal or background scene. Irrespective of 
participants’ cultural background, participants reported attending more to focal details than 
background details, with a large effect size. It was also found that there was no difference in 
memory for focal objects between cultures. However, Canadian participants reported 
attending more to background scenes than Chinese participants did. Thus, there seem to be 
mixed findings on research on the influence of culture on memory.  
The current research 




Increasingly, investigators interview witnesses from diverse cultural backgrounds, and 
given that cultural norms may influence the nature or content of the information reported in 
such interviews, this may have implications for the criminal justice system. Criminal justice 
professionals can be confronted with challenges when they lack the relevant awareness, 
knowledge, and training about cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports. To date, 
research in this area has largely been conducted using WEIRD (Western, Educated, 
Industrialised, Rich and Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) samples, with 
little consideration of cross-cultural factors or comparisons. There have been calls for cross-
cultural research to go beyond Western borders to enhance our understanding of cultural 
variations in behaviour (Brady et al., 2018; Gelfand et al., 2017) and, more specifically, to 
appreciate cultural differences relevant for the field of investigative interviewing (Hope & 
Gabbert, 2019).  
Consequently, efforts are being made in psychological science to explore other non-
WEIRD samples. However, a recent meta-analytic review revealed that, even for the small 
proportion of non-WEIRD populations studied in cross-cultural research, the majority of 
these non-WEIRD populations were from East Asia (collectivistic culture), with only 0.63% 
of the non-WEIRD sample populations from Africa (Veillard, 2017). Hence, in the current 
study, we sampled participants from sub-Saharan Africa (typifying collectivistic culture) and 
Western Europe (typifying individualistic culture). Within the collectivistic culture, we were 
also interested in comparing rural and urban cultures, as the latter tends to be less 
collectivistic than the former (Rooks, Klyver, & Sserwanga, 2016). This difference is likely 
due to the fact that urban centres are prone to cultural infiltration and there is greater 
exposure to western cultural values in urban areas than rural areas (Ma, Pei, Jin, & De Wit, 
2015). To date, the literature on cross-cultural cognition has rarely made that distinction 




between rural and urban dwellers in collectivistic societies. To address this issue in the 
current research, we compared eyewitnesses from Western European culture with 
eyewitnesses from urban and rural sub-Saharan African cultures. 
Mock-witnesses from sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe viewed stimuli scenes 
presenting African and European settings and reported what they saw in a free recall test. 
Afterwards, they were asked cued recall questions that focused on both central and 
background details of the scenes. Drawing on theory and previous findings, we predicted 
cultural differences in the types of details reported by the cultural groups. Specifically, we 
expected Western European mock witnesses to report more focal details about the crime 
scene than sub-Saharan African mock witnesses. Conversely, we expected sub-Saharan 
African mock witnesses to report more contextual details than Western European mock 
witnesses. Among sub-Saharan African mock witnesses, we expected differences between 
mock witnesses from rural and urban areas in the type of details reported. Specifically, we 
predicted that those from rural sub-Saharan Africa would report more contextual details than 
those from urban sub-Saharan Africa. Mock witnesses from urban sub-Saharan Africa were 
expected to report more focal details than those from rural sub-Saharan Africa. We also 
expected that cultural setting would play a role in the memory reports of mock witnesses of 
all cultural groups. Specifically, we predicted that mock witnesses across cultures would 
report more central details about Western European cultural settings than sub-Saharan 
African cultural settings. Mock witnesses across cultures were also predicted to report more 
background details for sub-Saharan African settings than Western European settings. Finally, 
we expected mock witnesses from sub-Saharan Africa to report more central and background 
details about sub-Saharan African settings than Western European settings, while we 
expected the reverse for mock witnesses from Western Europe.  





Participants and Design 
A total of 207 participants were sampled from Ghana (nrural Ghana = 78; nurban Ghana =73) 
and The Netherlands (n = 56). The selection of countries for inclusion is consistent with 
previous research (Hofstede, 1983, 2001).2 Out of the 207 participants recruited, 7 were 
excluded. These participants were excluded because they did not follow instructions (n = 2), 
viewed only three out of the four scenes (n = 4), and had East Asian parents although born in 
The Netherlands (n = 1). Our final sample comprised 200 participants (103 males, 97 females, 
Mage = 28.44, SD = 12.43). The urban sample (n = 70; Mage = 26.39, SD = 10.79) in Ghana 
were recruited in the capital city, Accra, while the rural sample (n = 75; Mage = 31.61, SD = 
14.29) were recruited in Akim Aduasa, a farming community in the Eastern Region of Ghana. 
Participants from The Netherlands (n = 55, Mage = 26.78, SD = 10.96) were recruited in 
Maastricht, a provincial capital in the south of the country. Student participants in The 
Netherlands were awarded course credits whereas non-student participants received a €5 
shopping voucher. Student and non-student participants from Ghana received a GH₵5 
voucher for phone credit.  
The design for the study was a 3 (Cultural Group: Rural Ghana, Urban Ghana, The 
Netherlands) X 2 (Crime Setting: Ghanaian setting, Dutch setting) mixed factorial design. The 
between-group variable was cultural group and the within-group variable was crime setting. 
The dependent variables were correct, incorrect, and withheld (Don’t know) details, for both 
central and background information. 
                                                          
2 Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism index indicates the extent to which countries are individualistic and 
collectivistic. On Hofstede’s index (ranging from 0 - 100), The Netherlands is associated with an individualism 
index of 80 while Ghana is associated with an index of 14, where a higher score reflects greater individualism.  





Stimuli. The stimuli used were eight photographs rich in central and background 
details. The photographs depicted four crime scenarios (theft, assault, accident, and robbery; 
See Table 1 for stimuli description). Each of these crime scenarios was photographed in a 
Ghanaian setting as well as a Dutch setting. For example, for a crime depicting a theft in a 
Ghanaian setting, the same crime was depicted in a Dutch setting. Each participant viewed 
four of these stimuli (Two stimuli each for Dutch and Ghanaian settings). The stimuli were 
prepared in The Netherlands and Ghana. Scenarios were prepared with a very clear central 
event that was distinct from the background.  
Two of the stimuli (1 Ghanaian setting and 1 Dutch setting) were piloted in the 
respective countries. A total of 14 participants (9 males, 5 females, M = 24.07, SD = 3.20) 
from Ghana and 15 participants (4 males, 11 females, M = 30.40, SD = 13.12) from The 
Netherlands provided ratings, using a five-point Likert scale. They rated the extent the 
stimulus (i) represented their native setting and (ii) represented a crime scene. Consistent with 
Paz-Alonso, Goodman, and Ibabe's (2013), the mid-rating score was used in deciding whether 
a stimulus received sufficient rating. The stimuli settings were rated by participants to 
adequately represent settings in their respective countries (Ghanaian stimuli – M = 3.79, SD = 
.97; Dutch stimuli – M = 3.33, SD = .62) and reflect plausible crime scenes (Ghanaian stimuli 
– M = 3.43, SD = 1.28; Dutch stimuli – M = 3.47, SD = .83). The pilot study also determined 
which details participants regarded as central and background details in each scene. To 
establish stimulus centrality, the participants were asked two open-ended questions: ‘What do 
you regard as the central event in the picture?’ and ‘What do you regard as background 
event(s) in the picture?’. All participants identified the central and contextual events in a 
manner consistent with our intended central and contextual elements when constructing the 




stimuli (with the exception of one participant who did not identify central event for the 
Ghanaian stimuli as such). Results from this pilot informed the development of the remaining 
stimuli with Ghanaian and Dutch settings, which were developed to have a clear central event 
distinct from the background. The stimuli are available on Open Science Framework at  
https://osf.io/t89hu/?view_only=59e038117b2d4d5588e00c804de3539a  
Table 1: Description of stimulus used in experiment 
Stimuli Type of 
incident 
Description 
A Robbery This is a Dutch scene where a man appears to be snatching a 
backpack from a woman. The incident occurs inside a 
building with shops. In the background of the scene, people 
are walking and some are standing beside a shop. 
B Theft This is a Ghanaian scene where a man is seen standing 
beside a car in a car pack, attempting to break in. Other cars 
are parked in the background. Also present in the 
background are trees, parked cars, people standing, and 
buildings.  
C Accident A Dutch scene where a woman is lying on the street beside 
a car. In the background are buildings and individuals 
walking and cycling.  
D Assault This is a Ghanaian scene where a man is attempting to hit a 
woman with his fist. The woman is sitting while the man is 
standing. The setting is a pub and there is a counter, chair, 
and drinks in the background.  
E Theft A Dutch scene where a man is seen standing beside a car in 
a car park, attempting to break in. In the background of the 
scene are other parked cars, buildings, bicycle sheds, and 
trees. 
F Robbery This is a Ghanaian scene where a man is seen attempting to 
snatch a bag from a woman. This is in a building with shops 




where other people are seen walking in the background 
whiles others are standing in front of one of the shops. 
G Assault A Dutch scene where a man is seen attempting to hit a 
woman with his fist. The woman is sitting while the man is 
standing. The setting is a pub and in the background is the 
counter, tables, chairs, etc. 
H Accident A Ghanaian scene where a woman appears to be lying on 
the street behind a black car. In the background of the scene 
are a building and trees. 
 
 Cultural Orientation Scale. We used the cultural orientation scale (Triandis & 
Gelfand, 1998) to measure self-reported individualism and collectivism of participants. That 
scale has 16-items with a nine-point Likert scale ( 1 =  never or definitely no and 9 = 
always or definitely yes). It has four subscales: vertical individualism (VI), horizontal 
individualism (HI), vertical collectivism (VC) and horizontal collectivism (HC).3 Sample 
items on the scale include: VI – “winning is everything”; HI – “I often do my own thing”; VC 
– “Parents and children must stay together as much as possible”; and HC – “If a co-worker 
gets a prize, I would feel proud”. The coefficient alphas of the sub-scales range from .62 to 
.75 (Soh & Leong, 2002).  
Procedure 
All participants in the study were tested individually. After consenting to participate, 
participants completed the cultural orientation scale and a short demographic questionnaire. 
                                                          
3 Vertical individualism refers to individualistic cultures where hierarchy is emphasised in social relationships; 
horizontal individualism refers to individualistic cultures where equality is emphasised in social relationships; 
vertical collectivism refers to collectivistic cultures where hierarchy is emphasized in social relationship; and 
horizontal collectivism refers to collectivistic cultures where equality is emphasize in social relationships 
(Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). 
.  




Participants then viewed the stimulus scenes, one at a time. Consistent with previous research 
(e.g. Wang & Pomplun, 2012), participants viewed each scene for 5 seconds. After viewing a 
scene, participants worked on a distractor task (mathematical problems) for five minutes. 
Participants were then instructed to provide a verbal free recall describing what they could 
remember about the scene they viewed. Participants were asked to be as detailed and accurate 
as possible in their reports about the scene. Participants had up to six minutes to provide that 
account.  
After the free recall task, participants answered 20 cued recall questions about central 
and background events or items in the stimulus (e.g., ‘How was the attacker dressed’ and 
‘Can you describe the colour of the building?’). The order of questions alternated between 
questions on central and background details. The instructions and questions for some 
participants in rural Ghana were given in the local language (Twi) as these participants had a 
low level of English comprehension.4  
After completing both recall tasks, participants saw the next scene and the procedure 
was repeated until they had viewed all four scenes. The presentation of the scenes was 
counterbalanced. Participants received the same instructions for all tasks. Participants’ 
responses were audio recorded. After completing the procedures, they were thanked and 
debriefed. The test session took approximately 60 minutes per participant. The study received 
ethical approval from the Ethics Review Committee Inner City faculties, Maastricht 
University, and the Ethics Committee for the Humanities, University of Ghana.  
Coding 
                                                          
4 A PhD student in Linguistics with expertise in the Ghanaian language translated the protocol. The interviewer 
who also had a good command of the local language explained the study instructions to these participants 
thoroughly, and also read the questions out to such participants in the Twi language.  




Verbal responses were transcribed. The interviews conducted in Twi in rural Ghana 
were translated into English during the transcription by one of the research assistants 
indigenous to the region. A detailed coding template for each of the stimulus scenes was 
developed by the first author and was adapted from previous research (Gabbert, Hope, & 
Fisher, 2009; Wright & Holliday, 2007). For the purposes of our study, details provided by 
participants were classified as either a background detail or central detail, in both free and 
cued recall, adhering a coding manual prepared in advance.5 An item was coded as correct if 
it was present in the stimuli scene and given a correct description. Incorrect items were also 
coded and scored accordingly. Vague responses (e.g., It was a red or green bag) or subjective 
inferences (e.g., the car belonged to the woman lying on the floor) were not coded. ‘Don’t 
know’ responses were coded as withheld details. A second coder coded 20% of the 
transcripts which were randomly selected to check for coding consistency. We found high 
inter-coder reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient) for free recall with regard to correct 
central details (r = .97) and correct background details (r = .95). The details provided by 
participants were collated across all stimuli and analysis was based on data for all scenes.  
Results 
Analyses were conducted using a mixed factorial ANOVA, except analysis on type of 
detail that dominated in the memory reports of the cultural groups, where repeated-measures 
ANOVA was used. Where significant difference existed, we used Games-Howell multiple 
comparisons test as this post-hoc test is suitable for comparison groups of unequal size (S. 
Lee & Lee, 2018). We applied a Bonferronni correction (.017) to control for increased 
familywise error rates arising from multiple tests.  
                                                          
5 Classification of central and background details in this coding manual was based on stimulus centrality 
established in the pilot study earlier reported. 





Central Details. Cultural group had a significant main effect on the number of correct 
central details reported, F(2, 197) = 43.02, p < .001, ηp
2 = .30. Participants from The 
Netherlands reported significantly more correct central details than participants from urban 
Ghana (p = .003), who also reported significantly more correct central details than 
participants from rural Ghana (p < .001; see Table 2.1). We also found a significant main 
effect for crime setting on correct central details, F(1, 197) = 8.78, p = .003, ηp
2 = .04. 
Participants reported more correct central details when the crime scene was a Ghanaian 
setting (M = 15.91, SD = 7.50) than when it was a Dutch setting (M = 14.54, SD = 7.35). 
There was no significant interaction effect between cultural group and crime setting, F(2, 
197) = 3.28, p = .04, η²p = .03. In order to test evidence in favour of the null, we proceeded 
with a Bayesian ANOVA analysis using JASP  (Wagenmakers, 2007). The analysis yielded a 
Bayes Factor of BF10 =  2.35 x 10
14. According to Raftery (1995) Bayes factor of 150 and 
above is indicative of very strong evidence in favour of the alternate hypothesis. A planned 
comparison revealed both participants from rural Ghana (p = .019) and urban Ghana (p = 
.001) significantly reported more correct central details for Ghanaian crime settings than 
Dutch crime settings. Participants from the Netherlands, however, did not significantly differ 
in correct central details reported for Ghanaian and Dutch crime settings (p = .770). Results 
are shown in Figure 2.1. 
There was a significant main effect of cultural group on the number of incorrect 
central details reported, F(2, 197) = 9.27. p < .001, ηp
2 = .09. Participants from rural Ghana 
reported significantly fewer incorrect central details than participants from The Netherlands 
(p = .001). Participants from urban Ghana and The Netherlands did not significantly differ in 
incorrect central details reported (p = .055). Participants from rural Ghana and urban Ghana 




also did not significantly differ in incorrect central details reported (p = .146; see Table 2.1). 
Crime setting did not have a significant effect on incorrect central details F(1, 197) = 3.80, p 
= .05 ηp
2 = .02. The interaction effect for cultural group and crime setting for incorrect central 
details was not significant, F(2, 197) = 2.05, p = .13, ηp
2= .02.  
 
 
Figure 2. 1. Mean correct central details for different crime settings reported across cultural 
groups under free recall.  
 
Background Details. There was a significant main effect of cultural group on the 
reporting of correct background details F(2, 197) = 45.35, p < .001, ηp
2 = .32. Participants 
from The Netherlands reported more correct background details than participants from urban 
Ghana (p = .002). Participants from urban Ghana also reported more correct background 
details than participants from rural Ghana (p < .001; see Table 2.1). There was also a 
significant main effect for crime setting, F(1, 197) = 38.03, p < .001, ηp
2 = .16. Participants 
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= 5.94) than Ghanaian settings (M = 6.93, SD = 4.81). However, the interaction between 
cultural group and crime setting was not significant, F(2, 197) = .94, p = .39, ηp
2  = .01.  
Cultural group had no significant main effect on incorrect background details 
reported, F(2, 197) = .47, p = .62, ηp
2 = .01. Crime setting also had no significant main effect 
on incorrect background details reported, F(1, 197) = .33, p = .57 ηp
2 = .002. The interaction 
between cultural group and crime setting on incorrect background details was also not 
significant F(2, 197) = 1.13, p = .33  ηp
2 = .01. 
 
Table 2. 1  
Mean (Standard Deviation) correct, incorrect, and withheld central and background details 
reported in free and cued recall by cultural groups  
   Rural Ghana Urban Ghana The Netherlands 
Free Recall Correct Central 9.71 (6.58) 15.57 (6.53) 20.39 (5.78) 
  Background 3.99 (4.76) 8.36 (4.69) 11.87 (4.75) 
 Incorrect  Central 1.13 (1.39) 1.51 (1.34) 2.17 (1.33) 
  Background .78 (1.13) .91 (1.09) .96 (1.11) 
Cued Recall Correct Central 13. 47 (5.72) 18.06 (5.69) 22.77 (5.71) 
  Background 4.59 (3.38) 6.26 (3.35) 10.73 (3.34) 
 Incorrect Central 5.59 (2.25) 5.15 (2.26) 6.10 (2.30) 
  Background 4.27 (2.51) 4.27 (2.51) 5.73 (2.52) 
 Withheld Central 6.25 (4.16) 5.54 (4.18) 3.75 (4.15) 
  Background 10.54 (3.64) 10.13 (3.68) 7.18 (3.63) 
 




Type of Detail Reported. We examined the total (correct and incorrect) amount of 
central and background details reported by each group. Participants from The Netherlands 
reported more central details than background details, F(1, 54) = 93.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = .63. A 
similar pattern was found for participants from urban Ghana who also reported more central 
details than background details, F (1, 69) = 100.85, p < .001, ηp
2 = .59. Participants from rural 
Ghana also reported more central details than background details, F(1, 74) = 156.35, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .68. See Table 2.3. Although central details dominated in the memory reports of 
all cultural groups, there was a significant difference in the total amount of central details 
reported across cultural groups, F(2, 197) = 43.09, p < .001, ηp² = .30. Participants from The 
Netherlands significantly reported more central details than participants from urban Ghana (p 
= .002), who also reported more central details than participants from rural Ghana (p < .001; 








Table 2. 2  
Mean (Standard Deviation) correct and incorrect details reported in free and cued recall for cultural groups by crime setting  
   Rural Ghana Urban Ghana The Netherlands 
   Ghanaian setting Dutch setting Ghanaian setting Dutch setting Ghanaian setting Dutch setting 
Free Recall Correct Central 10.56 (5.45) 8.87 (5.02) 16.93 (7.80) 14.21 (7.38) 20.25 (9.08) 20.53 (9.29) 
  Background 3.20 (2.68) 4.79 (4.52) 7.06 (4.86) 9.66 (6.76) 10.55 (6.63) 13.20 (6.40) 
 Incorrect Central 1.29 (1.55) .97 (1.00) 1.46 (1.73) 1.56 (1.97) 2.53 (2.40) 1.82 (1.86) 
  Background .63 (1.17) .93 (1.26) .97 (2.02) .86 (1.12) .95 (1.15) .96 (1.41) 
Cued Recall Correct Central 13.51 (5.70) 13.44 (6.70) 17.69 (6.30) 18.44 (7.72) 21.45 (5.85) 24.09 (6.70) 
  Background 3.72 (3.10) 5.45 (3.86) 4.81 (3.17) 7.71 (4.06) 7.78 (4.54) 13.67 (5.17) 
 Incorrect Central 5.85 (3.28) 5.33 (2.96) 5.61 (2.47) 4.69 (2.61) 6.60 (3.20) 5.60 (2.86) 
  Background 3.59 (2.60) 4.96 (3.02) 4.06 (2.76) 4.49 (3.15) 5.25 (3.06) 6.20 (3.37) 
 Withheld Central 6.45 (11.26) 6.05 (3.05) 4.81 (2.52) 6.27 (2.47) 3.56 (2.49) 3.93 (2.36) 
  Background 11.96 (4.64) 9.39 (4.16) 10.74 (4.17) 9.51 (3.69) 8.55 (4.61) 5.81 (3.53) 





Central Details. There was a significant main effect of cultural group on correct 
central details reported in response to cued recall questions focused on central details, F(2, 
197) = 42.66, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .30. Participants from The Netherlands reported more correct 
central details than participants from urban Ghana (p < .001), who also reported more correct 
central details than participants from rural Ghana (p < .001). See Table 2.1. There was also a 
significant main effect of crime setting on correct central details reported, F(1, 197) = 5.82, p 
= .017,  ηp
2 = .03. Participants reported more correct central details when the crime scene was 
a Dutch setting (M = 18.66, SD = 7.21) than when it was a Ghanaian setting (M = 17.55, SD 
= 6.08). The interaction between cultural group and crime setting was not significant, F(2, 
197) = 2.85, p = .06, ηp
2 = .02. We proceeded with a Bayesian ANOVA to test for evidence 
for the null. We found the Bayes Factor to be BF10 = 7.964 X 10
12, indicative of very strong 
evidence (Raftery, 1995) in favour of the alternate hypothesis. A planned comparison 
revealed participants from rural Ghana did not differ on correct central details reported for 
Ghanaian and Dutch crime settings (p = .91). Participants from urban Ghana also did not 
significantly differ on correct central details reported for the two cultural settings (p = .36). 
However, participants from the Netherlands reported more correct central details for Dutch 
crime settings than they did for Ghanaian crime settings  (p = .01). See Figure 2.2. 
The main effect of cultural group on incorrect central details reported, in response to 
questions focused on central details was not significant, F(2, 197) = 2.66, p = .07,  ηp
2 = .02. 
There was, however, a significant main effect of crime setting on incorrect central details 
reported, F(1, 197) = 10.16, p = .002, ηp
2 = .05. Participants reported more incorrect central 
details when crime setting was a Ghanaian setting (M = 6.02, SD = 2.97) than when it was a 




Dutch setting (M = 5.21, SD = 2.83). The interaction between cultural group and crime 
setting was not significant, F(2, 197) = .36, p = .699, ηp
2 = .004.  
Cultural group had a significant main effect on the central details withheld by 
participants, F(2, 197) = 5.97, p = .003, ηp
2 = .06. Participants from rural Ghana withheld 
more responses for questions about central details than participants from The Netherlands (p 
= .004). Participants from urban Ghana also withheld more central details than participants 
from The Netherlands (p < .00). Participants from rural Ghana and urban Ghana did not 
significantly differ in central details withheld (p = .619; see Table 2.1). Crime setting did not 
have a significant main effect on the central details withheld by participants, F(1, 197) = .90, 
p = .34, ηp
2 = .01. The interaction between cultural group and crime setting on withheld 
central details was also not significant, F(2, 197) = 1.29, p = .28 η²p = .01.  
 
 
Figure 2. 2. Mean correct details for different crime settings reported across cultural groups 
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Background Details. There was a significant main effect of cultural group on correct 
background details reported in response to questions about background details, F(2, 197) = 
55.59, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36. Participants from The Netherlands reported more correct 
background details than participants from urban Ghana (p < .001) and rural Ghana (p < .001). 
Participants from urban Ghana also reported more correct background details than 
participants from rural Ghana (p = .004; see Table 2.1). The main effect of crime setting on 
correct background details reported was significant, F(1, 197) = 130.51, p < .001, ηp
2 = .40. 
Participants reported more correct background details when crime setting was a Dutch setting 
(M = 8.95, SD = 4.38) than when it was a Ghanaian setting (M = 5.44, SD = 3.68). The 
interaction between cultural group and crime setting was also significant, F(2, 197) = 15.23, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .13. A planned comparison revealed participants from rural Ghana reported 
more correct background details for Dutch settings than Ghanaian settings (p < .001). 
Participants from urban Ghana also reported more correct background details when crime 
scene was a Dutch setting than Ghanaian setting (p < .001). We found a similar pattern for 
participants from The Netherlands, who reported more correct background details when 
crime setting was a Dutch setting than when it was a Ghanaian setting (p < .001). The 
interaction effect for correct background details could be accounted for by the magnitude of 
the simple main effect. This is because, for all cultural groups, the slopes of the simple main 
effect of crime setting have the same direction. See Table 2.2 for descriptive statistics on 
interaction between cultural group and crime setting.  
There was also a significant main effect of cultural group on incorrect background 
details, F(2, 197) = 6.81, p = .001, ηp
2 = .07. Participants from urban Ghana reported fewer 
incorrect background details than participants from The Netherlands (p = .009). Participants 
from rural Ghana also reported fewer incorrect background details than participants from The 




Netherlands (p = .005). Participants from urban Ghana and rural Ghana did not differ in 
incorrect background details reported (p = 1.00). See Table 2.1. Setting of crime had a 
significant main effect on incorrect background details reported, F(1, 197) = 15.29, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .07. Participants reported more incorrect background details for Dutch crime settings (M 
= 5.22, SD = 3.25) than Ghanaian crime settings (M = 4.30, SD = 2.83). The interaction effect 
between cultural group and crime setting on incorrect background details reported was not 
significant, F(2, 197) = 1.50, p = .23. ηp
2 = .02.  
The analysis also revealed that the main effect of cultural group on background details 
withheld by participants was significant, F(2, 197) = 15.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = .13. Participants 
from urban Ghana withheld significantly more responses for questions on background details 
than participants from the Netherland (p < .001). We also found a similar pattern for 
participants from rural Ghana, who withheld significantly more responses to questions on 
background details, than participants from The Netherlands (p < .001). No significant 
difference was observed for withheld responses for participants from rural Ghana and urban 
Ghana (p = .781). See Table 2.1. The setting of crime also had a significant main effect on 
background details withheld by participants, F(1, 197) = 54.54, p < .001,  ηp
2 = .22. 
Participants withheld more background details for Ghanaian crime settings (M = 10.33, SD = 
4.53) than Dutch crime settings (M = 8.24, SD = 3.81). The interaction effect between 
cultural group and crime setting for background details withheld by participants was not 
significant, F(2, 197) = 2.47, p = .09,  ηp
2 = .02.  
Type of Detail Reported. The total (correct and incorrect) amount of details reported 
for central and background details for each group was compared to find out the type of detail 
that dominated in their reports. Participants from rural Ghana significantly reported more 
central details than background details, F(1, 74) = 304.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .81. Participants 




from urban Ghana also significantly reported more central details than background details, 
F(1, 69) = 370.02, p < .001, ηp
2 = .84. We found the same pattern for participants from The 
Netherlands who also significantly reported more central details than background details, 
F(1, 54) = 334.83, p < .001, ηp
2 = .86. See Table 2.3. Notwithstanding the observation that in 
all cultural groups central details dominated in the memory reports, the cultural groups 
significantly differed in amount of central details reported, F(2, 197) = 44.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.31. Participants from The Netherlands significantly reported more central details than 
participants from urban Ghana (p < 001), who also reported more central details than 
participants from rural Ghana (p < .001). 
 
Table 2. 3  
Mean (Standard Deviation) of amount of central vs background details for cultural groups 
under free and cued recall 
   The Netherlands Urban Ghana Rural Ghana 
 Central Background Central Background Central Background 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Free Recall 45.13 19.21 25.65 11.70 34.16 14.27 18.54 12.34 21.69 9.41 9.55 6.66 
Cued Recall 57.75 10.97 32.91 9.89 46.43 11.83 20.97 8.02 38.13 12.24 17.64 8.59 
 
Self-Reported Cultural Orientation 
We conducted an exploratory analysis on the self-reported cultural orientation of 
participants from the cultural groups. The analysis revealed that the cultural groups did not 
differ on horizontal collectivism, F(2, 197) = .69, p = .50, ηp
2 = .01, but did differ on vertical 




collectivism, F(2, 197) = 8.30, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08. Participants from rural Ghana (M = 29.72, 
SD = 6.87) significantly scored higher on vertical collectivism than participants from The 
Netherlands (M = 26.20, SD = 4.67) (p = .002). Participants from urban Ghana (M = 30.01, 
SD = 4.99) also scored higher on self-reported vertical collectivism than participants from 
The Netherlands (p < .001). There was no significant difference between participants from 
rural Ghana and urban Ghana on vertical collectivism (p = .95).  
There was also a (marginally) significant difference between the cultural groups on 
horizontal individualism, F(2, 197) = 3.05, p = .05, ηp
2 = .03. Participants from rural Ghana 
(M = 26.83, SD = 6.45) and The Netherlands (M = 25.84, SD = 4.78) did not differ on scores 
on horizontal individualism ( p = .57). There was also no significant difference between 
participants from rural Ghana and urban Ghana (M = 28.29, SD = 5.21) on self-reported 
horizontal individualism (p = .29). However, there was a significant difference in self-
reported horizontal individualism between participants from urban Ghana and The 
Netherlands (p = .02). Participants from urban Ghana gave higher ratings than participants 
from The Netherlands on horizontal individualism. The cultural groups significantly differed 
on self-reported vertical individualism F(2, 197) = 14.86, p < .001, ηp
2 = .13. Participants 
from rural Ghana (M = 24.52, SD = 6.80) reported higher scores on vertical individualism 
than participants from The Netherlands (M = 17.98, SD = 7.26) (p  < .001). Participants from 
urban Ghana (M = 23.04, SD = 6.83) also significantly gave higher ratings on vertical 
individualism than participants from the Netherland (p < .001). There was no significant 
difference between participants from rural Ghana and urban Ghana on self-reported vertical 
individualism (p = .40). 
 
 





We examined eyewitness memory reports of individuals from different cultural 
groups thought to typify individualistic (Western Europe) and collectivistic cultures (sub-
Saharan Africa). The results appear to reveal a tendency toward the under-reporting of details 
by sub-Saharan African mock witnesses. In addition, central details dominated in the 
eyewitness memory reports provided across cultures. The results also showed that in free 
recall, sub-Saharan African mock witnesses reported more correct central details when the 
crime scenario was witnessed in their own-native setting than when it was witnessed in a 
non-native setting. Western European mock witnesses also reported more correct central 
details in cued recall when the crime scenario was witnessed in their own-native setting than 
a non-native setting. Mock witnesses from sub-Saharan Africa reported more background 
details about a non-native setting than they did for their own-native setting under cued recall. 
Crime context did not appear to affect the nature of correct background details that Western 
European mock witnesses reported in free recall. However, they reported more correct 
background details when crime was witnessed in their own-native setting than a non-native 
setting in cued recall.  
It was hypothesised that sub-Saharan African mock witnesses would report more 
contextual details than western European mock witnesses, who were expected to report more 
central details than sub-Saharan African mock witnesses. These hypotheses were not 
confirmed as regardless of detail types, western European mock witnesses reported more 
elaborate details than sub-Saharan African mock witnesses. The differences between cultural 
groups with respect to the amount of reported details is noteworthy. One possible explanation 
for this finding could be elaboration differences due to socialisation affordances (Peterson, 
Sales, Rees, & Fivush, 2007). Such a difference is conspicuous in childrearing practices, 




where it has been observed that parents from individualistic cultures provide much more 
feedback to their children in conversations than those from collectivistic cultures (Wang, 
2004). It may be the case that differences in linguistic elaboration are transmitted to children 
and persist to later adulthood. Consequently, while eyewitnesses from collectivistic cultures 
report details about a crime scene, they may not spontaneously provide a detailed elaboration 
in their memory narratives. This speculation fits with assertions that individuals from 
collectivistic cultures report less specific and more generic details than individuals from 
individualistic cultures (Millar, Serbun, Vadalia, & Gutchess, 2013; Wang & Ross, 2005). 
Similar results have been observed in research on deception detection, showing interviewees 
in individualistic cultures typically report more explicit details than interviewees from 
collectivistic cultures (Leal et al., 2018). Leal et al. (2018) argued that interviewees from 
collectivistic cultures tend to leave many things unsaid, allowing the context to communicate 
what is implied, whereas in individualistic cultures the communication style tends to be more 
explicit. Therefore, during investigative interviews, it may be necessary to prompt and 
encourage eyewitnesses from collectivistic cultures to elaborate further on the initial 
information they provide.  
Apart from the possibility of elaborative differences, it may be the case that 
individuals from collectivistic cultures have a tendency to be more modest or restrained when 
providing their memorial accounts than those from individualistic cultures. Cultural 
differences in self-effacement and self-enhancement have been documented, with self-
effacement attributed to collectivistic cultures and self-enhancement attributed to 
individualistic cultures (Takata, 2003; Yamagishi et al., 2012a). Such differences may reflect 
cultural disparities in the independent-interdependent construal of the self (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Individuals from cultures with independent construal of the self are more 




likely to emphasise the unique attributes of a person. This tendency may be reflected in their 
self-presentation in regard to expressing themselves, as they may be inclined to emphasise 
their positive attributes (self-enhancement; Takata, 2003). In contrast, individuals from 
collectivistic cultures, in comparison to individuals from individualistic cultures, have a 
tendency to be self-critical and modest about emphasising their unique attributes (self-
effacement; Heine, Lehman, & Takata, 2000). Therefore, individuals from collectivistic 
cultures are more likely to be modest in terms of self-presentation and expression (Wise, 
Gong, Safer, & Lee, 2010). These concepts have been identified as powerful determinants of 
behaviour, especially within a social context (Brown & Gallagher, 1992). It is possible for a 
witness from a collectivistic culture to self-efface when being interviewed, by being modest 
in terms of the extent of the personal memory narrative provided (i.e., providing a less 
elaborative or detailed account spontaneously). However, it is worth noting that this tendency 
to self-efface may attenuate when the implications or stakes of self-effacing are high 
(Yamagishi et al., 2012a). Future research should explore whether this tendency is attenuated 
when investigators emphasize the importance of providing details to pursue an investigation.  
In the current study, mock witnesses from the collectivistic cultural groups provided 
more ‘Don’t Know’ responses than those from the individualistic cultural group. Thus, in this 
study at least, participants from collectivistic cultures might have applied a relatively strict 
criterion for reporting, and withheld details they remembered but were not confident about 
(Cai, Brown, Deng, & Oakes, 2007). This pattern aligns well with the self-effacing tendency 
of collectivistic cultures. In a study on self-effacement and self-enhancement among 
Canadians and Japanese participants, Heine et al. (2000) found that while the former were 
confident they performed well on a test, the latter were reluctant to admit that they had 
performed better. It may be that when sub-Saharan mock witnesses were not confident about 




memory for certain details, they simply decided not to report them. Consistent with this 
notion is the observation that participants from Western Europe, who tend to be more 
assertive and expressive than people from collectivistic cultures (Matsumoto et al., 2008), 
provided more inaccurate responses than participants from sub-Saharan Africa which 
suggests Western European mock witnesses had a looser threshold for reporting accurate 
details. Future research should examine the extent to which there are cultural differences in 
the reporting of low-confidence memories. 
The social dynamics during the interview may have also played a role in the amount 
of information mock witnesses reported, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. 
Individuals from sub-Saharan Africa have been shown to be high on the cultural dimension of 
power distance (Hofstede, 1983). Power distance, another dimension in which cultures differ, 
is the extent to which a society endorses hierarchy in social relationships (Oyserman, 2006). 
High power distance (endorsement of hierarchy in social relationships) may inhibit free and 
spontaneous communication when an individual is in a social interaction with an authority 
figure (Ghosh, 2011). Consistent with this speculation, in the present study, sub-Saharan 
African mock witnesses endorsed more hierarchy in social relationships (vertical 
collectivism) than Western European mock witnesses. Therefore, there is the possibility that 
the mere fact of reporting to an authority or expert (i.e. a researcher) may have produced 
cultural differences in the amount of details provided. Future research should explore the 
impact of this dimension further to (i) determine whether in an interview context, the 
presence of an authority figure plays a culture-related role in the amount of information 
reported by witnesses and (ii) explore how such differences might be attenuated. 
None of the cultural groups appear to have processed background information deeply 
(cf. central details; Wong et al., 2017) as, regardless of cultural background, central details 




dominated in the memory reports provided. This finding does not align with previous 
research suggesting collectivistic cultures attend holistically to a visual field (Istomin et al., 
2014). However, it is worth noting that the stimuli used in our study were crime scenes and 
quite different from the stimuli used in previous research. Previous studies used stimuli such 
as pictures from the physical environment and artistic representations (Boduroglu et al., 2009; 
Miyamoto et al., 2006). The focus of attention when a crime occurs is likely not the same as 
any ordinary or neutral everyday scene. For example, in a robbery, the threatening and 
unusual nature of the scene will make it more likely for people at the scene to attend to this 
focal event than other activities that may be going on at the background. Perhaps, this can be 
likened to the phenomenon of weapon focus effect where a witness is inclined to attend to the 
weapon that is being used to attack than other details (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987).  The 
tendency to attend more to noticeable details in a visual field is well documented (Loftus & 
Mackworth, 1978; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006, Experiment 3; Wang & Pomplun, 2012).  
It is also worth noting that past research on culture and visual attention focused 
mostly on comparing East Asian and other Western cultures. Hence, even though African 
cultures are regarded as collectivistic, the findings for East Asian cultures may not be 
generalizable to sub-Saharan Africa. Studies in cross-cultural cognition have largely studied 
East Asian cultures and it may be that the collectivistic self (interdependent self-construal) 
may not be a one-size-fits-all phenomenon for all collectivistic cultures. This conclusion is 
consistent with the notion that collectivism is not a context-free construct (Triandis, 2001). 
As such, the self-construal for collectivistic cultures may be context-specific. For example, it 
has been argued that the interdependent self-construal among Africans does not suggest a 
total loss of the independent self in the collective (Adams & Dzokoto, 2003) and there may 
be different variations of the interdependent self-construal among collectivistic cultures. In 




that vein, the holistic-analytic categorisation of visual attention across cultures may be 
relative. Future research should explore differences between and within different collectivist 
cultures.  
The current results suggest that the cultural setting in which a crime is witnessed may 
also be important when considering eyewitness reports. Mock witnesses reported more 
correct central details for Ghanaian crime settings than for Dutch crime settings for free 
recall. When cued recall questions were asked, mock witnesses reported more correct central 
details for Dutch settings than Ghanaian settings. That finding partially aligns with the results 
of previous research. For example, Masuda and Nisbett (2006) found that both participants 
from individualistic (North America) and collectivistic (Japan) cultural groups detected focal 
changes to North American stimuli scenes quicker than they did for Japanese stimuli scenes. 
In the current research, sub-Saharan African mock witnesses reported more correct central 
details in free recall, when reporting about crime witnessed in their own-native setting than 
when it was witnessed in a non-native setting. This superior performance for crime witnessed 
in a native setting was not observed when cued recall questions were asked. However, 
Western European mock witnesses reported more correct central details when the witnessed 
crime was in their own-native setting than a non-native setting in cued recall, but not for free 
recall. The own-cultural-setting effect for central details observed for the cultural groups is 
consistent with work showing familiar environments have the tendency to modulate the 
processing of visual details (Epstein et al., 2007). However, that explanation does not fit for 
correct background details witnessed by sub-Saharan African mock witnesses when crime 
setting was considered, as sub-Saharan African mock-witnesses reported more contextual 
information about a non-native setting than they did for their own-native setting in cued 
recall. We suspect that because the non-native setting was an unfamiliar setting, participants 




from sub-Saharan Africa may have attended more to contextual information in that setting 
than they did for their own-native setting. Future work should pursue the issue of crime 
context and how this relates to reporting in cross-cultural contexts.  
There are some limitations associated with the current research. The first limitation 
relates to some unavoidable differences in the education levels for one of the cultural group 
samples. While the Dutch and urban Ghanaian samples comprised mainly university-level 
students with a similar age range and were, as such, well matched with respect to education 
level, this was not the case for the rural Ghanaian sample. Participants from rural Ghana had 
a minimal level of education and were relatively older. Both of these factors may have 
affected the performance of this group relative to the other experimental groups – although it 
is also worth noting that it would likely be impossible to recruit university-level educated 
sample in rural Ghana. Similar issues relating to the difficulty of matching samples across 
different cultures is common in the cultural literature (Buil, De Chernatony, & Martínez, 
2012). A second possible methodological concern relates to the test language. As the study 
instructions were translated for participants in rural Ghana who lacked adequate 
comprehension of the English language, we do not rule out the possibility that the translation 
into a different language may have in some way affected the outcomes for the rural sample. 
Finally, we acknowledge that the static nature of the stimuli used limit generalizability to the 
eyewitness context. Typically, crime events involve dynamic movement and action and the 
reporting of such information may also vary culturally. While static images might be a useful 
starting point to examine reporting from memory, future research should adopt the more 
typical mock witness paradigm using recorded or live events. 
Conclusion 




In this research, we sought to take the first steps in addressing an important gap in the 
eyewitness literature. Specifically, drawing on samples from sub-Saharan Africa and Western 
Europe, we examined eyewitness memory reports for differences predicted by theory in the 
cross-cultural literature. Our results show that individuals from individualistic cultures 
provide more details in their account of crime scene information, irrespective of type of 
detail. We also found evidence that regardless of the culture of an eyewitness, central details 
dominated in their report of crime scene information. Finally, we found evidence that the 
cultural setting in which a crime is witnessed may play a role in eyewitness memory reports. 
These findings not only identify important routes for future research in this area but also 
highlight the importance of considering the cultural background of the witness when eliciting 
memory reports. As such, these findings should be informative for legal and investigative 
professionals working in international criminal justice settings, border and security 
practitioners interviewing in asylum, migration and intelligence-gathering contexts, and law 

























Chapter 3: The acculturation effect and eyewitness 
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When people migrate to new cultures, they adapt to their new culture while at the same time 
retaining the norms of their original culture. The phenomenon whereby migrants adapt to the 
cultural norms of a host culture has been referred to as acculturation. Using a mock witness 
paradigm, we examined the acculturation effect in the eyewitness memory reports of sub-
Saharan African migrants in Western Europe. We sampled sub-Saharan African migrants in 
Western Europe, as well as sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa as a control group (total N 
= 107). The mock witnesses were shown stimuli scenes of crimes in African and Western 
European settings and provided free and cued recall reports about what they had seen. Central 
details were reported more than contextual details by both groups of sub-Saharan Africans. 
Relative to the control group of sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa, sub-Saharan African 
migrants in Western Europe provided more correct central details in free recall. The longer 
migrants had resided in Western Europe, the less collectivistic they become. Migrants also 
provided more elaborate reports the longer their duration of residence in Western Europe. 
The findings of the current research suggest the new cultural environment of migrants 
impacts their cultural norms, which may have implications for their eyewitness memory 
reports.  











There has been an increasing trend in migration globally (United Nations Population 
Division, 2019) which means there is an increasing chance that legal and investigative 
professionals will interview eyewitnesses who are migrants. No matter who the migrant is or 
where they have been born, they would have been socialized into a particular cultural context. 
When individuals migrate to new cultures, they move with the cultural norms and values of 
their native culture (Sam & Berry, 2010). With time, they may adapt to their new cultural 
environment, internalizing some of the norms of the host culture in the process (Arends-Tóth 
& van de Vijver, 2009; Triandis, 2001). The culture in which individuals have been 
socialised can impact the content of their memory reports (Anakwah, Horselenberg, Hope, 
Amankwah-Poku, & van Koppen, 2020; Gutchess & Boduroglu, 2019; Wang, 2009). Given 
that migrants adapt to their new cultural environments, it is necessary to examine whether 
this adaptation process also shapes the content of their eyewitness memory reports. A lack of 
relevant knowledge about how migrants formulate their memory reports as a consequence of 
cultural or acculturation factors may impede efforts at eliciting eyewitness memory reports 
from migrants. In the current research, we examined whether the acculturation of migrants in 
their new cultural environment has any impact on their reports from memory about witnessed 
events.  
Cross-cultural differences: Implications for memory reports 
Cultural orientation is the predisposition for members of a cultural group to think, 
feel, and act in ways consistent with the norms of the cultural group (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Cultural orientation has been argued to be the basis for cross-cultural differences in social 
relationships (Chioneso, 2008; Hofstede, 2011; Lalwani, Shavitt, & Johnson, 2006; Uchendu, 
2007). In his model of national cultures, Hofstede (1983; 2011) proposed six cultural 




orientations (power distance, masculinity-femininity, individualism-collectivism, long-term 
orientation, indulgence-restraint, and uncertainty avoidance), with countries considered low 
or high on each of these dimensions. Among these cultural dimensions, the individualism-
collectivism dimension has been argued as the most influential regarding social phenomena 
(Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Tassell, Flett, & Gavala, 2010; Triandis, 2001). 
Individualism refers to a cultural orientation where the relationships between individuals tend 
to be very loose, whereas in collectivism, the relationships between individuals tend to be 
very tight (Hofstede, 1983). In individualistic cultures, it is proposed that individual goals are 
prioritised above that of the group, whereas in collectivistic cultures the goals of the group 
and collective achievement are prioritised over that of the individual (Sharma et al., 2016). 
Thus, in collectivistic cultures, individuals are thought to be embedded in a strong cohesive 
in-group and are expected to remain committed to the in-group (Hofstede, 2001). Countries 
in Western Europe, North America, and Australia are examples of individualistic cultures 
whereas countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America are examples of 
collectivistic cultures (Gyekye, 2002; Hofstede, 2011; Minkov et al., 2017).  
The prevailing cultural orientation of the society in which an individual is socialized 
can shape the individual’s cultural self-construal and cognition (Chasiotis, Bender, Kiessling, 
& Hofer, 2010; Gutchess & Boduroglu, 2019; Huang & Park, 2013; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991, 2003; Wang, 2001). According to prevalent theories in this domain, individuals 
socialised in collectivistic cultures tend to develop an interdependent self-construal, whereby 
the self is viewed as more integrated with the social context (Gyekye, 2002; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991, 2010). Interdependent self-construal has been argued to lead to more holistic 
perception, making individuals inclined to attend more to context in a visual field 
(Boduroglu, Priti, & Nisbett, 2009; Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006; Nisbett & 
Miyamoto, 2005). On the contrary, individuals socialised in individualistic cultures tend to 




develop an independent self-construal, viewing the self more as containing unique 
dispositions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). Independent self-construal has been argued 
to lead to analytic perception, making people socialised in such cultures more inclined to 
attend to focal details in a visual field (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Gutchess & Indeck, 
2009; Miyamoto et al., 2006; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005). These purported cultural 
differences at the encoding stage have been argued to impact right through to the reporting 
stage (Istomin et al., 2014; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). For example, Istomin et al. (2014) 
argue that cross-cultural difference in holistic-analytic cognition affects reporting norms of 
the respective cultures. Consistent with this perspective, some research suggests that 
individuals socialised in individualistic cultures report more information about focal details, 
whiles those socialized in collectivistic cultures report more information about contextual 
details (Istomin et al., 2014; Masuda, Gonzalez, Kwan, & Nisbett, 2008; Masuda & Nisbett, 
2001).   
Independent-interdependent self-construal has also been argued to lead to cross-
cultural differences in terms of tendency to provide enhanced or elaborate responses (Leal et 
al., 2018; Wang, 2004). For example, it has been suggested that individuals from 
collectivistic cultures acquire a habitual modest response pattern through socialisation 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This pattern has been attributed to the tendency for individuals 
from collectivistic cultures to exercise more self-restraint, a phenomenon known as self-
effacement (Yamagishi et al., 2012b). Conversely, in individualistic cultures where the self is 
viewed as more unique and possessing dispositional attributes to a great extent (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), there is a tendency to show less restraint and be less modest in individual 
responses, a phenomenon referred to as self-enhancement (Yamagishi et al., 2012b). Thus, 
whereas individuals from individualistic cultures tend towards self-expression, those from 
collectivistic cultures are likely to be more self-restrained. These cultural differences in self-




presentation have been argued to reflect in the content of memory reports (Schwarz, 
Oyserman, & Peytcheva, 2010). For example, previous research suggests cultural differences 
in self-presentation shape autobiographical memory reports, with individuals from 
individualistic cultures providing more explicit and detailed autobiographical memory reports 
(Wang, 2004).   
Consistent with research on cultural self-construal and autobiographical memory, 
research has also demonstrated cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports. For 
example in research by Anakwah et al. (2020), participants from a collectivistic culture 
(Ghana) and an individualistic culture (The Netherlands) were shown stimuli scenes of crime 
scenarios in both countries and reported what they saw. Results showed that mock witnesses 
from individualistic cultures provided more detailed memory reports than mock witnesses 
from collectivistic cultures, with a large effect size. Interestingly, irrespective of cultural 
background, mock witnesses reported more central details than background details. The 
authors also found that mock witnesses from both cultural groups reported more details when 
the crime was witnessed in their own-native setting than a non-native setting. These findings 
suggest that a person’s cultural orientation and the cultural setting of the witnessed crime can 
impact the content of their memory reports. If the culture in which individuals are socialised 
shape their memory reports, does the content of such reports change when one migrates to a 
new cultural environment?  
Acculturation: Implications for eyewitness memory reports 
The phenomenon whereby individuals who have been socialised in their native 
culture migrate to a new culture and adapt to the norms of the host culture has been referred 
to as acculturation (Berry, 2003; Birman & Simon, 2013; Chudek, Cheung, & Heine, 2015; 
Kim, 2001). The acculturation process involves both cultural and psychological change 




(Berry, 2003; Bhugra, 2004; Hedden, Ketay, Aron, Markus, & Gabrieli, 2008). For example, 
it has been shown that the traditional family values of immigrants with collectivistic cultural 
orientation living in an individualistic culture decrease with time living in the new cultural 
environment (Rosenthal, Ranieri, & Klimidis, 1996). As cultural orientation systematically 
impacts cognition (Chasiotis et al., 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Park & Huang, 2010), 
the shifting of the traditional cultural values of the immigrants could also systematically 
shape their behavior and cognition. It is possible that when migrants adapt to a new cultural 
environment, the adaptation process systematically shapes their cultural self-construal and 
psychological processes. Consistent with this argument, research by Mesoudi, Magid, and 
Hussain (2016) suggests that migrants from collectivistic cultures now living in 
individualistic cultures do not differ from the indigenes of the host culture in terms of 
holistic-analytic cognition and self-enhancement, the individualistic cultural disposition to be 
self-expressive and less restrained. In this research, participants were groups of migrants with 
collectivistic cultural backgrounds living in the UK and groups of British non-migrants who 
completed measures of cultural orientation and cognitive styles (categorization and drawing 
tasks). The researchers also observed that migrants declined in collectivism the longer they 
lived in the host culture. Although no longitudinal or transitional data were available, such 
similarities are suggestive of an acculturation effect on the migrants’ cultural orientation and 
psychological processes. As such, the content of eyewitness memory reports of migrants 
living in individualistic cultures may share similarities with that of eyewitnesses from the 
host culture.  
Previous work suggests that the content of the autobiographical memory reports of 
migrants may be shaped by acculturation (Kim, 2013; Wang, 2013). For example, in a study 
by Wang (2013), Asian immigrants and Caucasians living in the US received text messages 
three times within a week that asked them to record what was happening 30 minutes before 




they received the text message. At the end of the week, the participants were given surprise 
memory tests about what they had recorded. The Asian migrants and the indigenous 
Caucasians did not differ in their autobiographical memory reports. It was also observed that 
Asian migrants who moved to the USA at an earlier age identified more with American 
culture and provided more elaborate details than those who migrated at an older age. Thus, 
while it is important that forensic interviews consider the cultural background of the 
interviewee, taking cultural background into account when interviewing eyewitnesses who 
are migrants, without an appreciation of whether acculturation factors might influence their 
memory reports, may be counterproductive.  
The Present Study 
Eyewitness evidence is crucial in legal proceedings. Criminal prosecutions, as well as 
legal decision-making, often rely on eyewitness accounts (Albright, 2017; Fisher, 2010; 
Wells et al., 2020). To date, there is no research examining the impact of migrants’ 
acculturation on their eyewitness memory reports. Also, studies on acculturation have usually 
compared migrants with participants from the host culture (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 
2009; Mesoudi, Magid, & Hussain, 2016). While that approach allows comparison of cultural 
values, it does not enable an assessment of potential divergence of cultural orientation within 
the same cultural group when some have migrated but others have not. An appropriate 
comparison group in this regard would be members of the same cultural group currently 
living in the native culture.  
Individualistic cultures are usually the regions of destinations for most migrants, who 
mostly are from countries with collectivistic orientation (Birman & Simon, 2013; United 
Nations Population Division, 2019). In the current study, we compared the eyewitness 
memory reports of migrants with a collectivistic cultural background but living in an 




individualistic culture, with that of those living in their native culture. We recruited sub-
Saharan African migrants living in Western Europe, with sub-Saharan Africans living in 
Africa as a comparison control group. Based on previous findings (Rosenthal et al., 1996), we 
expected that during the years in Western Europe, self-reported collectivism among sub-
Saharan African migrants would decrease. We also expected that the self-reported 
individualism of sub-Saharan African migrants would increase during the years in Western 
Europe. Based on the findings of previous research (Anakwah et al., 2020a), we predicted 
that sub-Saharan Africans living in Western Europe would report more central and 
background details than sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa. Although previous research 
suggests that mock witnesses report more details for their own-native setting than a non-
native setting (Anakwah et al., 2020a), in view of the hypothesized acculturation, we 
expected these migrants to report an equal amount of details for sub-Saharan African crime 
settings and Western European crime settings.  
Methods 
Participants and Design 
A total of 107 participants took part in the current study. Of these, 60 (10 females, 50 
males; Mage = 21.03, SD = 2.58) were sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa and 47 (22 
females, 25 males, Mage = 25.38, SD = 4.96) were sub-Saharan African migrants living in 
Western Europe. Sub-Saharan Africans in Western Europe were from Ghana (n=20), Guineas 
Bissau (n=3), Kenya (n=4), Malawi (n=1), Nigeria (n=11), Tanzania (n=2), Uganda (n=2) 
and Zimbabwe (n=3). One sub-Saharan African migrant did not specify the country of 
origin.6 The migrants were sampled in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. All the 
                                                          
6 This participant was included in analysis as he fell within inclusion criteria specifying sub-Sahara African 
migrants. 




countries migrants originated from are collectivistic in cultural orientation (Hofstede, 1983, 
2011; Minkov et al., 2017). Participants in this sample all had university-level education at 
either bachelors or postgraduate education level (see Supplementary Materials for exploratory 
analyses with respect to education).7 The average duration of residence of the migrants in 
Western Europe was 99.33 months (SD = 101.89; range: 2 – 288 months, equivalence of 0.17 
– 24 years). Sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa were born and raised in Ghana. 
Participants who volunteered for compensation were given a €5 shopping voucher in Western 
Europe, or a GH₵10 credit card voucher in sub-Saharan Africa; some participants opted to 
take part without compensation. The design was a 2 (Group location: Africans living in 
Western Europe, Africans living in Africa) X 2 (Crime setting: European setting, African 
setting) mixed factorial design. The between-group variable was cultural group and the 
within-group variable was crime setting. Dependent variables were correct details, incorrect 
details, and unanswered questions (Don’t know responses)8 for both central and background 
information. 
Materials 
Stimuli. Eight photographs with rich central and background details were used as 
stimuli. These photographs consisted of four different crime scenarios (a theft, assault, 
robbery, and an accident). Each of the depicted crime scenarios had a Ghanaian and a Dutch 
setting. The staged crimes in these settings were by actors from the respective countries. For 
example, actors for scenarios for Ghanaian settings were all from sub-Saharan Africa. 
Similarly, actors for scenarios for Dutch settings were from Western Europe. Also, the actors 
in the respective photos were different for each of the stimuli, for both Dutch and Ghanaian 
                                                          
7 Only one of the sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa had primary education level. Excluding data for this 
participant did not change the pattern of results so it was included in the analysis. 
8 This variable refers to situations where participants responded don’t know or don’t remember. 




settings. This variation was introduced to limit the impact of any stimuli specific effects. The 
stimuli were developed, piloted and used in a previous study (Anakwah et al., 2020a). In that 
study, two of the stimuli were piloted (1 Ghanaian setting and 1 Dutch setting) in Ghana and 
the Netherlands to find out whether participants regard them as representing their respective 
settings, and also a crime setting. A total of 14 participants (9 males, 5 females, M = 24.07, 
SD = 3.20) from Ghana and 15 participants (4 males, 11 females, M = 30.40, SD = 13.12) 
from the Netherlands rated the extent to which the stimuli represented scenes in Western 
Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, using a five-point Likert scale. The mid-rating score was 
used as a criterion in determining whether the stimuli received an adequate rating, consistent 
with previous research (Paz-Alonso et al., 2013). Participants rated the stimuli to adequately 
represent settings in their respective countries (Ghanaian stimuli – M = 3.79, SD = .97; Dutch 
stimuli – M = 3.33, SD = .62) and also reflect plausible crime scenes (Ghanaian stimuli – M = 
3.43, SD = 1.28; Dutch stimuli – M = 3.47, SD = .83). Consistent with previous studies, we 
operationalised centrality both in terms of importance to the plot and visual centrality 
(Boduroglu et al., 2009; Mahé, Corson, Verrier, & Payoux, 2015; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; 
Wong et al., 2017; Wyler & Oswald, 2016). To confirm what constituted central and 
background event(s), participants in the pilot test made centrality judgments. They were 
asked the following questions: (a) “What do you regard as central event”, and (b) “What do 
you regard as background events”. Participants' judgement of central and background events 
was consistent with our operationalisation, in line with previous research (Davidson & 
Vanegas, 2015). The stimuli are available at Open Science Framework via 
https://osf.io/t89hu/?view_only=59e038117b2d4d5588e00c804de3539a . 
Cultural orientation scale. The cultural orientation scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) 
was used to measure the self-reported cultural orientation of participants. The scale measures 
individualism and collectivism across 16 items and uses a nine-point Likert scale ranging 




from 1 (never or definitely no) to 9 (always or definitely yes). Sample items are ‘Family 
members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required’ and ‘My personal 
identity, independent of others, is very important to me’. The cultural orientation scale has a 
reliability of .75 (Gelfand & Realo, 1999).  
Procedures 
After consenting to participation, participants completed the cultural orientation scale 
and provided demographic details (gender, education level, country of origin, and duration of 
residence in host country). They then viewed the first crime scenario for five seconds. This 
exposure duration is consistent with exposure durations used in previous studies using similar 
methodologies (e.g., Levy-Gigi & Vakil, 2014; Prull & Yockelson, 2013; Wang & Pomplun, 
2012). Following this, participants completed a short distraction task (mathematical problem) 
for five minutes. After that, participants provided a free recall account of what they had seen 
in the crime scenario. They were asked to provide as much information as possible in their 
own words and to be as accurate and detailed as possible. Participants had up to six minutes 
to provide this verbal free recall and were informed they still had time to remember and 
report more if they finished their initial account before the six minutes had elapsed. This time 
limit was based on earlier pilot observations and all participants completed their account 
before six minutes had elapsed. Following the free recall task, participants were asked a 
series of cued recall questions about the scenario. The cued recall task consisted of 20 
questions about details of the stimulus event (10 questions each about central and background 
details). Cued recall questions alternated between central and background details. Participants 
then viewed the next crime scenario after which they completed a distraction task. Again, this 
was followed by free and cued recall tasks. The instructions and questions were in English, 




for all participants, who were all proficient in the language.9 The procedure continued, using 
exactly the same instructions for all groups until participants had finished viewing all four of 
the crime scenario stimuli. The presentation of the crime scenario stimuli was 
counterbalanced. The interviews were conducted by the first author and a research assistant, 
who were both trained on the study protocol and used the same script. The study protocol 
received ethical approval from the Ethics Review Committee Inner City faculties, Maastricht 
University, and the Ethics Committee for the Humanities, University of Ghana.  
Coding 
The coding protocol used by Anakwah et al. (2020) was used in coding the transcripts 
for the current experiment. The protocol categorises the crime scenario details into central 
and background information, based on the stimulus centrality established in the pilot study. 
For both the free and cued recall tasks, information that was present in the stimuli and 
accurately described was scored as correct. Information that was present but described 
inaccurately was scored as incorrect. A response was also scored as incorrect if it was a detail 
mentioned by participants that was not actually present in the scene. ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Don’t 
remember’ responses to cued recall questions were coded as unanswered questions. 
Subjective (e.g, The car belonged to the woman lying on the floor) and vague responses (e.g, 
left or right arm) were not coded. Each detail that was scored as correct received 1 point. 
Similarly, each detail scored as incorrect received 1 point. This was same for both free and 
cued recall. Don’t know responses under cued recall also received 1 point each. The scores 
were aggregated for the respective variables. The first author conducted the coding. A second 
coder who was also trained on the coding guide and blind to the hypothesis coded 17% of the 
                                                          
9 All migrant participants and participants in Ghana were proficient in English. The official language and 
medium of instruction in educational institutions, from basic to tertiary level in Ghana is English. 




transcripts for inter-coder reliability. There was high inter-rater reliability. Intra-class 
correlation coefficients ranged from .72 to .99 (see Supplementary Materials).  
 
Results 
The analysis was conducted using mixed ANOVA with group location as the 
between-subjects factor and crime setting as the within-subject factor. Pearson’s r was used 
for analysis on the relationship between migrants’ duration of residence and internalised 
cultural norms, as well as analysis on the relationship between migrants’ duration of 
residence and reported details. 
Free recall  
Central Details. There was a significant main effect of group location on the number 
of correct central details reported, F(1, 105) = 5.32, p = .02, ηp
2 = .05. Sub-Saharan African 
migrant mock witnesses (M = 12.81, SD = 6.31) reported more correct central details than 
sub-Saharan African mock witnesses living in Africa (M = 9.98, SD = 6.27). See Table 3.1 
for descriptive statistics. Crime setting did not have a significant main effect on the number 
of correct central details reported, F(1, 105) = .48, p =.49, ηp
2 = .01. The interaction between 
location and crime setting for the number of correct central details reported was also not 
significant, F(1, 105) = .61, p = .44, ηp
2 = .01.  
Group location did not have a significant main effect on the number of incorrect 
central details reported, F(1,105) = 3.74, p = .06, ηp
2 =.03. We proceeded with a Bayes 
analysis and found a Bayes Factor of BF01 = 1.09, showing a weak evidence in favour of the 
null hypothesis (Raftery, 1995). Sub-Saharan African migrants in Western Europe (M = .88, 
SD = .89) reported more incorrect central details than sub-Saharan Africans located in Africa 




(M = .55, SD = .85). The setting of crime also did not have a significant main effect on the 
number of incorrect central details reported, F(1, 105) = .00, p = .98, ηp
2 = .000. The 
interaction between group location and crime setting was also not significant F(1, 105) = 
1.90, p =.17, ηp
2 = .02.  
Background Details. Location of group did not have a significant main effect on the 
number of correct background details reported, F(1, 105) = .96, p =.33, ηp
2 = .01. Crime 
setting, however,  had a significant main effect on the number of correct background details 
reported, F(1, 105) = 4.19, p = .04, ηp
2 = .04. Mock witnesses reported more correct 
background details for Western European crime settings (M = 8.59, SD =  .47) than they did 
for sub-Saharan African crime settings (M = 7.38, SD = .59). There was no interaction effect 
between crime setting and location of group on correct background details F(1 ,105) = .87, p 
= .35, ηp
2 = .01.  
There was a significant main effect of group location on the number of incorrect 
background details F(1, 105) = 6.24, p = .01, ηp
2 = .06. Sub-Saharan African migrant mock 
witnesses (M = .77, SD = .82) reported more incorrect background details than sub-Saharan 
Africans living in Africa (M =.38, SD = .77). See Table 3.1 for descriptive statistics. The 
setting of crime also had a significant main effect on the number of incorrect background 
details F(1, 105) = 11.61, p =.001, ηp
2 = .10. Mock witnesses reported more incorrect 
background details for Western European crime settings (M = .72, SD = 1.10) than they did 
for sub-Saharan African crime settings (M = .37, SD = .81). However, there was no 
interaction effect between group and crime setting on incorrect background details F(1, 105) 
= 1.49, p = .23, ηp
2 = .01.  
 




Table 3. 1 
Mean (standard deviation) of correct details, incorrect details, and unanswered questions by 
groups 
   Sub-Saharan African 
migrants 
Sub-Saharan 
Africans in Africa 
   M (SD) (M (SD) 
Free Recall Correct Central 12.81 (6.31) 9.98 (6.27) 
  Background 8.42 (4.52) 7.55 (4.57) 
 Incorrect  Central .88 (.89) .55 (.85) 
  Background .77 (.82) .38 (.77) 
Cued Recall Correct Central 17.75 (4.80) 16.83 (4.80) 
  Background 8.89 (4.18) 7.79 (4.18) 
 Incorrect Central 5.53 (2.19) 4.29 (2.25) 
  Background 4.87 (2.54) 4.23 (2.56) 
 Unanswered Questions Central 5.00 (2.61) 5.23 (2.63) 
  Background 8.65 (3.63) 9.23 (3.64) 
 
Cued Recall 
Central Details. Location had no significant main effect on correct central details 
reported under the cued recall task, F(1, 105) = .97, p = .33, ηp
2 = .01. Neither the main effect 
of crime, F(1, 105) = .61, p = .44, ηp
2 = .01,  nor the interaction, F(1, 105) = 2.70, p = .104, 
ηp
2 = .03, was significant for the number of correct central details reported in response to 
cued recall questions. 
There was a significant effect of group on incorrect central details reported in 
response to cued recall questions, F(1, 105) = 8.29, p =.01, ηp
2 = .07. Sub-Saharan African 




migrants (M = 5.53, SD = 2.19) provided more incorrect central details than sub-Saharan 
Africans living in Africa did (M = 4.29 , SD = 2.24). Setting of crime did not have a 
significant main effect on incorrect central details reported, F(1, 105) = .39, p = .54, ηp
2 = 
.004. There was also no interaction effect between group and crime setting on incorrect 
central details reported, F(1, 105) = 1.30, p = .26, ηp
2 = .01.  
The setting of crime had a significant effect on unanswered questions for central 
details, F(1, 105) = 19.30, p < .001, ηp
2 = .16. There were more unanswered questions about 
central details for Western European crime settings (M = 5.66, SD = 2.90) than there was for 
sub-Saharan African crime settings (M = 4.58, SD = 2.90). Neither the main effect of 
location, F(1, 105) = .21, p = .65, ηp
2 = .002, nor the interaction between location and crime 
setting, F(1, 105) = 1.65, p = .20, ηp
2 = .02 for unanswered questions about central details 
was significant. 





Table 3. 2 
Mean (standard deviation) of correct details, incorrect details, and unanswered questions for crime setting by groups 
   Sub-Saharan African Migrants Sub-Saharan Africans in Africa 
   Ghanaian setting Dutch setting Ghanaian setting Dutch setting 
   M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Free Recall Correct Central 12.79 (7.58) 12.83 (8.85) 10.35 (5.44) 9.62 (5.35) 
  Background 8.09 (7.11) 8.74 (4.78) 6.67 (5.11) 8.43 (4.77) 
 Incorrect Central .79 (1.06) .98 (1.38) .65 (1.33) .45 (.75) 
  Background .66 (1.05) .87 (1.19) .15 (.44) .60 (1.01) 
Cued Recall Correct Central 17.51 (6.01) 17.98 (6.72) 17.48 (4.70) 16.17 (4.91) 
  Background 7.15 (5.81) 10.64 (5.92) 6.25 (3.44) 9.33 (4.54) 
 Incorrect Central 5.79 (3.49) 5.28 (2.56) 4.22 (2.31) 4.37 (2.31) 
  Background 4.04 (3.58) 5.70 (3.44) 4.03 (2.30) 4.42 (2.47) 
 Unanswered Questions Central 4.62 (3.09) 5.38 (3.03) 4.53 (2.70) 5.38 (.3.03) 
  Background 9.43 (5.10) 7.87 (4.31) 9.82 (3.75) 8.63 (3.90) 




Background Details. The setting in which the crime was witnessed had a significant 
main effect on correct background details reported by mock witnesses in response to cued 
recall questions, F(1, 105) = 44.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = .30. Mock witnesses reported more correct 
background details if the crime was witnessed in a Dutch setting (M = 9.91, SD = 5.20) than 
if it was witnessed in a Ghanaian setting (M = 6.64. SD = 4.63). Neither the main effect of 
location, F(1, 105) = 1.8, p = .18, ηp
2 = .02, nor the interaction effect between location and 
setting of crime, F(1, 105) = .17, p = .68, ηp
2 = .002, on correct background details reported 
was significant.  
Location had no significant main effect on incorrect background details reported, F(1, 
105) = 1.72, p = .19, ηp
2 = .02. The setting of the crime, however, had a significant main 
effect on incorrect background details reported by the groups, F(1, 105) = 12.71, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .11. Mock witnesses reported more incorrect background details for Western European 
crime settings (M = 5.06, SD = 2.30) than they did for sub-Saharan African crime settings (M 
= 4.04, SD = 2.30). Group location and crime setting had a significant interaction effect on 
incorrect background details reported, F(1, 105) = 4.96, p = .03, ηp
2 = .05. Sub-Saharan 
African migrant mock witnesses significantly reported more incorrect background details for 
Western European crime settings than they did for sub-Saharan African crime settings (p = 
.001). Sub-Saharan Africans located in Africa, however, did not differ in incorrect 
background details reported for both crime settings (p = .30). See Table 3.2 for descriptive 
statistics.  
There was no significant main effect of group on unanswered questions about 
background details F(1, 105) = .65, p = .42, ηp
2 = .01. Setting of crime had a significant main 
effect on unanswered questions about background details F(1, 105) = 10.75, p = .001, ηp
2 = 
.09. There were more unanswered questions about background details for sub-Saharan 




African crime settings (M = 9.62, SD = 4.45) than Western European crime settings (M = 
8.25, SD = 4.14). However, there was no interaction effect between group and crime setting 
on unanswered questions about background details F(1, 105) = .20, p = .66, ηp
2 = .002. 
Prioritised Details 
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to determine the type of detail that was 
mostly reported in the eyewitness memory reports of migrants. Sub-Saharan African migrants 
in Western Europe provided significantly more central details than background details in both 
free recall F(1, 46) = 23.79, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34, and cued recall tasks F(1, 46) = 119.92, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .72. Similarly, sub-Saharan Africans in Africa also significantly reported more 
central details than they did for background details, also for both free recall F(1, 59) = 17.05, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .22, and cued recall F(1, 59) = 232.68, p < .001, ηp
2 =.80. See Table 3.3 for 
descriptive statistics on prioritised details. 
Table 3. 3 
Mean (Standard Deviation) of amount of central vs background details for groups under free 
and cued recall 
 Sub-Saharan African migrants Sub-Saharan Africans in Africa 
 Central Background Central Background 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Free Recall 27.38 (16.41) 18.36 (11.22) 21.07 (10.80) 15.85 (8.48) 
Cued Recall 46.55 (14.23) 27.53 (14.40) 42.23 (9.24) 24.03 (8.07) 
 
 




Duration of residence and memory reports 
There was a small but significant relationship between the number of correct central 
details reported and duration of residence in Western Europe, for both free recall (r (47) = 
.29, p = .048) and cued recall (r (47) = .30, p = .041). There was, however, no significant 
relationship between migrants’ duration of residence in individualistic culture and the number 
of correct background details reported for free recall (r (47) = .12, p = .442) and cued recall (r 
(47) = .07, p = .624).  
Migrants and self-reported individualism/collectivism 
There was a significant difference in self-reported individualism for the two groups, t 
(105) = 2.43, p = .02, d = .47. Sub-saharan Africans in Africa (M = 51.35, SD = 9.55) gave 
higher ratings on individualism than sub-Saharan Africans in Western Europe (M = 46.96, SD 
= 8.91). Self-reported collectivism between migrants in Western Europe and Africans located 
in Africa did not significantly differ, t (105 ) = .77, p = .45, d = .15. However, we found a 
significant negative correlation between sub-Saharan African migrants’ duration of residence 
in Western Europe and their self-reported collectivism, r(47) = -.56, p < .001. Duration of 
residence in Western Europe was not related with self-reported individualism r(47) = .01, p = 
.97. 
Discussion 
In this study, we compared eyewitness memory reports provided by sub-Saharan 
African migrants with reports provided by sub-Saharan Africans located in Africa. We found 
that mock witnesses across groups reported central details more than they did for background 
details. We also found that sub-Saharan African migrants in Western Europe provided more 
correct central details in their free recall accounts than did sub-Saharan Africans in Africa. 




An exploratory correlation analysis suggested that the sub-Saharan African migrants reported 
more details the longer they lived in Western Europe.  
We hypothesized that sub-Saharan African migrants in Western Europe would report 
more central and background details than sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa. This 
hypothesis was partly confirmed as sub-Saharan African migrants reported more correct 
central details in their free recall than did sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa. This more 
elaborative reporting by sub-Saharan African migrant mock witnesses could be due to 
reporting norms in Western cultures that emphasize explicitness (Holtgraves, 1997). Previous 
research has reported a similar pattern of findings, with Western Europeans providing more 
detailed responses in their memory reports than sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa 
(Anakwah et al., 2020a). Through childhood socialization, people from individualistic 
cultures tend to become more elaborate in communication than people from collectivistic 
cultures (Jobson, 2009). Wang and colleagues (Wang & Ross, 2005; Wang, Song, & Kim 
Koh, 2017) argued that such cultural differences in memory reports occur because each 
culture creates a model of what life narratives or personal storytelling should look like, 
resulting in response bias in memory narratives. The model for reporting life narratives in 
individualistic cultures tends to emphasise specificity and explicitness whereas in 
collectivistic cultures, reporting models tend to be more general and less explicit (Jobson, 
2009; Wang, 2001). Hence, it is possible that through socialization in the new culture, the 
migrants become adapted to the reporting models of the individualistic culture overtime. That 
speculation is consistent with the finding that migrants reported more elaborate details the 
longer they have lived in their new culture. Living in the new cultural environment could 
facilitate cultural learning and socialization into the host cultural norms. Thus, socialization 
might occur not only when one migrates as a child or adolescent, but is also the case for adult 
migrants. That is because, although cultural norms have been suggested to be formalised in 




childhood and adolescence (Chua et al., 2005; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003), cultural learning 
facilitates the adaptation of adult migrants to the new cultural environment (Hsu, 2010; 
Mesoudi, 2018). This adaptation, however, may be more rapid for those who migrated at a 
younger age (before age 15; Cheung et al., 2011; Tsai, Ying, & Lee, 2000). Notwithstanding, 
research also shows sub-Saharan migrants who migrated as adults seem to adapt more 
quickly to the host culture overtime (Chudek et al., 2015). Future research should explore 
differences in memory reports between those who migrated as children and those who 
migrated as adults.   
 It is possible that as migrants adapt to their new cultural environment, they also 
become predisposed to self-enhance, a cultural disposition identified among individualistic 
cultures (Takata, 2003; Yamagishi et al., 2012b). Research has shown cultural differences in 
self-expression, with self-enhancement identified as a characteristic of individualistic cultures 
whereas self-effacement is identified as a feature of collectivistic cultures (Suzuki et al., 
2008). Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that the modest self-presentation among 
collectivistic cultures could lead to giving modest responses and providing descriptions that 
are abstract and lack informativeness. That tendency for cultures to differ at the level of 
description might be illustrated by contrasting American and Japanese proverbs, two cultures 
that reflect the individualistic and collectivistic dimensions, respectively. Markus and 
Kitayama (1991) note the difference between the American proverb ‘the squeaky wheel gets 
the grease’ and the Japanese proverb ‘the nail that sticks out gets pounded’ (p. 224). These 
proverbs in the respective cultures illustrate cultural differences in self-presentation. When 
migrants from a collectivistic culture move to an individualistic culture, it is likely that the 
demands of the new culture require migrants from collectivistic cultures to assert their 
uniqueness. It is possible that, in terms of self-presentation, they become less modest and 
instead, assert their unique traits and attributes as a way of adapting to the host culture. For 




example, Hsu (2010) argues that the communication traits of migrants become more similar 
to those of the host culture in an effort to meet the new cultural demands. The shift in self-
presentation is consistent with studies that have found migrants from collectivistic cultures do 
not differ from the non-migrant individualistic cultural group in self-enhancement (Mesoudi 
et al., 2016). It may be helpful to assess the cultural adaptation of the migrant witness (e.g., 
using a cultural adaptation inventory) to determine migrants’ level of acculturation and tailor 
interviewing techniques accordingly. Thus, we recommend future research to examine this 
issue further in field settings. 
 Consistent with the acculturation effect, we found sub-Saharan African migrants’ self-
reported collectivism decreased with time living in Western Europe. This finding is 
consistent with studies showing that when people migrate to a different cultural environment, 
their cultural orientation is impacted as they adapt to the host culture (Bhugra, 2004; 
Rosenthal et al., 1996). Research suggests such migrants can be primed to respond in a 
manner consistent with either the norms of the host culture or that of their home culture 
(Adair & Xiong, 2018; Mok & Morris, 2009; Peng & Knowles, 2003; Wang, 2008; Wang & 
Ross, 2005). Thus, it is possible the migrants adjust their cognitive style depending on the 
cultural context. In forensic and asylum seeker settings, priming migrants' self-construal 
might be beneficial for information elicitation. Research on cultural priming has 
demonstrated the content of memory reports reflects aspects of the self-construal that is 
primed (Wang & Ross, 2005). Techniques employed in previous research to prime the 
independent self-construal included asking participants to describe themselves as unique 
individuals or listing personal attributes and beliefs about themselves, prior to recall (Wang & 
Ross, 2005). Such priming techniques have been shown to yield results consistent with the 
aspect of the self that is primed. Future research should examine whether cultural priming 
would facilitate memory reports consistent with the reporting norms of the primed culture.  




 There were similar amounts of unanswered questions by Sub-Saharan African migrant 
mock witnesses and sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa. In a previous study, more 
questions were left unanswered by mock witnesses from collectivistic cultures than mock 
witnesses from individualistic cultures (Anakwah et al., 2020a). The authors argued that 
mock witnesses from collectivistic cultural background used strict criterion for reporting, 
which resulted in leaving questions they were not certain or confident about the answer 
unanswered (Anakwah et al., 2020a). The findings of the current study suggest that when 
people from collectivistic cultures migrate to individualistic cultures, that tendency might 
persist in their memory reports. Thus, even though migrants adapt to their new cultural 
environment, this does not affect confidence in their memory reports. Hence, during 
investigative interviews with eyewitnesses who are migrants from collectivistic cultures, it 
may be appropriate to emphasize that they should report any detail they remember no matter 
how insignificant it might be. Future research should examine accuracy-confidence trade-offs 
in memory reports across different cultural groups, including migrants. 
Both sub-Saharan African migrants and sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa 
reported central details more than background details. That finding is not consistent with 
research on self-construal and cognition suggesting individuals with collectivistic cultural 
orientation report more contextual than focal details (Istomin et al., 2014; Masuda, Gonzalez, 
et al., 2008). That could be attributed to the fact that previous research on self-construal and 
cognition used neutral and ordinary scenes as the to-be-remembered stimuli. The stimuli used 
in the current study, however, depicted crime scenarios. The threatening nature of a crime 
may draw more attention to the focal details and featured prominently in memory reports than 
other contextual details (Yegiyan & Lang, 2010). The current finding is consistent with 
previous research in which mock witnesses reported more central details (cf. background 




details) about a crime scenario, regardless of their cultural background (Anakwah et al., 
2020a).  
There are some limitations associated with the present research. The varied 
experiences when people migrate may limit the generalizability of the study findings. People 
migrate for different reasons, including to pursue education, to continue relationships, to 
benefit economically and to seek asylum. Depending on their reasons for migration, migrants 
are likely to have quite different experiences and exposure to the host culture (Orton, 2012). 
For example, people who migrated for education or economic reasons are more likely to 
come into contact with other members of the host culture. As most participants in our study 
had migrated for education and economic reasons they are likely to have other members of 
the host culture within their social network, facilitating exposure to the host cultural norms. 
Conversely, some migrants may have minimal social contact with other members of the host 
culture. Research has shown minimal change in cultural norms among migrants whose social 
network is limited to migrant members of their home culture (Chioneso, 2008). Future 
research should examine the extent to which acculturation affects the eyewitness memory 
report among such migrants. A related limitation is that motivation to embrace the host 
culture among migrants may vary. For example, migrants who have migrated to Europe for 
the long-term might have a strong motivation to embrace and adapt to the host culture than 
migrants who are in Europe for a short period. Thus, it is likely that the effects of 
acculturation might differ depending on the motivation of migrants to engage with the host 
culture. Future research should examine whether motivation to engage with the host culture 
plays any role in the acculturation effect. It is also possible that people who choose to 
migrate, share some idiosyncratic features that could be a confound in the current study. In 
other words, it may be the case that migrants are already different in some way from the 
population who stay in their native country. A longitudinal design tracking the nature of 




memory reports of migrants over time, from the period of arrival in the host country, may 
contribute to a fuller understanding of the extent of acculturation in the memory reports. That 
said, the comparison group of sub-Saharan Africans located in Africa was a first step in 
determining how the reporting norms of African migrants change as they adapt to their new 
culture. This approach is consistent with previous acculturation research where group 
differences and duration of residence in the host culture were used as a proxy for 
acculturation (e.g., Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Cheung et al., 2011; Chudek et al., 
2015; Wang, 2013; Wang & Ross, 2005).  
We also acknowledge the possibility of cross-cultural factors to have accounted for 
the ratings on the Cultural Orientation Scale. For example, sub-Saharan Africans in Africa 
self-reported high individualism ratings, inconsistent with the individualism-collectivism 
model of national cultures. In our previous study comparing Africans with Western 
Europeans, we found a similar pattern (Anakwah et al., 2020a). Specifically, in that study, 
sub-Saharan Africans living in Africa self-reported higher individualism scores than Western 
Europeans. Also, sub-Saharan Africans in Africa in that study did not differ from Western 
Europeans on self-reported collectivism. Such unexpected responding has been shown to be 
attributable to a response process that is culturally grounded (Harzing, 2006) and concerns 
over such unexpected differences have been expressed in the cross-cultural research literature 
(Bou Malham & Saucier, 2016; Lalwani et al., 2006). Previous research in cross-cultural 
psychology has shown that social desirability/ acquiescence response patterns are stronger 
among collectivistic cultural samples (de Bruïne, Vredeveldt, & van Koppen, 2018; He & 
Van de Vijver, 2016; Kim & Kim, 2016), and this issue has been highlighted as a major 
challenge in conducting cross-cultural surveys (Kemmelmeier, 2016). In view of such 
response bias in previous cross-cultural surveys, some have argued response bias in cross-




cultural studies should be considered a cultural behaviour in themselves (Bou Malham & 
Saucier, 2016; Kemmelmeier, 2016). 
Finally, we acknowledge the possibility of the instruction for participants to recall the 
event in six minutes to have created time pressure that may have impaired reporting. It is 
noteworthy, however, that previous verbal free recall task with this kind of stimuli and 
piloting suggested this was an adequate amount of time to make available (Anakwah et al., 
2020a). Indeed throughout the testing, none of the participants in any of the groups exhausted 
the six minutes in the free recall report tasks.  
 Conclusion 
The main aim of the current research was to examine whether the eyewitness memory 
reports of migrants are impacted by their new cultural environment. We sampled mock 
witnesses who are sub-Saharan African migrants in Western Europe and sub-Saharan 
Africans living in Africa as a control group. Our results suggest that migrants originally from 
a collectivistic culture but now living in individualistic cultures provide more elaborate 
memory reports in free recall than individuals still located in their native culture. This 
acculturation effect in eyewitness memory report is consistent with our finding that the self-
reported collectivism of sub-Saharan African migrants attenuates with time living in Western 
Europe. Our findings provide some preliminary insights for investigative professionals with 
respect to how the eyewitness memory reports of migrants may be impacted as they adapt in 
















Chapter 4: The misinformation effect and 















The culture in which individuals are socialised can play a role in shaping their eyewitness 
memory reports. Based on cultural self-construal theory, we examined cultural differences in 
the misinformation effect for central and contextual details. In a mock witness paradigm, 
participants sampled from collectivistic (Ghana; n = 65) and individualistic (UK; n = 62) 
cultures were exposed to misleading post-event information. Participants provided a free 
recall account and then completed a recognition task that included misinformation items. 
Across cultural groups, misleading post-event information impaired memory for original 
details to the same extent, for both central and contextual details. This effect was, however, 
larger for contextual details than it was for central details, for both cultural groups. Mock 
witnesses from the collectivistic cultural group endorsed misleading items more, in the 
recognition task than those from the individualistic cultural group. This cultural difference in 
misinformation endorsement was not observed in the free recall task. These findings provide 
preliminary insight into the role of cultural self-construal in susceptibility to misleading post-
event information across cultures and highlight the need for investigative interviewers in 
cross-cultural contexts to avoid leading or suggestive questions.  
Keywords: eyewitness memory reports, cultural orientation, misinformation effect, 
investigative interview, self-construal 
  





Eyewitness evidence is crucial in legal proceedings. Criminal prosecutions, as well as 
investigative decision-making, often rely on eyewitness accounts (Albright, 2017; Fisher, 
2010; Wells et al., 2020). Errors in eyewitness accounts can, therefore, have grave 
implications for the criminal justice system. One of the common sources of such errors is 
misleading post-event information (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Cheung, & Maybery, 2015; 
LaPaglia & Chan, 2019; Loftus, 2005). Exposure to misleading post-event information (PEI) 
can compromise eyewitness evidence, impairing its legal usefulness (Luna & Migueles, 
2009). Consequently, investigators have to be aware of the potential impact of 
misinformation, whatever the source, when conducting investigative interviews (Oeberst & 
Blank, 2012).  
Recent trends in migration (United Nations Population Division, 2019; van 
Veldhuizen et al., 2018) have made it more likely that investigators will interview 
eyewitnesses from different cultures. Psychological processes across cultures may differ and 
the eyewitness memory reports may be shaped by cultural factors (Anakwah et al., 2020a). 
Given that early work suggests that cultural factors may affect reporting (Jobson, 2009; 
Wang, 2001;  2011), then the reporting of misleading PEI may also vary across cultures. 
The misinformation effect 
The change in memory about a witnessed event as a result of exposure to erroneous 
information about the event has been referred to as the misinformation effect (Frenda, 
Nichols, & Loftus, 2011; Loftus, 2005). Research has demonstrated how an eyewitness’ 
memory for a witnessed event can be altered after exposure to misleading information about 
that event (Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Stark, Okado, & Loftus, 2010; Weingardt, Loftus, & 




Lindsay, 1995; Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2007). It has been argued that the 
misinformation effect is a result of an impairment in memory that could result when 
misleading information alters the original memory trace (Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 
1994; Loftus, 1979, 2005). Proponents of this alteration hypothesis suggest that there is a 
permanent loss of the original information after an eyewitness accepts misleading 
information. Thus, according to that perspective, the encoding of a misinformation item leads 
to memory impairment by altering the memory traces of the original item. Other perspectives 
have argued that the misinformation effect is not a result of impairment of the original 
memory trace but that the original information was not encoded in the first place or not 
remembered, making individuals likely to accept a later introduced misleading information 
(McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). These perspectives provide insights into various ways 
misinformation can impact the accuracy of eyewitness accounts. In sum, the misinformation 
effect may be due to the fading of the original memory, failure to properly encode the 
original memory, and weakening of the original memory trace by misleading PEI (Loftus, 
2019; Zaragoza et al., 2007).  
The way in which attentional resources are allocated has been argued to have 
implications for the extent of the misinformation effect (Ayers & Reder, 1998; Loftus, 2005). 
For example, misleading information is more likely to impair memory for an original event 
when attentional resources at the time of encoding were weak (Frenda et al., 2011; Loftus, 
2005; Wright & Loftus, 1998). However, during encoding individuals attend to central details 
more than peripheral details (Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1991; 
Yegiyan & Lang, 2010). As a result, it is likely that individuals have stronger memories for 
central details than background details (Ibabe & Sporer, 2004). Hence, susceptibility to 
misleading information may be stronger for the latter than the former (Candel, Merckelbach, 




Jelicic, Limpens, & Widdershoven, 2004; Paz-Alonso et al., 2013; Roebers & McConkey, 
2003). What individuals attend to in visual scenes, however, has been shown to vary across 
cultures (Gutchess & Indeck, 2009; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). 
Culture and cognition 
Behaviour and psychological processes are situated within a cultural context. The 
individualism-collectivism cultural dimension has been argued to play an important role in 
shaping cognition (Gutchess & Boduroglu, 2019; Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Masuda, 
Gonzalez, Kwan, & Nisbett, 2008). Individualism has been described as a cultural orientation 
where the individual is viewed as separated from the social context (Ghosh, 2011; Hofstede, 
2001). Collectivism, on the other hand, has been described as a cultural orientation where 
members from such cultures are not separate from the social context but integrated into a 
cohesive social relationship (Hofstede, 1983, 2001). Collectivistic cultures include cultures in 
East Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, while individualistic cultures include 
cultures in North America, Australia, and Northern Europe (Hofstede et al., 2010; Minkov et 
al., 2017).  
Previous research suggests that while individuals socialised in individualistic cultures 
attend more to central (focal) details, those socialised in collectivistic cultures attend more to 
background (contextual) details (Ji & Yap, 2016; Kastanakis & Voyer, 2014b; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). In their self-construal theory, Markus and 
Kitayama (1991; 2010) argue that individuals socialised in individualistic cultures develop 
independent self-construal, whereas those socialised in collectivistic cultures develop 
interdependent self-construal. According to this account, individuals with an independent 
construal of the self view the self as containing more unique dispositions and attributes and, 
consequently, become more oriented to the properties of an object, developing an analytic 




perception, and attending more to focal events. Individuals having an interdependent 
construal of the self, however, consider the self to be intricately connected to other members 
of the society, and value communal living. Markus and Kitayama (1991) argue that due to the 
interdependent view of the self, individuals socialised in collectivistic cultures tend to 
become perceptually oriented to their surroundings (holistic perception), attending more to 
the context. Consistent with this perspective, previous research has demonstrated differences 
in attentional allocation across cultures (Boduroglu et al., 2009; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; 
Miyamoto et al., 2006). For example, in one such study using a visual change detection 
paradigm, East Asians were shown to allocate attention broadly at a visual scene, compared 
to Americans, who attended more to focal details (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006).  
 
The misinformation effect and culture 
Given the cross-cultural differences in attentional allocation, memory impairment for 
central and background details after exposure to misleading post-event information (PEI) 
may vary cross-culturally. Post-event information is information received after an event has 
occurred which may contain erroneous details and may impair the memory for the original 
event (Blank, 1998; Lee & Chen, 2013). In light of previous findings suggesting that people 
from collectivist cultures attend more to background than central details (Huang & Park, 
2013; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006), it is plausible that misleading PEI may impair memory 
performance for central details more than for background details in a collectivist sample. That 
is because when attentional resources are distributed broadly at a visual field, there may be 
fewer cognitive resources allocated to a focal event (Boduroglu et al., 2009). Similarly, if 
individuals from individualistic cultures attend more to focal details than contextual events, 
their available cognitive resources for background details may be limited. Consequently, for 




individuals from individualistic cultures, misleading PEI may impair memory performance 
for background details more than for central details.  
Aside from the possibility of cross-cultural differences in memory impairment 
resulting from misleading PEI, cultures might differ in their tendency to endorse misleading 
PEI. Due to the independent-interdependent construal of the self, it is possible that 
individuals from different cultures may respond to social influences differently (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). For instance, it may be that individuals from collectivistic cultures who 
view the self as integrated with the social context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), may be more 
sensitive to social influences than individuals from individualistic cultures. As such, 
information from other social sources may influence individuals from collectivistic cultures. 
Similarly, if individuals from individualistic cultures view the self as separate from the social 
context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), they may be less likely to incorporate information from 
other social sources in their accounts.  
The Current Study 
Research on the misinformation effect spans over four decades. Conclusions from 
research in this area have largely been based on Western samples and, to date, cross-cultural 
research using the misinformation effect paradigm is limited.  In the present study, we 
examined the misinformation effect across two cultures. Mock witnesses from sub-Saharan 
Africa and Western Europe received misleading PEI about an incident, and later provided 
free recall and completed a recognition test for details of the incident. In line with previous 
research suggesting that individuals from individualistic cultures are less sensitive to 
contextual details (Boduroglu et al., 2009; Huang & Park, 2013; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006), 
we expected misleading PEI to impair memory for original background details, for mock 
witnesses from individualistic cultures more than for mock witnesses from collectivistic 




cultures. Similarly, in line with past research showing individuals from collectivistic cultures 
attend broadly to contextual details but are less sensitive to central details (Boduroglu et al., 
2009), we expected misleading PEI to impair memory for original central details for mock 
witnesses from collectivistic cultures more than for mock witnesses from individualistic 
cultures. We also expected the cultural groups to differ in the extent to which they endorse 
misleading items, consistent with the theory on independent-interdependent self-construal 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). Specifically, we expected mock witnesses from 
collectivistic cultures would accept and report suggested details than mock witnesses from 
individualistic cultures.  
Method 
Design 
A 2 (Cultural Group: Ghana, United Kingdom) x 2 (Misinformation: Control items, 
Experimental items) mixed design was used. The between-subject factor was cultural group 
and the within-subject factor was misinformation. The dependent variables were the number 
of correct details reported about central and background events, the number of incorrect 
details reported about central and background events, and the number of misleading details 
reported about central and background events.  
Participants  
One hundred and twenty-seven undergraduates from Ghana (15 males, 50 females, 
Mage = 19.89, SD = 1.44) and the UK (30 males, 32 females, Mage = 20.53, SD = 2.70) 
participated in the study. These participants were born, raised, and lived in the respective 
countries at the time of testing. The two countries represent the cultural dimension of interest 
in the current study, as The UK is more individualistic, scoring 89 on the Hofstede Index 




while Ghana is more collectivistic, scoring 14 on the same index (Hofstede et al., 2010).10 
Participants in Ghana and the United Kingdom were university students in the respective 
countries. Participants in both countries were proficient in the English language. 11 
Participants in Ghana were recruited through advertisements and announcements at lecture 
halls. Participants in the United Kingdom were recruited through advertisements and 
departmental participant pools. Participants recruited in Ghana received GHȻ 10 voucher for 
phone credits or opted to participate without compensation. Participants in the UK received 
course credits or opted to participate without compensation. 
Materials 
Stimulus event. The stimulus event was a film about a theft in a travel agency. In the 
event, a courier wearing a motorcycle helmet is seen entering the office of a travel agency 
with a parcel. When she enters the office, a receptionist collects the parcel and signs for it. 
While the receptionist goes to another room to fetch a glass of water, the courier quickly 
takes a laptop from the office desk and rushes out of the office. When the receptionist returns, 
she realises the courier is not in the office and also notices the laptop is not on the desk. The 
receptionist rushes out and starts shouting to raise the alarm. She attempts chasing the 
courier, but cannot apprehend her. In the last scene of the event, the courier stops running, 
removes her helmet, throws it into a nearby garden, and then leaves the scene. The event is 
approximately 1 minute 30 seconds in duration. The stimuli event, used with permission, is 
available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D0GwhUEfMgA 
                                                          
10 On Hofstede’s Index, higher score reflects greater individualism. See https://www.hofstede-
insights.com/product/compare-countries/ for comparison of country scores. 
11 The study was conducted in English in both countres. The official language and medium of instruction, from 
basic to tertiary education level in both countries are English.  




Misinformation items. The stimulus event was piloted to identify misinformation 
items. Twelve participants (5 males, 7 females, M = 20.33, SD = 2.39) from Ghana and UK 
watched the event and provided a free recall in writing of what they remembered. Participants 
were also asked to indicate within that written report which details they regard as central and 
background within the event. From the free recall reports of participants, four items with 
medium to high memorability were identified as critical (target) items, in line with previous 
studies (Blank et al., 2013; Van Bergen, Horselenberg, Jelicic, & Beckers, 2010). These four 
critical items were ‘jacket’, ‘desk’, ‘laptop’, and ‘shopping bags’. These selected items were 
regarded as central (jacket, laptop) and background (desk, shopping bags) details by 
participants in the pilot study. The critical items were manipulated to produce contradictory 
misinformation items (Huff & Umanath, 2018; Van Bergen et al., 2010). For example ‘white 
desk’ (correct item) was changed to ‘black desk’ (misleading item) to develop a contradictory 
misinformation item.  
The pilot data were also used to generate four other (additive) misinformation items. 
Participants in the pilot study were presented with a list of 21 events (central and 
background) that were either present or absent in the video event. Participants were asked to 
rate the plausibility of these events to have occurred in the video event, on a scale of 1 (not at 
all plausible) to 8 (extremely plausible), consistent with Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, and 
Relyea (2004). Among events that were not present in the video, four of those events that 
received the highest plausibility rating were selected. The selected events were ‘The office 
employee shook hands with the courier’, ‘The courier pulled out a mobile phone at the 
office’, ‘There were two kids walking at the other side of the street’ and ‘There was a dog on 
the pavement outside the office’. Thus, in total eight (additive and contradictory) critical 
misinformation items, comprising central (4 items) and background (4 items) details were 




selected for the current study. These critical items were used as control and experimental 
items in a within-subject misinformation design (see Blank et al., 2013, for similar within-
subject misinformation manipulation). The misinformation item matrix is presented in Table 
4.1. 
Post-event narrative. In order to enhance the credibility of the post-event narrative, 
we prepared a mock news report that gave an account of the incident of theft at the travel 
agency. The report ended by appealing to the general public to provide information about the 
perpetrator. This mock news report was formatted to resemble a BBC webpage report (for 
similar misinformation format, see Gabbert, Hope, Fisher, & Jamieson, 2012). Two versions 
of the report were prepared, with the control and experimental (misled) items 
counterbalanced across the reports, consistent with previous studies (Blank et al., 2013; 
Garry, French, Kinzett, & Mori, 2008). Thus, although participants read about the same 
event, half of them were misled about four of the critical items (jacket, desk, kids, phone) but 
not the other four critical items (laptop, shopping bag, dog, handshake), and vice versa for the 
other half of the participants. The post-event narratives are available on OSF at 
https://osf.io/jn36k/?view_only=e24b6afd843b46ed9f5f73f15f6ae97a .  
Recognition Test. The recognition test consisted of twelve forced-choice questions; 
eight questions about the critical (target) items and four filler questions. Consistent with Zhu 
et al. (2013), each question offered four possible response options: the original item, 
misinformation item; new foil item and, to minimise guessing (Paz-Alonso et al., 2013), a 
‘don’t know’ response option. A sample question is ‘The courier was wearing a_____’, with 
response options as ‘black jacket’ (original item), ‘brown jacket’ (misinformation item, 
where this erroneous colour detail is provided in the misinformation narrative), ‘blue jacket’ 
(foil item) and ‘don’t know’. The twelve forced-choice questions comprised of six questions 




each about central and background event. The recognition test is available at 
https://osf.io/fwm3n/?view_only=5bc602edf1e94b35a06b2c06a441404d . 
Table 4. 1 
Misinformation item matrix 




PEI Set A The courier looked 
on as the secretary 
signed for the parcel. 
As the secretary 
signed for the parcel, 
the courier pulled 
out her mobile 
phone. 
Central  Additive 
     
 She ran past a 
woman wearing 
black clothes. 
She ran past two 
school children. 
Background  Additive 
     









     
     
PEI Set B The courier and the 
office employee did 
not shake hands 
before delivering the 
parcel. 
The courier shook 
hands with the office 
employee before 
delivering the parcel. 
Central Additive 
     
 Just beside the 
entrance was a 
bicycle  
Just beside the 
entrance was a dog 
Background  Additive 
     
 Grey-coloured 
laptop 
Blue-coloured laptop Central Contradictory 
     
 Yellow shopping 
bags 
Green shopping bags Background Contradictory 
PEI = Post-event information 




Cultural orientation scale. This scale measures self-reported cultural orientation. It is a 16-
item scale that measures individualism and collectivism on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = never 
or definitely no and 9 = always or definitely yes). Sample items on the scale include ‘It is 
important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups’ and   ‘My personal identity, 
independent of others, is very important to me’. The reliability of the scale is .75 (Gelfand & 
Realo, 1999).  
Procedure 
Participants took part in the study individually. After consenting to participate, they 
watched the video event, which was followed by a distraction task (visual illusion task and 
mathematical problems) for 15 minutes. Participants were then asked to read the mock news 
report (post-event narrative) and were told that it was a media report about the incident 
published after it occurred. The presentation of the post-event narratives was counterbalanced 
across participants such that half of the participants received PEI Set A while the other half 
received PEI Set B, whereby each misinformation item was paired with a control item (See 
Blank et al., 2013; Pansky, Tenenboim, & Bar, 2011, for similar within-subjects 
misinformation methodology). After reading the post-event narrative, participants were given 
another distraction task, which lasted 10 minutes (word search and mathematical problems). 
Following this, participants were asked to provide a verbal free recall of the original event 
they had viewed in as much detail as possible. This report was audio recorded. After the free 
recall, participants completed the recognition test. Again, participants were instructed that 
their responses should be based on what they saw in the film event. After the recognition test, 
participants completed their demographic information and the cultural orientation scale. 
Afterward, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation. All instructions and 
questions were in English for participants, who were all proficient in the English language. 




Each test session lasted approximately 45 minutes. The study received ethics approval from 
institutional review boards in the respective countries.  
Coding 
Free recall responses were transcribed and coded. A coding template for central and 
background details based on the pilot data was developed. Using this template, the free recall 
reports were coded for central and background details, with each detail type additionally 
coded as correct, incorrect, or as endorsing misinformation. Items that were in the event and 
rightly described as such were coded as correct (e.g., describing that the courier wore a black 
helmet). Items coded as incorrect were descriptions that were discrepant with the event (e.g., 
describing the colour of the courier’s helmet as red when in fact it was black). Items that were 
suggested in the post-event narrative but which did not occur in the target event were coded 
as misinformation endorsement (e.g., when it was suggested in the narrative that the courier 
shook hands with the receptionist, and participants mention this suggested item in their free 
recall). Vague or ambiguous responses were not coded. Twenty percent (20%) of the 
transcripts were randomly selected and coded by a second coder. There was a high inter-
coder agreement (intra-crass correlation coefficient) for correct central details (.88), and 
correct background details (.77). 
Results 
Free recall 
Analysis of free recall was conducted using an independent t-test, with correct details, 
incorrect details, and misleading details reported, as the dependent variables.  
Correct. There was a significant difference in the number of correct central details 
reported in the free recall task between the cultural groups, t(125) = 3.61, p < .001, d = .64. 




Participants from UK (M = 28.31, SD = 7.79) reported more correct central details than did 
participants from Ghana (M = 23.18, SD = 8.18). There was also a significant difference 
between the cultural groups in the number of correct background details reported in free 
recall, t(125) = 4.51, p < .001, d = .80. Participants from UK (M = 9.40, SD = 3.56) reported 
more correct background details than did participants from Ghana (M = 5.97, SD = 4.89).  
Incorrect. There was a significant difference between the cultural groups in the 
number of incorrect central details reported t(125) = 3.17, p = .002, d = .56. Participants from 
UK (M = 1.11, SD = 1.12) reported more incorrect central details than participants from 
Ghana (M = .58, SD = .73). However, there was no significant difference between the cultural 
groups in the number of incorrect background details reported (Ghana – M = .46, SD = .90; 
UK – M = .53, SD = .72), t(125) = .49, p = .63, d = .09. 
Misinformation. Participants from the UK (M = .16, SD = .41) and Ghana (M = .12, 
SD = .33) did not significantly differ in the number of misinformation details reported in the 
free recall task for central details, t(125) = .58, p = .57 d = .10. Similarly, there was no 
statisfically significant difference between participants from UK (M = .06, SD = .25) and 
Ghana (M = .14, SD = .39) with respect to the number of misinformation details reported for 
background details, t(125) = 1.27, p = .21, d = .23. 
Misinformation effect in recognition task  
Memory for original details. To examine the impact of misinformation on memory 
for original details for the recognition task, we compared the number of correct responses for 
control and experimental (misled) items. A mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted with 
cultural group (Ghana, UK) as between-subject factor and misinformation (control items, 
experimental items) as a within-subject factor. The dependent variables were the total number 




of correct central details (memory for original central details) and the total number of correct 
background details (memory for original background details) selected in the recognition task. 
Memory for original central details after exposure to misinformation was similar across 
cultural groups, as there was no significant difference between participants from Ghana and 
the UK F(1, 125) = 1.02, p = .315, ηp
2 = .01 (See Table 4.3). There was, however, a 
significant main effect of misinformation on the number of correct central details selected, 
F(1, 125) = 51.95, p < 001, ηp
2 = .29. Misleading (experimental) items (M = 1.18, SD = .75) 
impaired participants' memory for original central details more than did control items (M = 
1.72, SD = .49), in the recognition task. The interaction between cultural group and 
misinformation was significant F(1, 125) = 4.75, p = .031, ηp
2 = .04. A planned comparison 
revealed memories for original central details were impaired by misleading items more than 
control (non-misleading) items, for both participants from the UK (p = .001) and Ghana (p < 
.001). The magnitude of the simple main effect could account for this interaction, as the 
slopes of the simple main effect for both cultural groups had the same direction. See Table 
4.2 for means of control and experimental items for the respective groups. 
The cultural groups did not significantly differ in memory for original background 
details after exposure to misinformation, F(1, 125) = 3.04, p = .084. ηp
2 = .02 (See Table 4.3). 
There was, however, a significant main effect of misinformation on the number of correct 
background details selected F(1, 125) = 38.36, p < .001. ηp
2 = .24. Participants memory for 
original background details was impaired more when they were misled (Experimental; M = 
.72, SD = .69) than when they were not misled (Control; M = 1.31, SD = .66). The interaction 
between cultural group and misinformation was significant F(1, 125) = 4.19, p = .043, ηp
2 = 
.023. Both participants from Ghana (p < .001) and the UK (p = .006) reported more correct 
control items than misled items.  




To assess whether the cultural groups’ are more susceptible to misinformation about a 
particular type of detail, we compared correct central and correct background details selected 
on the recognition test by participants from the respective cultural groups. On control items, 
both participants from Ghana [F(1, 64) = 16.39, p < .001, ηp
2 = .20] and UK [F(1, 61) = 
16.66, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21] selected more correct central details than correct background 
details. For experimental items, participants from Ghana selected more correct central details 
than correct background details, F(1, 64) = 19.30, p < .001 = ηp
2 = .23. Participants from the 
UK also selected more correct central details than correct background details for 
experimental items, F(1, 61) = 17.93, p < .001, ηp
2 = .23 (See Table 4.2).  
Misinformation endorsement. Apart from the effect of misinformation on memory 
for original items, we also examined the effect of misinformation on the acceptance of 
misleading items (misinformation endorsement) in the recognition task. To that end, we 
conducted a mixed factorial ANOVA with cultural group (Ghana, UK) as a between-subject 
factor and misinformation condition (control items, misled items) as a within-subject factor. 
The dependent variables were the total number of misleading items selected (endorsed) for 
central details and the total number of misleading items selected for background details. 
There was a significant main effect of cultural group on the endorsement of misleading items 
about central details F(1, 125) = 4.77, p =.031, ηp
2 = .04. Participants from Ghana endorsed 
more misleading items about the central event than did participants from the UK (See Table 
4.3). There was also a significant main effect of misinformation on the endorsement of 
misleading items about central details F(1,25) = 41.87, p < .001, ηp
2 = .25. Participants 
selected experimental (misleading) items (M = .58, SD = .75) more than control (non-
misleading) items (M = .11, SD = .34), for central details. The interaction between cultural 
group and misinformation was not significant, F(1, 125) = 3.24, p = .074, ηp
2 = .03.  




There was a significant difference between the cultural groups in the extent to which 
they endorsed misleading items about background details, F(1, 125) = 5.50, p = .021 ηp
2 = 
.04. Participants from Ghana selected misleading items about background details more than 
did participants from the UK (See Table 4.3). There was also a significant main effect of 
misinformation on the endorsement of misleading items about background details, F(1, 125) 
= 57.78, p < .00, ηp
2 = .32. Participants selected more experimental (misleading) items (M = 
.59, SD = .77) than they did for control items (M = .04, SD = .23), for background details. 
The interaction between cultural group and misinformation on the endorsement of misleading 
items about background details was also significant F(1, 125) = 8.34, p = .005, ηp
2 = .06. A 
planned comparison revealed participants from Ghana selected more misleading items than 
control items for background details (p < .001). Participants from the UK also selected more 
misleading items than control items for background details (p = .001; See Table 4.2). 
Table 4. 2 
Mean (standard deviation) of memory for original details and misinformation endorsement 
for misleading and control items by cultural groups on the recognition task 
  Memory for original details Misinformation endorsement 
  Control  Misleading  Control Misleading 
Central Ghana 1.75(4.34) 1.06(.77) .12(.33) .72(.78) 
 UK 1.68(.54) 1.31(.71) .11(.35) .44(.69) 
      
Background Ghana 1.34(.67) .57(.66) .02(.12) .77(.82) 
 UK 1.27(.66) .89(.68) .06(.31) .40(.66) 
 




Table 4. 3 
Mean (Standard deviation) of memory for original details and misinformation endorsement 
by cultural group on recognition task 
  Memory for original details Misinformation endorsement 
Central Ghana 1.41 (.47) .42 (.40) 
 UK 1.49 (.47) .27 (.40) 
    
Background Ghana .95 (.41) .39 (.38) 
 UK 1.08 (.41) .23 (.38) 
 
Self-reported cultural orientation 
Analysis of self-reported cultural orientation revealed that the cultural groups did not 
significantly differ on horizontal, t(125) = .15, p = .877, d = .08, nor vertical, t(125) = 1.70, p 
= .093, d = .30, dimensions of individualism. However, they differed on both horizontal, 
t(125) = 2.24, p = .027, d = .39, and vertical, t(125) = 2.16, p = .033, d = .38, dimensions of 
collectivism. Specifically, participants from the UK (M = 28.18, SD = 4.26) gave higher 
ratings on horizontal collectivism than participants from Ghana (M = 25.95, SD = 6.73). 
Participants from Ghana (M = 29.37, SD = 7.36), however, gave higher ratings on vertical 
collectivism than participants from the UK (M = 27.03, SD = 4.60).  
Discussion 
We examined the misinformation effect in eyewitness memory reports across two 
cultural groups. We found that misleading post-event information (PEI) impaired memory for 
original details to the same extent across cultural groups. Contrary to our hypotheses, the 




misinformation effect was more pronounced for background details than central details, 
irrespective of the cultural background of mock witnesses. We also found that mock 
witnesses from the collectivistic cultural group endorsed misleading details more than mock 
witnesses from the individualistic cultural group. However, this difference in the 
endorsement of misinformation was absent when free recall questions were asked.  
Across cultural groups, memory for original details was impaired to the same extent 
after exposure to misleading information. Given previous accounts of the misinformation 
effect (e.g., Frenda et al., 2011; Loftus, 2005), it is possible that the misleading PEI interfered 
with the memory for original details, causing a similar degree of impairment in memory 
across cultural groups. This speculation is consistent with retroactive interference, a 
phenomenon where new information interferes with the retrieval of previously learned 
information resulting in decreased memory performance (Sosic-Vasic, Hille, Kröner, Spitzer, 
& Kornmeier, 2018). Thus, it is also possible that during retrieval, there was a competition 
between original and misleading details about a common critical item leading to impaired 
memory performance. This perspective is consistent with the argument that the 
misinformation effect is due to the weakening of the original memory trace by the misleading 
information (Loftus, 2005; 2019).  
Mock witnesses, across cultures, resisted misinformation about central details more 
than they did for background details, suggesting that across cultures, mock witnesses attended 
more to central details than background details. This finding runs counter to our hypotheses 
which were based on previous work describing cultural differences in attention to central and 
contextual details, with people from collectivistic cultures attending more to contextual 
details, and vice versa (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). However, it is worth bearing in mind that 
previous work on cross-cultural cognition has typically used neutral scenes (Masuda & 




Nisbett, 2006; Miyamoto et al., 2006). It might be argued that it makes sense that witnesses, 
regardless of their cultural background, may be inclined to attend more to central details at a 
crime scene, due to the arousing, threatening or otherwise attention-capturing nature of the 
crime event (Anakwah et al., 2020a). Thus, the use of forensically relevant stimulus in the 
current study may have prompted mock witnesses to attend more to the central event. 
Consequently, stronger memory for central details might have facilitated the detection of 
details that were inconsistent with what was originally witnessed, leading to resistance to 
misleading information about central details. Similarly, mock witnesses' susceptibility to 
misleading background details could be due to weaker memory for the background event, 
making mock witnesses more susceptible to misleading influences about the background 
event (Heath & Erickson, 1998; Wright & Stroud, 1998).  
We expected mock witnesses from collectivistic cultures would endorse misleading 
PEI than mock witnesses with and individualistic cultures. We found support for this as the 
results showed mock witnesses from the collectivistic cultural group endorsed misleading 
details more than those from the individualistic cultural group. That finding is consistent with 
the argument that individuals with collectivistic cultural orientation are more sensitive to their 
social context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010), making them more susceptible to social 
influences. Due to that interdependent construal of the self, they may not depend on their own 
memory alone in their memory reports. That speculation is in line with the argument that in 
sub-Saharan African societies, the tendency to rely on social sources could be engrained in 
the socialisation process, culture, and belief system (Wiafe-Akenten, 2020). According to 
Wiafe-Akenten (2020), heavy reliance on social sources of information in such societies 
could contribute to misinformation acceptance. In the current study, 61.5% of mock 
witnesses with collectivistic orientation accepted misinformation, whereas 41.9% of mock 




witnesses from individualistic cultures accepted misinformation.12 Therefore, whereas 
misinformation acceptance permeates across cultures, the rate of acceptance seems to be 
higher among collectivistic cultures. During investigative interviews, it may be helpful to ask 
such witnesses to indicate which of the reported information was a recollection of what they 
witnessed themselves and which is from other sources.  
The weakened endorsement of misinformation among individualistic culture mock 
witnesses could be due to the view of the self as separate from the social context 
(independent-self; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). Consequently, individuals socialised in 
such cultures would be less inclined to accept misinformation from social sources. Consistent 
with this speculation, previous work has shown the role of the independent self-construal in 
resisting misleading PEI in a co-witness paradigm (Petterson & Paterson, 2012). In that 
study, however, the interdependent self was not found to be related to susceptibility to 
misleading influences. The finding of no relationship between the interdependent-self and 
misinformation susceptibility in that study may be due to the fact that participants in that 
study were sampled from an individualistic culture and measured on their level of self-
construal. It can, therefore, be rightly argued that participants were not representative of 
individuals from collectivistic cultures, who subscribe to the interdependent construal of the 
self. In the current study, participants representing the interdependent self-construal were 
individuals living in their native collectivistic cultural environment since birth. It makes sense 
that they would have been socialised in the collectivistic culture to develop an interdependent 
self-construal, viewing the self as embedded in the social context. As a result, they may have 
become more prone to influences from other social sources such as the media. 
                                                          
12 Overall misinformation acceptance across cultural groups was 52%.  




It has also been argued in the literature on cultural self-construal that individuals from 
individualistic cultures view the self more as possessing unique dispositions than individuals 
from collectivistic cultures (Coşkan, Phalet, Güngör, & Mesquita, 2016; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991, 2010). That proposed cultural difference in the extent at which the self is viewed as 
possessing unique dispositions might have accounted for the differences in misinformation 
endorsement observed in the current study. Broadly, individuals who view themselves as not 
possessing sufficient internal attributes are less likely to rely on their own memories in the 
recount of events (Frenda et al., 2011). It is likely that because individuals from cultures with 
an independent self-construal view the self as more unique, they are more likely to rely more 
on their own memory and discount information from other sources in their memory accounts. 
Conversely, because individuals from collectivistic cultures may not view the self more as 
unique compared with individuals from individualistic cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 2010), 
they may be less likely to rely solely on their memory in their account of events they have 
witnessed. They may not discount information from other sources in their memory accounts. 
Consequently, they may be more likely to yield to post-event information from other 
secondary sources, compared to individuals from collectivistic cultures.   
Related to the above, cultural differences in self-presentation could play a role in the 
extent of misinformation endorsement. Because individuals from individualistic cultures may 
be inclined to view the self as more unique (Coşkan et al., 2016), it could result in self-
enhancement, the tendency to become less-restrained and see oneself in a more positive light 
(Yamagishi et al., 2012a). Individuals from collectivistic cultures, on the other hand, have 
been argued to engage more in self-effacement, the tendency to be modest and more 
restrained  (Takata, 2003; Yamagishi et al., 2012a). This difference in self-presentation across 
cultures has been argued to play a role in low-confidence memory reports among mock 




witnesses from collectivistic cultures (Anakwah et al., 2020a). Thus, it could be that 
individuals from collectivistic cultures were more likely to incorporate suggested details in 
their eyewitness memory reports because they were not certain about their memory of the 
witnessed event. This speculation is consistent with previous findings showing that witnesses 
with low confidence about their memories are more susceptible to misinformation (Van 
Bergen et al., 2010).  Future research should explore the role of low-confidence memory 
reports in susceptibility to post-event information across cultures. 
Although cross-cultural differences in misinformation endorsement were observed 
under the recognition test, such differences were not present in the free recall report. Overall, 
18% of the sample reported at least one item of misinformation in the free recall (Ghana = 
20%; UK = 16%). It is possible that during the free recall, mock witnesses from collectivistic 
culture engaged in more stringent memory regulation. Mock witnesses from collectivistic 
cultures might have withheld details that could contaminate their accounts to enhance the 
accuracy of reported details. That may also explain why mock witnesses from collectivistic 
culture reported fewer incorrect details in free recall than mock witnesses from individualistic 
cultures. That finding is in line with previous research showing mock witnesses from 
collectivistic cultures reported less incorrect details than those from individualistic cultures 
(Anakwah et al., 2020a). Mock witnesses from collectivistic cultures should be encouraged to 
use memory regulation strategies to enhance their memory reports.   
Finally, cultural differences were observed in the memory reports generated in the 
current study. Mock witnesses from individualistic cultures reported more details than those 
with a collectivistic cultural background. That finding is in line with previous research 
(Anakwah et al., 2020; Leal et al., 2018; Wang, 2004). Cultural differences in elaborate 
memory reports could be accounted for by socialisation practices and reporting norms in the 




respective cultures. Individualistic cultures engage in more explicit reporting, compared to 
individuals from collectivistic cultures where communication can be more implicit (Hall, 
1976; Leal et al., 2018; Wang, 2004). This cultural difference has been argued to reflect in 
eyewitness memory reporting, where individuals from individualistic cultures in the attempt 
to be more explicit, provide more details in their memory reports (Anakwah et al., 2020a). 
Related to this is the self-enhancing tendency of individuals with individualistic cultural 
background, which may lead to more elaborate or enhanced memory report, compared to 
individuals from collectivistic cultures. Thus, it is more likely that individuals from 
collectivistic cultures may be more inclined to engage in modest responses, due to the self-
presentation norm predominant in such cultures (self-effacement).  
A potential limitation of the current study is that the time interval before asking 
participants to provide memory reports was quite short. In real-life situations, it sometimes 
takes days before witnesses are called on to give an account. Thus, in instances where 
eyewitnesses give accounts days after exposure to the post-event information, it is not clear 
whether the cultural difference in misinformation endorsement would persist or fade with 
time. Future cross-cultural research on the misinformation effect should ask participants to 
give memory reports days after receiving the post-event misinformation. There was also no 
manipulation check to assess whether participants did indeed read the PEI. However, because 
participants took part in the study individually and in-person (i.e., in the presence of the 
researcher), they were required to notify the researcher when they finish reading the PEI. 
Thus, even though there was no manipulation check, it is less likely this might have affected 
the outcome of the research. It is also possible that the presence of the experimenter might 
have played a role in misinformation acceptance, especially for mock witnesses from the 
collectivistic cultural group. That is because individuals from collectivistic cultures are more 




sensitive to power differentials (Anakwah et al., 2020a; Piyush Sharma, 2010). Hence, the 
acceptance of the misinformation could be due to the mere presence of the experimenter. 
Future research should explore whether, in a situation where the experimenter is not present 
during testing, misinformation acceptance would still be found. It would also be interesting 
for future research to examine the role of authority in the acceptance of misinformation 
across cultures. Specifically, future research should examine whether mock witnesses across 
cultures would accept misinformation when it is directly coming from an authority figure 
(e.g., investigator). 
Conclusion 
We examined the misinformation effect across cultures. Our results show that misleading PEI 
impairs memory performance across cultures. Mock witnesses regardless of their cultural 
background are more susceptible to misleading information about peripheral details than 
central details. We also found that mock witnesses with collectivistic cultural background 
endorse misleading information more than those with individualistic background. However, 
this difference in misinformation endorsement disappears during free recall tasks. These 















Chapter 5: The effect of authority on eyewitness 



















The culture in which individuals have been socialised can impact on both behaviour and 
psychological processes. Using the power distance cultural framework, we examined whether 
eyewitness memory reports provided by individuals from different cultural backgrounds are 
affected by whom those reports are provided to, in this case an authority figure or a peer. We 
sampled participants (N = 115) from high and low Power Distance (PD) cultures. In a 2 
(Cultural orientation: high PD vs. low PD) X 2 (Reporting context: Police vs. Peer) design, 
participants viewed a mock crime event and later provided free and cued recalls. High PD 
culture mock witnesses reported similar amount of details when reporting to police and a 
peer. Low PD culture mock witnesses reported more details when reporting to police than 
when reporting to a peer. Mock witnesses from low PD cultures provided more details than 
high PD culture mock witnesses, irrespective of reporting context. Our findings provide 
insight into the extent to which reporting to an authority figure in an investigative context 
may affect the content of eyewitness memory reports. 












Detailed eyewitness reports are crucial in police investigations as well as legal 
proceedings. In particular, detailed reports can provide valuable leads during investigations. 
As such, accounts that are sparse or lacking in detail can frustrate investigative efforts and 
have implications for judicial decisions in criminal prosecutions. Given the crucial role of 
eyewitness evidence in dispensing justice (Wells et al., 2020), researchers have investigated 
how best to elicit detailed accounts from eyewitnesses (e.g., Dando et al., 2018; Fisher, 
Geiselman, & Amador, 1989; Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, 2009). Because interviewers are 
increasingly likely to encounter people from different cultures in the conduct of 
investigations, the need to improve understanding in eliciting details from eyewitnesses in 
cross-cultural contexts is clear (Anakwah et al., 2020a; de Bruïne et al., 2018; Hope & 
Gabbert, 2019). As individuals, eyewitnesses have been socialised into their respective 
cultures, hence, attendant cultural dynamics may play out in social situations, such as the 
investigative context. In eyewitness interviews, the audience for the account provided by the 
witness is typically an authority figure, such as a police investigator (McCallum, Brewer, & 
Weber, 2016). Different cultures have different norms regarding relating or interacting with 
authority figures (Hofstede, 2011). It is not clear whether or how such dynamics will impact 
on the nature or content of reports from memory in an investigative context. In the current 
research, we examined whether there is any preliminary evidence for an authority effect in 
the eyewitness memory reports provided by eyewitnesses from different cultures. 
Authority and eyewitnesses 
Authority is characterised by an influence that one social actor exerts over another 
(Morselli & Passini, 2011). It has been argued to determine the outcome of social interactions 
(Cialdini, 2013; Milgram, 1963; Plazinić, Banjac, & Joksimović, 2019). According to 




Cialdini (2013), because individuals are socialised right from birth to obey authority figures, 
authority can exert a powerful influence on them. The influence by authority may be subtle or 
direct and permeates other aspects of society, including the legal system. Indeed, in law 
enforcement and other investigative contexts, interviews are conducted by investigators who 
are accorded an authority status. The perceived authority in investigative contexts may 
impact on the amount of information an interviewee is willing to provide. Specifically, 
research suggests that authority influences informational outcomes within an investigative 
interview context (Goodman-Delahunty & Howes, 2016). In one study, participants took part 
in a mock crime and later provided written statements and were interviewed in a high or low 
authority context (Matsumoto & Hwang, 2019). Authority in that study was manipulated by 
using indirect trappings of authority. Specifically, in the high authority condition, the 
interviewer was formally dressed in a suit, tie, and had a photo ID. There were also two 
certificates from the law enforcement agency that hung on the wall of the interview room. 
Both certificates bore a fictitious name of the interviewer and attested to the interviewer’s 
competence. Also on the wall of that interview room was a photoshopped image of the 
interviewer with a well-known law enforcement official. In the low authority condition, the 
interviewer wore a plain white shirt and had no photo ID. The low authority condition also 
had a certificate on the wall but the inscriptions on it were unintelligible. Results revealed 
that the participants in the high authority condition provided more explicit details in both 
verbal and written statements, with large effect size.  
The results of research examining the effects of authority on memory reports have 
been inconsistent. When asked to provide memory reports of a short story either to an 
experimenter or a co-participant, participants in both conditions did not differ in detail 
provision (Hyman, 1994). Similarly, McCallum et al. (2016) found mock witnesses did not 




differ in informativeness when providing their reports in either a high authority (police) or a 
low authority (an experimenter) condition. McCallum et al. (2016)  noted, however, that the 
mock witnesses in their study might have perceived both the police and experimenter as 
experts. Indeed, in this example, both scenarios may be considered as involving an authority, 
hence the ensuing social dynamics when interviewing mock witnesses may have impacted 
information elicitation to a similar degree.  
The social dynamics when individuals from different cultures are being interviewed 
by an authority figure may vary (Ghosh, 2011; Goodman-Delahunty & Howes, 2016). That 
could have implications for informational outcomes during investigative interview in cross-
cultural settings. That is because, information elicited during investigative interviews of 
witnesses is not only determined by cognitive processes, such as memory, but also by the 
social dynamics between the interviewer and interviewee (Abbe & Brandon, 2013; Fisher, 
Milne, & Bull, 2011). Given that cultural norms in interacting with authority figures differ, 
the social dynamics present when a police investigator is interviewing eyewitnesses from 
different cultures may not be the same across witnesses. It is, therefore, reasonable to argue 
that authority might impact information elicitation differently across witnesses with different 
cultural backgrounds.  
Authority and memory reports across cultures  
An individual’s cultural background may impact social interactions with authority 
figures (Hofstede, 2011; Khatri, 2009). The cultural dimension of power distance sheds light 
on how the perceived inequality in society might affect social interactions (Hofstede, 1983). 
Power distance refers to the extent to which members of a society accept and perceive 
inequality in power, prestige, and wealth (Oyserman, 2006). Cultures with high power 
distance endorse hierarchy in social relationships, whereas that is not the case for cultures 




with low power distance. In high power distance cultures, there usually exists a 
communication gap between subordinates and authority figures (Ghosh, 2011; Khatri, 2009). 
This hierarchy in communication norms can make it difficult for subordinates to express their 
views to superiors (Gosh, 2011). Specifically, Ghosh (2011) suggests that in cultures with 
high power distance, free and spontaneous communication may well be inhibited.  
The cultural dimension of power distance is associated with the cultural dimension of 
individualism-collectivism (Minkov et al., 2017). The individualism-collectivism cultural 
dimension concerns the extent to which individual members of a cultural group are 
considered integrated in (or separate from) their social context (Hofstede, 2011). In 
individualistic cultures, the relationship between individual members is conceptualised as 
loose, whereas in collectivistic cultures a tighter relationship among individual members of 
the cultural group is predicted (Hofstede et al., 2010). It has been argued that individuals 
from individualistic cultures prioritise their own thoughts, opinions, and view the self as more 
unique (Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Wasti, Tan, Brower, & Önder, 2007). In contrast, it has 
been argued that individuals from collectivistic cultures subordinate their opinions and 
preferences to that of the social group, in an effort to maintain group harmony (Wasti et al., 
2007). It has been proposed that this may result in cultural differences in self-presentation, 
where individuals socialised in collectivistic cultures show self-effacement (modesty), 
whereas those socialised in individualistic cultures show self-enhancement (self-expression; 
Takata, 2003). These self-presentational differences may have implications for cultural 
differences in confidence in performance (Heine et al., 2000). For example, when asked 
about how well they performed on a test, Japanese (collectivist) participants were reluctant to 
accept they performed better than their average classmate, whereas Canadian (individualist) 




participants refused to conclude that they performed worse than their average classmate 
(Heine et al., 2000). 
The individualism-collectivism cultural dimension has also been argued to shape the 
content of memory reports (Anakwah et al., 2020a; Anakwah, Horselenberg, Hope, 
Amankwah-Poku, & van Koppen, 2020b; Wang, 2006). Such research has shown a consistent 
pattern of underreporting among individuals socialised in collectivistic cultures relative to 
counterparts from individualistic cultures. For example, in one study using a mock witness 
paradigm, participants sampled from Ghana (collectivistic culture) and the Netherlands 
(individualistic culture) provided a free recall account and answered questions about a crime 
event. Mock witnesses socialised in the collectivistic culture reported fewer details than those 
socialised in the individualistic culture, who provided more elaborate memory reports 
(Anakwah et al., 2020a). In another study examining the effects of acculturation using a 
similar paradigm, it was found that migrant mock witnesses with a collectivistic cultural 
background who now live in an individualistic culture provided more elaborate memory 
reports than mock witnesses still living in the native collectivistic culture (Anakwah et al., 
2020b). In both of these studies, it may be that cross-cultural differences in relating with 
authority figures could account for the underreporting among witnesses living in their native 
collectivistic culture. Specifically, and as argued by Anakwah et al. (2020a), it may be that 
mock witnesses perceived the experimenter as an expert, hence, impeding spontaneous 
reporting for mock witnesses socialised in collectivistic cultures. In line with that argument, it 
was also found in that study that mock witnesses from the collectivistic cultural group scored 
higher on vertical collectivism (endorsement of hierarchy in social relationships) than mock 
witnesses from the individualistic cultural group. Thus, due to the perceived power status of 




the interviewer, interviewees with cultural backgrounds where hierarchy in social 
relationships is emphasised may not spontaneously provide detailed reports.  
Differences in the effects of authority on reporting across cultures may emerge due to 
socialisation practices. Wang (2006) argued that in childrearing practices in most 
collectivistic cultures, it is normative to emphasise obedience, respect, and fear of authority 
figures in social relationships (Wang, 2006). In a study involving Chinese and American 
mothers interacting with their respective children, Wang (2006) noted that the conversation 
between a Chinese mother and her child, focused on reinforcing the mother’s position as an 
authority figure, with the mother directing the course of the conversation whereas this did not 
tend to be the pattern for North American mothers. Subsequently, American children 
provided more elaborate reports than Chinese children when sharing memory reports with 
their mothers. Burns and Radford (2008) made a similar observation with a sub-Sahara 
African sample. In that research exploring parent-child interaction among Nigerian families, 
parent-child dyads playing and talking in their home contexts were observed. The study 
showed conversations between the mothers and their respective children were instructional 
and often involve directive talk. The authors argued that the use of instructional talk by 
Nigerian mothers when conversing with their children was ingrained in cultural norms. 
Specifically, they indicate that such cultures specify the role of adults (authority figures) and 
children when engaging in conversations. For that reason, the authors note the need to take 
cultural contexts into account when evaluating such interactions. Thus, sensitivity to 
authority status during social interactions with authority figures may differ across cultures in 
view of differences in socialisation practices. 
 
 




The current study 
Efforts at eliciting detailed eyewitness memory reports may be inhibited if there is a 
limited understanding of whether cultural differences in relating to authority figures (power 
distance) impacts reporting. To date, no research has been conducted on how the cultural 
dimension of power distance could impact the information reported by eyewitnesses from 
different cultures. In view of the increasing cross-cultural contacts within the criminal justice 
system, it is necessary to examine whether the cultural dimension of power distance could 
impact the details reported by witnesses.  
Mock witnesses were sampled from Ghana and the Netherlands. On Hofstede’s Power 
Distance Index, Ghana and the Netherlands score 80 and 38, respectively (where high scores 
indicate high power distance). Thus, these two countries represent high and low power 
distance cultures respectively. Participants in the role of mock witnesses viewed a crime 
event and later provided free and cued recall reports. With respect to reporting context, we 
expected that mock witnesses from the high PD culture would report more correct details to a 
peer than to the police on the grounds of the power distance cultural framework (Ghosh, 
2011; Hofstede, 2011). Specifically, because individuals socialised in high PD cultures are 
more sensitive to hierarchy in social relationships, their memory reports to authority figures 
were expected to be impeded when reporting to a police detective (Ghosh, 2011). This was 
not expected for mock witnesses from low PD culture who, on the grounds of the power 
distance cultural framework, we predicted would report a similar amount of details to police 
and peer (Hofstede, 2011). Thus, because hierarchy in social relationships is less emphasised 
in low PD cultures, we expected that regardless of the reporting context, witnesses with low 
PD cultural background would report the same amount of details. Finally, based on research 
by Anakwah et al. (2020), we predicted that mock witnesses from low PD cultures would 




report more correct details than mock witnesses from high PD cultures, irrespective of 
reporting context.   
Methods 
Participants and design 
A total of 115 participants were sampled for the study. The participants were recruited 
from Ghana (n = 66, Mage = 20.03 years, SD = 1.88) and the Netherlands (n = 49, Mage = 
22.84 years , SD = 2.44). All participants in both countries had a university-level education 
and were also proficient in the English language.13 Participants in Ghana were recruited 
through announcements in lecture halls. Participants in the Netherlands were recruited by 
advertisements on university campus. Participants who volunteered for compensation 
received a €5 shopping voucher for participants in the Netherlands and GH₵10 voucher for 
phone credit, for participants in Ghana. Some participants opted to participate without 
compensation.  
The design was a 2 (Cultural orientation: High Power Distance, Low Power Distance) 
X 2 (Reporting context: Police, Peer) between-subjects design. The independent variables 
were cultural orientation and reporting context. The dependent variables were the number of 
correct details reported, the accuracy of details reported (proportion of correct details relative 
to the total number of details), unanswered questions, and confidence about the overall report 
in free and cued recall.  
Materials 
                                                          
13 Participants across cultures were proficient in English. The official language in Ghana is English, which is the 
medium of instruction from basic to tertiary level of education.  




Stimulus event. Stimuli for the study was a recording of a mock crime about a theft in 
a travel agency. In the event, a courier wearing a motorcycle helmet and holding a parcel 
walks towards a travel agency. When the courier enters the office, she delivers the parcel to 
the receptionist, who signs for it. After signing for the parcel, the receptionist enters another 
room to fetch a glass of water while the courier is still present. As the receptionist enters the 
room, the courier quickly picks a laptop on the office desk and hurriedly leaves the office. 
Upon return with the glass of water, the receptionist realises the courier has left the office. As 
she sits down, she notices the laptop is no longer on the desk. The receptionist quickly rushes 
out of the office and sees the courier outside with the laptop. The receptionist raises an alarm 
by shouting. As the courier runs away, she bumps into a woman with shopping bags, making 
the shopping bags fall to the ground. The courier continues to run until she gets to a nearby 
garden where no one was present at scene. She removes her helmet, throws it into the garden, 
and leaves the scene. The duration of the event is approximately 1 minute 30 seconds. The 
recording, used with permission, is available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D0GwhUEfMgA  
Personal Cultural Orientation Scale (Piyush Sharma, 2010). This scale measures 
several dimensions of cultural orientation. For the purposes of our study, the Power and the 
Social Inequality sub-scales were used to measure self-reported power distance (Sharma, 
2010). These two sub-scales comprise four items each. Sample items on the power sub-scale 
are ‘I find it hard to disagree with authority figures’ and ‘It is difficult for me to refuse a 
request if someone senior asks me’. Sample items on the social inequality sub-scale are ‘It is 
difficult to interact with people with different social status than mine’ and ‘A person’s social 
status reflects his/ her place in society’. Items on the scale are measured on a 7-point Likert 




scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Reliability for the cultural dimensions (sub-
scales) ranges from .72 to .85 (Sharma, 2010). 
 
Procedure 
Participants in the study were tested individually. After giving consent for 
participation, participants viewed the mock crime and then completed a filler task (visual 
illusion task) for 10 minutes. Participants were then asked to provide a written free recall 
report about the event they had witnessed. Participants in the police condition were told to 
assume they were reporting what they had witnessed to a police investigator. Participants in 
the peer condition were told to assume they were reporting what they had witnessed to a 
friend. Participants in both conditions were instructed to be as accurate and detailed as 
possible in their reports. Participants had up to 10 minutes to give their written free recall 
report, in line with previous research (Karpicke & Roediger, 2007; Zaromb & Roediger, 
2010). They were also informed that should they finish before the 10 minutes elapsed, any 
remaining time would still be available to them before moving to the next task. All 
participants across groups completed their reports before the 10 minutes elapsed. Following 
the free recall report, participants were asked to rate their level of confidence in their overall 
report on a scale of 1 (not at all confident) to 10 (very confident). Participants then completed 
a cued recall task in which they were asked six questions about the event (e.g., ‘What was the 
courier wearing?’ and ‘What items were on the employee’s desk?’). There was no time 
restriction on cued recall questions. At the outset, they were reminded again of the audience 
for these answers (police or peer) and they were instructed to be accurate and detailed as 
possible in their answers and to avoid guessing. After responding to the cued recall questions, 
participants rated their level of confidence in their overall cued recall report, on a scale of 1 




(not at all confident) to 10 (very confident). Participants then completed the cultural 
orientation scale (measures of Power and Inequality) and provided demographic information. 
All instructions and questions in the study were in English. Participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation after completion of the procedures. The study received ethical 
approval from institutional review boards in Ghana and the Netherlands. 
Coding 
A detailed coding template developed by the first author based on the target event 
which we used in a previous study was used in coding the transcripts. Items coded as correct 
were items that were present in the filmed event and rightly described as such by participants 
(e.g., describing a white desk in the office). Items were coded as incorrect if the description 
was discrepant with what was in the film event (e.g., describing the office desk as brown, 
when in fact it was white). Vague (e.g., she was average height) and subjective responses 
(e.g., the man was handsome) were not coded.  ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Don’t remember’ responses 
were coded as unanswered questions. ‘Don’t know’ response type has also been referred to as 
‘Withheld details’ in the metacognition literature (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994, 1996). In this 
study, we used the term ‘unanswered questions’ for the avoidance of confusion. A second 
coder coded 22% of the transcripts. We found high inter-coder reliability (ICC) for correct 
details both in free recall (.96) and cued recall (.89). 
Results 
Free recall 
There was a significant main effect of cultural group for the total number of correct 
details reported in free recall, F (1, 113) = 52.78, p <.001, ηp
2 = .32. Mock witnesses from the 
Netherlands (M = 39.14, SD = 12.13) reported significantly more details in their free recall 




reports than mock witnesses from Ghana (M = 25.36, SD = 9.33) despite both groups 
receiving exactly the same reporting instructions. The main effect of reporting context on the 
total number of correct details reported was not significant, F (1, 113) = 3.36, p = .07, ηp
2 
=.03. There was, however, a significant interaction effect between cultural group and 
reporting context for the total number of correct details reported, albeit a small effect, F (1, 
113) = 5.87, p = .02, ηp
2 = .05. Mock witnesses from the Netherlands reported more correct 
details when reporting to police than when reporting to a peer (p = .02). Reports provided by 
mock witnesses from Ghana did not differ in the number of correct details reported to either 
police or a peer (p = .62). See Table 5.1.  
Table 5. 1 
Mean (Standard Deviation) for correct details, accuracy rate, unanswered questions, and 
confidence ratings in the respective conditions by cultural group in free recall and cued 
recall 
  Ghana The Netherlands 
  Police Peer Police Peer 
Free Recall Correct details 24.79 (7.88) 25.94 (10.67) 43.73 (12.58) 35.41 (10.57) 
 Accuracy rate .98 (.03) .98 (.03) .98 (.02) .98 (.02) 
 Confidence 8.51 (1.12) 8.70 (1.21) 7.91 (.97) 8.37 (1.01) 
Cued Recall Correct details 12.39 (4.12) 11.21 (4.46) 20.41 (6.67) 16.81 (4.46) 
 Accuracy rate .89 (.13) .90 (.10) .95 (.05) .92 (.07) 
 Confidence 8.06 (1.25) 8.12 (1.41) 7.18 (1.26) 7.33 (1.30) 
 Unanswered questions .39 (.79) .45 (.71) .77 (.61) .70 (.82) 
 
The main effect of culture on the accuracy rate of reported details was not significant, 
F (1, 113) = .19, p = .67, ηp
2 = .002. The accuracy rate for free recall was high for each group 




(Ghana – M = .98, SD = .03; the Netherlands – M = .98, SD = .02). The main effect of 
reporting context on the accuracy of reported details was also not significant F (1, 113) = .07, 
p = .80, ηp
2 =.001. The interaction between cultural groups and reporting context was also not 
significant F (1, 113) = .54, p = .47, ηp
2 = .01.  
We conducted an exploratory analysis on the confidence in reported details in free 
recall. There was a significant main effect of cultural group on confidence in overall report 
for free recall reports, F (1, 113) = 5.06, p = .03, ηp
2 = .04. Mock witnesses from Ghana (M = 
8.61, SD = 1.16) had more confidence in their free recall reports than mock witnesses from 
the Netherlands (M = 8.16, SD = 1.01). Reporting context did not have a significant effect on 
confidence in free recall reports, F(1, 113) = 2.41, p = .12, ηp
2 = .02. The interaction between 
cultural group and interviewing condition was not significant, F(1, 113) = .45, p = .50, ηp
2 = 
.004.     
Cued recall  
There was a significant main effect of cultural group on the total number of correct 
details reported in cued recall, F(1, 113) = 54.64, p < .001, ηp
2 = .33. Mock witnesses from 
the Netherlands (M = 18.43, SD = 5.79) reported significantly more correct details than mock 
witnesses from Ghana (M = 11.80, SD = 4.30). There was a significant main effect of 
reporting context for the total number of correct details reported F(1, 113) = 6.72, p = .01, ηp
2 
= .06. Mock witnesses reported more correct details when reporting to a police investigator 
(M = 16.40, SD = .4.97) than when reporting to a peer (M = 14.01, SD = 4.90). The 
interaction effect between cultural group and reporting context was not significant F(1, 113) 
= 1.72, p = .19, ηp
2 = .02.  




The main effect of cultural group on the accuracy of reported details was significant, 
F(1, 113) = 6.19, p = .01, ηp
2 = .05. Responses to cued recall questions provided by mock 
witnesses from the Netherlands (M = .94, SD = .06) were more accurate than responses 
provided by mock witnesses from Ghana (M = .89, SD = .11). Both the main effect of 
reporting context, F(1, 113) = .40, p = .53, ηp
2 = .004, and the interaction between cultural 
group and reporting context on the accuracy of details were not significant, F(1, 113) = .93, p 
= .34, ηp
2 = .01.  
The main effect of cultural group on unanswered questions was significant, F(1, 113) 
= 4.97, p = .03, ηp
2 = .04. Mock witnesses from the Netherlands (M = .73, SD = .73) left more 
questions unanswered than mock witnesses from Ghana  (M = .42, SD = .75). However, it 
should be noted that the number of unanswered questions was very small, less than one on 
average. The main effect of reporting context on unanswered questions was not significant, 
F(1, 113) = .001, p = .98, ηp
2 = .000. The interaction between cultural group and reporting 
context was also not significant, F(1, 113) = .21, p = .65, ηp
2 = .002.  
Finally, there was a significant main effect of cultural group on confidence in overall 
cued recall reports, F(1, 113) = 11.30, p = .001, ηp
2 = .09. Mock witnesses from Ghana (M = 
8.09, SD = 1.32) were more confident in their cued recall reports than mock witnesses from 
the Netherlands (M = 7.27, SD = 1.27). The main effect of reporting context on confidence in 
cued recall reports was not significant, F(1, 113) = .18, p = .67, ηp
2 = .002. The interaction 
between cultural group and reporting context on confidence in cued recall reports was not 
significant, F(1, 113) = .03, p = .86, ηp
2 = .000. 
Self-reported power distance 




On the power dimension of the cultural orientation scale, participants from Ghana (M 
= 16.12; SD = 5.35) and the Netherlands (M = 15.63; SD = 4.19) did not significantly differ 
in their ratings, t(113) = .53, p = .60, d = .10. There was, however, a significant difference 
between participants from Ghana and the Netherlands on the social inequality dimension of 
the cultural orientation scale, t(113) = 8.29, p < .001, d = 1.58, with participants from Ghana 
(M = 17.24, SD = 4.19)  perceiving more social inequality than participants from the 
Netherlands (M = 10.98, SD = 3.74).  
Discussion 
We investigated whether there is what might be described as an authority effect in the 
eyewitness memory reports provided by witnesses from different cultural backgrounds. In our 
sample of participants drawn from high and low power distance (PD) cultures, the reports 
provided by mock witnesses from the high PD culture did not differ in terms of the amount of 
information reported irrespective of the reporting context. However, mock witnesses from the 
low PD culture reported more details when told the audience for their report would be a 
police investigator than when told it would be a peer. Irrespective of reporting context, mock 
witnesses from the low PD culture reported more details in their eyewitness memory reports 
than mock witnesses from the high PD culture. We also found mock witnesses from the high 
PD culture were more confident in their memory reports than mock witnesses from the low 
PD culture.  
Mock witnesses from the high PD culture reported the same amount of details 
irrespective of who they were reporting to. Although this is not consistent with our 
hypothesis that such witnesses would provide less information when reporting to an authority 
figure, it is an interesting outcome, particularly in light of the pattern observed for low PD 
mock witnesses. However, perhaps in the absence of relevant previous literature to draw on 




in this particular context, we failed to take account of the effect of another important factor. 
In a typical forensic setting involving a high-stakes situation, one would expect that a 
premium would be placed on detailed information provision, unlike any ordinary situation 
like reporting to a friend. That speculation is consistent with the finding that mock witnesses 
from the low PD culture reported more details when reporting to police than to a peer. As this 
was not the case for sub-Saharan African mock witnesses, we speculate the perceived 
authority might have impaired providing detailed reports to the police. This speculation is in 
line with the argument that high PD could impede free and spontaneous communication 
(Ghosh, 2011). In fact, in a previous study where mock witnesses from a collectivistic culture 
provided less detailed memory reports, it was also observed that they endorsed hierarchy in 
social relationships, compared to mock witnesses from an individualistic culture, who 
reported more details (Anakwah et al., 2020a). Consistent with that study, we found in the 
present study that mock witnesses from the high PD (collectivistic) culture perceived more 
social inequality than mock witnesses from the low PD (individualistic) culture. Essentially, 
high PD mock witnesses were more likely to indicate the existence of hierarchy in social 
interactions. There is the need for investigative professionals to put in place measures to 
reduce interviewees’ sensitivity to power dynamics that may impair reporting during 
investigative interviews. Future research should examine how the authority effect on 
information elicitation in forensic settings can be mitigated, especially for witnesses from 
high PD cultures.  
The self-enhancing tendency, argued to be a predominant self-presentational norm 
among individualistic cultures (Yamagishi et al., 2012a), may have accounted for the 
differences in memory reports provided to police and a peer, by mock witnesses from the low 
PD (individualistic) culture. Mock witnesses from individualistic culture reported more 




details when reporting to a police detective, a more formal context than when reporting to a 
friend, an informal context. These two scenarios (police and friend) involve different stakes 
and might have led individuals from the individualistic culture to optimise their reports 
consistent with the stake or scenario involved. Thus, with higher stakes involved (reporting to 
police), the individualistic culture mock witnesses were motivated to adjust their self-
presentation accordingly, and thus, engaged more in self-enhancement. Hence, for individuals 
from individualistic cultures, the motivation to be self-expressive is likely to be high in a 
more formal context. That speculation is in line with previous research showing that in 
formal settings, individuals are more likely to provide more useful information than in 
informal settings (Martín-Luengo, Shtyrov, Luna, & Myachykov, 2018). Thus, because 
reporting to police assumes a formal setting, we speculate this may have facilitated detailed 
reporting more than an informal scenario such as reporting to a friend, for mock witnesses 
from the low PD (individualistic) cultural group.  
The observed differences across cultures in optimising details provided to police may 
also reflect different experiences and attitudes towards the police in the respective countries. 
For example, excesses in policing such as police brutality, human rights abuses, and 
corruption may vary across countries. It has been argued that such excesses tend to be high in 
developing countries than developed countries (Tankebe, 2010), most of whom fall within the 
individualistic and collectivistic cultural dimensions, respectively (Hofstede et al., 2010). It 
could be that these variations in police experiences may lead to different levels of trust in 
police and institutions across cultures. Indeed it has been argued that in many high PD 
cultures, there is weak trust in institutions (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). Consistent with 
that arguement, it has been demonstrated that compared to America (low PD culture), 
confidence in police in South Korea (high PD) is low (Boateng, Lee, & Abess, 2016). Trust 




facilitates motivation and co-operation (Zanini & Migueles, 2018), therefore, a low level of 
trust in the police may have implications for unwillingness to cooperate as witnesses in 
investigative contexts (Papp, Smith, Wareham, & Wu, 2019; Tankebe, Reisig, & Wang, 
2016). When cooperation is lacking in investigative interviews, information disclosure may 
be minimal (De La Fuente Vilar et al., 2020). Thus, differences in experience and levels of 
trust in the police across cultures may account for the observed differences in optimising 
reports provided to the police. Future research should investigate whether police trust plays 
any role in the provision of eyewitness memory reports across cultures.  
Mock witnesses from the low PD (individualistic) culture reported more details than 
mock witnesses from the high PD (collectivistic) culture, irrespective of the reporting 
context. This finding is in line with previous work showing mock witnesses from 
individualistic cultures report more elaborate memory reports than those from collectivistic 
cultures (Anakwah et al., 2020a). Communication in collectivistic cultures has been argued to 
be high in context, where many things are not explicitly communicated (Hall, 1976). 
According to Hall (1976), in high context (collectivistic) cultures where the relationship 
between individuals is tight, communication is not explicit and many things tend to be left 
unsaid, allowing the context to communicate what is implied. Thus, in their memory reports, 
mock witnesses from collectivistic cultures might not be spontaneously explicit and might 
assume their audience to have some prior knowledge or use some contextual cues to grasp the 
message. Conversely, as communication in low context (individualistic) cultures tend to be 
more explicit, mock witnesses from individualistic cultures might have spontaneously 
provided elaborate memory reports. This is consistent with previous research showing 
individuals from collectivistic cultures provide generic responses, compared with those from 
individualistic cultures (Wang, 2004).  




Mock witnesses from the high PD culture gave higher confidence ratings for their 
memory reports than mock witnesses from the low PD culture. It is possible that even though 
mock witnesses from the high PD cultural group underreported details, they were certain 
about the accuracy of their memory reports. In line with this speculation, we found that 
although mock witnesses from the high PD culture reported fewer details than low PD mock 
witnesses, the former did not differ from the latter in the accuracy of reported details for free 
recall. Nevertheless, during cued recall, mock witnesses from low PD cultures seemed to be 
more accurate. That difference in the cued recall may be because low PD mock witnesses 
may have engaged more in memory regulation during cued recall where they had the option 
to withhold (refrain from answering) or provide answers to questions. Consistent with that 
speculation we found more questions were left unanswered by low PD mock witnesses than 
high PD mock witnesses.   
There are some limitations associated with the current study. The instruction to mock 
witnesses to provide a written recall in the respective scenarios might not be strong enough to 
induce the hypothesised effect. Although we argue the similar amount of details reported by 
collectivistic cultural mock witnesses to police and peer could be another manifestation of 
authority effect (i.e, lack of enhanced memory report to police), a stronger manipulation such 
as a live interviewer might have yielded an authority effect in the hypothesised direction (i.e., 
impeding memory reports of high PD mock witnesses to police more than to a peer). Future 
research should use a live interviewer, playing the appropriate role, in the respective 
conditions. Having said that, our methodological approach is in line with previous research 
showing an authority effect even under subtle or implicit operationalisations of authority 
(Matsumoto & Hwang, 2019). The use of an urban (university) collectivistic sample might 
have also weakened the authority effect. Rural collectivistic cultures have been argued to be 




more collectivistic than urban collectivistic populations (Ma et al., 2015; Rooks et al., 2016). 
It makes sense, therefore, that among collectivistic cultures, power distance would be higher 
among rural populations than urban populations. Future studies should examine the authority 
effect further by including a rural sample. Another limitation is that the sample size on which 
our findings are based on is relatively small. This limits the generalisability of our findings. 
Nevertheless, our findings provide some initial evidence on how authority status impacts 
witnesses with diverse cultural backgrounds differently. Future research should explore this 
further with a larger sample size.   
Conclusion 
Our aim in this study was to examine whether reports from memory about crime 
events provided by witnesses from different cultural backgrounds would differ as a function 
of who they are reporting to. Specifically, we wanted to find out whether an authority 
reporting context would impact eyewitness memory reports differently than a non-authority 
context across cultures. We sampled mock witnesses from western Europe and sub-Saharan 
Africa, representing low PD and high PD cultures, respectively. Our results suggest authority 
may play a role in cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports. Specifically, the results 
show while reporting to an investigator may facilitate elaborate memory reporting for 
witnesses with low PD cultural background, it may impede memory reporting for witnesses 
with a high PD cultural background. Findings from this research provide initial insight for 
investigative professionals eliciting memory reports in cross-cultural contexts, on how power 
dynamics may impact informational outcomes. Future research is needed on how best to 
minimise perceived power differentials in cross-cultural investigative interviews. 
 
 

























Information obtained from eyewitnesses is an important piece of evidence in criminal 
prosecutions (Wells et al., 2020). In an era of increased migration and globalisation, 
investigative and legal practitioners inevitably handle eyewitness memory reports obtained in 
cross-cultural contexts. Eliciting eyewitness memory reports in cross-cultural settings can be 
challenging if insight into culturally determined reporting norms is limited. Previous research 
has documented cultural influences in behaviour and cognitive processes. Given that the 
culture in which individuals are socialised may play a role in shaping their behaviour and 
cognition, research in eyewitness memory must examine whether there are variations in 
eyewitness memory reports across cultures. That is particularly important given that, to date, 
most of the conclusions drawn from research in eyewitness memory has been based on work 
with western samples. The programme of research conducted for this doctoral thesis makes a 
novel contribution to the field of eyewitness memory by going beyond examining eyewitness 
memory performance in western cultures in order to understand how individuals socialised in 
sub-Saharan African cultures formulate their eyewitness memory reports. Thus, the 
programme of research is the first to examine comprehensively, cultural differences in the 
content and nature of eyewitness memory reports.  
The overarching aim of the programme of research reported for this thesis was, 
primarily, to find out whether there are cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports. 
Across four empirical studies, there was consistent evidence of underreporting of details 
among sub-Saharan African mock witnesses in comparison to Western European mock 
witnesses. Overall, the research provides evidence that eyewitness memory reports may be 
shaped by culturally determined reporting norms of the witness. In this chapter, a summary 




and consolidation of the findings from this programme of research is presented. This is 
followed by a discussion on the scope and generalisbility of the findings. Afterwards, 
theoretical considerations, as well as methodological considerations and future research 
directions, are presented. Following that is a discussion about the implications of the findings. 
Finally, challenges involved in conducting cross-cultural research will be explored.  
Summary of findings  
Cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports. The goal of the first 
experiment reported in the thesis (Chapter 2) was to provide some initial insights into 
whether the eyewitness memory accounts provided by people from different cultures differ in 
terms of content or other aspects. Previous research on cross-cultural cognition demonstrated 
that individuals may be prone to prioritise either central or contextual details in their memory 
reports, depending on their cultural orientation. Based on work on cultural differences in 
holistic-analytic cognition, it was expected that mock witnesses with a collectivistic cultural 
background would report more contextual details than mock witnesses with an individualistic 
cultural background, who were expected to report more central details than mock witnesses 
with collectivistic orientation. The results indicated that irrespective of their cultural 
background, witnesses report central details more than contextual details in their eyewitness 
memory reports.  
Although mock witnesses across cultures did not differ in reporting specific types of 
details, the results described in Chapter 2 showed cultural differences in elaborate memory 
reporting. In that novel contribution, I found that mock witnesses with a collectivistic cultural 
orientation report fewer details in their eyewitness memory reports than mock witnesses with 
an individualistic cultural orientation, in both free and cued recall. That observed cultural 
difference in eyewitness memory reporting can be attributed to culturally determined 




reporting norms. For instance, it has been argued that communication in collectivistic cultures 
tends to be more implicit, where many things are left unsaid, unlike individualistic cultures 
where explicitness is valued more (Hall, 1976). Hence, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
eyewitness memory reports provided by individuals with an individualistic cultural 
background contained more explicit descriptions of event details than descriptions provided 
by individuals with a collectivistic cultural background.  
The cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports could also be accounted for by 
self-presentational differences across cultures, with individualistic cultures emphasising self-
expression more than collectivistic cultures, where modesty in self-presentation tends to be 
the norm (Heine et al., 2000; Yamagishi et al., 2012a). Modest reporting norm is also 
demonstrated by the fact that mock witnesses from the collectivistic cultural group withheld 
more details than those from the individualistic cultural group. It could be that mock 
witnesses from collectivistic cultures withheld details they were unsure about, accounting for 
the underreporting of details. It has been argued in a framework on the strategic regulation of 
memory that individuals opt not to report details they are uncertain about to enhance the 
accuracy of reported details (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). That memory regulation strategy 
was effective in minimising the reporting of incorrect details among the sub-Saharan African 
mock witnesses, as the results also show that they reported fewer incorrect details than mock 
witnesses from the individualistic cultural group. Hence, while details were underreported by 
mock witnesses from collectivistic cultures, it was at the expense of reporting incorrect 
details in their eyewitness accounts. That finding suggests that the threshold for reporting 
correct details by witnesses from collectivistic cultures seems to be relatively strict in 
comparison to witnesses from individualistic cultures. 




The findings presented in Chapter 2 also showed the tendency for an own-cultural-
setting effect in the reporting of crime scene information. Mock witnesses with collectivistic 
cultural orientation were likely to report more correct central details in their free recall for 
crimes witnessed in their own cultural setting than those witnessed in a different cultural 
setting. However, the own-cultural-setting effect for witnesses with collectivistic cultural 
background seems to disappear in a cued recall, as they report the same amount of correct 
central details, regardless of the setting, in response to cued recall questions. Interestingly, in 
the cued recall, witnesses with the individualistic cultural background reported more details 
for crimes witnessed in their own-native setting than a non-native setting, but not for free 
recall. In free recall, individualistic mock witnesses did not differ in the reporting of correct 
central details for their own-native setting and a non-native setting.  
Acculturation effect. Given that socialisation in a cultural context impacts the 
content of eyewitness memory reports, the focus of the second experiment (Chapter 3) was 
on examining whether migrating and adapting to a culture different from one’s native culture 
shapes eyewitness memory reporting. The results showed that migrant witnesses with 
collectivistic cultural backgrounds living in individualistic cultures provided more elaborate 
memory reports than those living in their native culture. In fact, migrants were more likely to 
provide detailed reports the longer their duration of residence in the host culture. The finding 
that adapting in a cultural environment has an impact on the content of memory reports is 
consistent with findings presented in Chapter 2 showing that socialisation in individualistic 
cultures leads to more elaborate memory reporting. Thus, the results presented in Chapter 3 
demonstrate that migrants adapt to the reporting norms of their host culture over time. As in 
Chapter 2, the results presented in Chapter 3 also demonstrate that regardless of the culture a 




witness is socialised in, central details are reported more than contextual details in their 
eyewitness memory reports.  
The misinformation effect. The aim of the research presented in Chapter 4 
(Experiment 3) was to examine whether witnesses socialised in different cultures are 
susceptible to misinformation about particular types of detail (i.e., central versus contextual 
detail). Based on work showing cross-cultural differences in holistic-analytic cognition, I 
sought to specifically find out whether individuals socialised in individualistic cultures are 
more susceptible to misinformation about contextual details, whereas those socialised in 
collectivistic cultures are more susceptible to misinformation about focal details. The results 
showed memory was impaired to the same extent for mock witnesses irrespective of culture, 
following exposure to misleading post-event information. I also found that irrespective of 
cultural background, memory impairment after exposure to misleading post-event 
information was more pronounced for contextual details than central details. Nevertheless, 
the results showed that while misinformation acceptance permeates across cultures, witnesses 
from collectivistic cultures are more likely to accept suggested details, compared with 
witnesses from individualistic cultures. That tendency may be attributed to the cultural 
construal of the self in collectivistic cultures, where the self is viewed as integrated with the 
social context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). An interdependent view of the self could 
increase the likelihood that witnesses socialised in such cultures will prioritise information 
from other social sources in their eyewitness accounts. Hence, in their account of witnessed 
events, they may become more susceptible to incorporating information from social sources 
such as co-witnesses.  
Although the results of the experiment presented in Chapter 4 showed cultural 
differences in the acceptance of misinformation in a recognition task, the results suggested 




that differences in misinformation endorsement disappear in free recall. Witnesses from 
collectivistic cultures appear to engage more in memory regulation by sieving out details that 
may compromise accuracy in their free recall (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). In line with this, 
the results in Chapter 4 also showed that witnesses from collectivistic cultures report fewer 
incorrect details in free recall than witnesses from individualistic cultures. However, the 
results showed again in Chapter 4 that witnesses with individualistic cultural backgrounds 
provide more elaborated memory reports in their eyewitness accounts. That finding replicates 
the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3.  
The authority effect. The experiments reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 show that 
individuals socialised in collectivistic cultures tend to underreport details in their eyewitness 
memory reports in comparison to individuals socialised in individualistic cultures. One factor 
that might account for the cultural differences in elaborate memory reporting is cultural 
differences in relating with authority figures. It has been argued that cross-cultural 
differences in interacting with authority figures could have implications for cultural 
differences in spontaneous and elaborate memory reporting (Ghosh, 2011; Wang, 2006). 
Accordingly, in Chapter 5 (Experiment 4), I sought to find out whether the mere fact of 
reporting to an authority figure (interviewer) might account for variations in eyewitness 
memory reports across cultures. Based on the power distance (PD) cultural framework 
(Hofstede, 1983, 2011), I sampled mock witnesses from cultures representing high PD and 
low PD cultures. They were asked to provide memory reports of a mock crime to either a 
peer or a police officer. The results showed that witnesses from individualistic (low PD) 
cultures provide more elaborate memory reports when reporting to a police detective than 
when reporting to a friend. However, witnesses from collectivistic (high PD) cultures report 
the same amount of details, regardless of whether they are reporting to a peer or a police 




detective. The elaborate memory report when reporting to police may be grounded in self-
presentational norms in individualistic culture (Yamagishi et al., 2012a). It has been argued 
that individuals from individualistic cultures are more responsive to the social environment 
and look for avenues to assert their unique dispositions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003). 
When reporting in a formal context such as a forensic setting, witnesses from individualistic 
cultures may be more likely to adjust their self-presentation, engaging more in self-
enhancement, than when reporting in an informal context.  
As with experiments reported in Chapters 2 - 4, the findings reported in Chapter 5 
indicate that witnesses from collectivistic cultures report fewer details than witnesses from 
individualistic cultures. However, the results in Chapter 5 also showed accuracy rates across 
cultures did not differ in free recall. That finding supports the earlier argument that although 
mock witnesses from collectivistic cultures underreport details, they may have engaged in 
memory regulation to enhance the accuracy of reported details. Nevertheless, the accuracy 
rate was higher for mock witnesses from individualistic cultures than those from collectivistic 
cultures, in cued recall. Mock witnesses from individualistic cultures left more questions 
unanswered in cued recall than mock witnesses from collectivistic cultures. The results 
described in Chapter 5 suggest that the PD cultural dimension may account for cultural 
differences in elaborate memory reporting.  
Theoretical considerations 
Analytic-holistic cognition. Findings from this programme of research challenge one 
of the dominant frameworks in cross-cultural cognition. Proponents of the framework on 
cultural differences in holistic-analytic cognition suggest that individuals from cultures that 
emphasise the independent self-construal develop analytic cognition, whereas individuals 
from cultures that emphasise the interdependent self-construal develop a holistic cognition 




(Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). As a result, they argue 
individuals with the individualistic cultural background are more likely to encode and recall 
more focal details, whereas those with a collectivistic background are more likely to encode 
and recall more contextual details. The holistic-analytic cognition proposal has been a 
dominant framework in the study of culture and memory (Gutchess & Sekuler, 2019). Indeed 
previous research has provided evidence consistent with the holistic-analytic cognitive styles 
in the respective cultures (Huang & Park, 2013; Kitayama et al., 2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 
2006). 
Interestingly, findings from this programme of research show that individuals are 
most likely to recall more focal details, regardless of their cultural orientation. That suggests 
that the proposed framework on the cultural difference in holistic-analytic cognitive style 
may have limited applicability across contexts. For example, it could be that the framework 
may not be applicable within the forensic context as demonstrated in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
That is because in any crime event, witnesses are more likely to focus on the actual event 
instead of other events in the background. Further development of the framework is needed to 
specify the scope of applicability and under what conditions or contexts the cultural 
differences in holistic-analytic cognition may be generalisable.  
Self-presentation. The results showing cultural differences in elaborate memory 
reporting seem to support cultural differences in self-presentation, as posited in the self-
construal theory. According to the independent-interdependent self-construal, self-
presentational patterns across individualistic and collectivistic cultures differ, as the 
respective cultures predispose individuals to self-enhance and self-efface, respectively 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Takata, 2003). For example, individuals socialised in 
individualistic cultures have been argued to view the self as unique (Markus & Kitayama, 




2003). As a consequence, they become more responsive to the social environment in which 
they find themselves, as they look for avenues to assert that uniqueness (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). That predisposition has been argued to make individuals from individualistic cultures 
more self-expressive, what has been referred to as self-enhancement (Yamagishi et al., 
2012a). In this programme of research, mock witnesses with an individualistic cultural 
background provided more enhanced memory reports, compared to mock witnesses with a 
collectivistic orientation, who underreported observed details. Indeed, further evidence from 
this programme of research suggests that more details were withheld by mock witnesses from 
a collectivistic cultural background, who refrained from reporting details they were uncertain 
about than mock witnesses with an individualistic cultural background. That modest reporting 
pattern seems to be in line with the proposed self-effacing self-presentational style of 
collectivistic cultures. Future research should examine the extent at which cultural differences 
in the presentation of the self shape the content of memory reports.  
Power distance framework. The results observed in this programme of research 
aligned with the power distance cultural framework, which predicts cultural differences in 
relating with authority figures. Specifically, whereas high PD cultures emphasise hierarchy in 
social relationships, in low PD cultures hierarchy is less emphasised (Hofstede, 2011). That 
difference has been argued to play a role in spontaneous and elaborate detail provision when 
interacting with authority figures (Wang, 2006). Our findings show that whereas individuals 
from low PD cultures provided more elaborate reports to a police detective than they did to a 
peer, those in high PD cultures did not differ in detail provision to police detective and peer. 
We argued that the differences could be accounted for by an authority effect, in line with the 
PD framework. Indeed our results also showed individuals in high PD cultures perceive more 




inequality (Chapter 5) and also endorse hierarchy in social relationships (Chapter 2) than 
individuals in low PD cultures.  
The observed differences in the authority effect on eyewitness memory reports across 
cultures may also be linked to self-presentation. It could be that interacting with an authority 
figure may enhance or impede self-presentation across the respective cultures. Thus, it is 
possible these two concepts (power distance and self-presentation) may be linked in 
explaining cultural differences in memory reporting. Specifically, while individuals with an 
independent self-construal are likely to see the self as unique, that uniqueness is likely to be 
most asserted in a formal setting such as interacting with or reporting to an authority figure 
than it is to be asserted when interacting with a peer. It is, therefore, proposed that even in 
cultures that emphasise the independent self-construal, the extent of self-enhancement may 
vary across situations and could be a function of who individuals are interacting with. 
Specifically, there is the possibility of extreme/ enhanced self-effacement when individuals 
from such cultures are interacting with authority figures than when interacting with a peer. 
Similarly, in cultures where the interdependent self-construal is emphasised, the extent of 
self-effacement may vary and could be a function of who individuals from such cultures are 
interacting with. Based on previous work and findings from the current programme of 
research, I propose a cross-cultural memory reporting model (Figure 6.1).  





Figure 6. 1. The proposed model shows differences in memory reporting across cultures. For 
each culture, the degree of self-presentation and content of memory reports further vary 
depending on who an individual is reporting to.  
The proposed model suggests that when individuals from cultures that emphasise the 
independent self-construal are interacting with or reporting to a non-authority figure (e.g., a 
peer), the self-presentational pattern they are likely to engage in is the normal self-
enhancement, consistent with the self-presentational style of that culture. Eventually, that 
self-enhancement may lead to the normal elaborate memory reporting, consistent with the 
general reporting model of that culture. However, when reporting to an authority figure, (e.g., 
police detective), they are likely to adjust their self-presentation and engage in an extreme 
form of the self-presentational pattern consistent with that culture (extreme self-
enhancement). It is proposed that, that extreme form of self-enhancement may also lead to an 




enhanced form of elaborate reporting. For individuals socialised in cultures that emphasise 
the interdependent self-construal, the model proposes a pattern of memory reporting that is 
different from individuals socialised in cultures where the independent self is emphasised. 
Specifically, it is proposed that when reporting to a non-authority figure (e.g., a peer) the 
normal self-presentational pattern consistent with that culture would be shown (i.e., self-
effacement), which would then lead to underreporting of detail, the general reporting model 
of that culture. It is further proposed that when reporting to an authority figure, individuals 
with an interdependent self-construal will engage in an extreme form of the self-
presentational pattern consistent with that culture (i.e., extreme self-effacement). That 
extreme form of self-effacement may impede memory reporting, thus, leading to an extreme 
form of underreporting. Future research should test this proposed model and, indeed, explore 
the boundaries of this proposed model, across individualistic and collectivistic cultures.  
Misinformation acceptance and self-construal. The research on the misinformation 
effect across cultures also seems to provide support for the self-construal theory. The theory 
posits that whereas individuals socialised in individualistic cultures view the self as separate 
from the social context, those socialised in collectivistic cultures view the self as integrated 
with the social context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Findings from this programme of 
research show that compared to individuals from individualistic cultures, individuals from 
collectivistic cultures were more susceptible to accepting misleading post-event information 
from a social source (i.e., media). According to the self-construal theory, individuals 
socialised in collectivistic cultures are more likely to prioritise the opinions of others than 
those socialised in individualistic cultures (Hofstede, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Triandis et al., 1988). It might be argued that the view of the self as less embedded within the 




social context may also account for misinformation resistance among mock witnesses from 
individualistic cultures, compared with collectivistic cultural mock witnesses.  
It is clear from the above that findings from this programme of research may have important 
theoretical implications. While the findings provide general support for the self-construal 
theory, there is the need for work in cross-cultural cognition to expand and revise 
propositions on how culture shapes memory and the context of applicability specified.  
Scope and generalisability of the current programme of research 
The current thesis fills an important gap in eyewitness memory literature. The vast 
majority of experiments on eyewitness memory have largely been conducted with mock 
witnesses from Western cultures. Generalising findings conducted with western samples to 
other non-western contexts can be problematic, as previous research has shown that cognitive 
processes may not be universal (Huang & Park, 2013; Kitayama et al., 2003). The scope of 
the current thesis, thus, differs from previous research in eyewitness memory, by going 
beyond western cultures and taking a cross-cultural perspective. Specifically, the programme 
of research takes an important step by comparing eyewitness memory reports provided by 
mock witness participants drawn from both western and sub-Saharan African cultures to 
examine how the cultural background of witnesses may shape eyewitness memory accounts. 
The experiments reported in this dissertation also differ from previous research on cross-
cultural cognition in that, research on cross-cultural cognition has largely focused on drawing 
comparisons between East Asian and North American samples (Duffy, Toriyama, Itakura, & 
Kitayama, 2009; Huang & Park, 2013; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005; 
Wang, Song, & Kim Koh, 2017). Thus, in the current research, the focus lay on comparing 
samples drawn from sub-Saharan Africa and Northern Europe.  




Of course, it could be argued that findings reported in this thesis only apply to sub-
Saharan Africans and Western Europeans, as that was the focus of comparison. Indeed, this is 
a limitation of the current programme of work. Nevertheless, these regions represent the 
collectivistic and individualistic cultural orientations. For example, on Hofstede’s 
Individualism Index, which is on a continuum of 0 to 100, African countries such as Ghana, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, and Nigeria have an individualism index ranging between 15 – 30; 
whereas Western European countries such as Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, and 
United Kingdom have index scores ranging between 80 to 91 (Hofstede, 1983; Hofstede et 
al., 2010). In a recent study by Minkov et al. (2017) examining 56 countries, the UK, The 
Netherlands, and other European countries featured among the top 10 individualistic 
countries, while sub-Saharan African countries featured in that study (e.g., Nigeria, Kenya, 
and South Africa) were among the 10 most collectivistic. Hence, even though the focus of 
this programme of research was sub-Saharan Africa and Western European comparison, these 
cultures are predominantly collectivistic and individualistic in orientation, respectively.  
While replication of the experiments reported in this programme of research in other 
collectivistic cultures is encouraged, the findings may still be generalizable to cultures falling 
on the same cultural dimension. For example, our finding showing that individuals from sub-
Saharan Africa underreport details in their eyewitness memory reports is consistent with 
previous studies on autobiographical memory conducted with East Asian and North 
American samples, representing collectivistic and individualistic cultures, respectively (e.g., 
Ross & Wang, 2010; Wang, 2004). Specifically, these studies also show that individuals from 
East Asia report fewer details in their autobiographical memory reports than individuals from 
North America. In view of the consistency in findings of the current study with studies in 
autobiographical memory conducted with Asian and North American samples, I argue that 




findings from the current study may be generalizable to other collectivistic and individualistic 
cultures.  
The current findings also highlight the possibility of within-cultural differences in 
eyewitness memory reporting. In the results described in Chapter 2, mock witnesses from the 
urban collectivistic cultural group reported more details than those from the rural 
collectivistic cultural group. A similar pattern has been reported in research on 
autobiographical memory reports, where children from rural collectivistic cultures report 
fewer details than children from urban collectivistic cultures (Göz, Çeven, & Tekcan, 2017). 
With the exception of the experiment reported in Chapter 2, all the collectivistic samples in 
this programme of research were urban collectivistic samples. Hence, it could be argued that 
findings reported in Chapters 3 through 5 may be more generalizable in terms of urban 
collectivistic cultures. However, considering that in those experiments, differences were still 
observed between individualistic and the urban collectivistic sample, it seems plausible to 
argue that the difference may have been more pronounced between rural collectivistic and 
individualistic sample, should those experiments have included rural collectivistic samples. 
For example, it is likely the authority effect may be more pronounced for rural collectivistic 
samples than an urban collectivistic sample. Similarly, the tendency for misinformation 
acceptance may be higher for rural collectivistic samples than an urban collectivistic sample. 
This is because previous work shows rural areas tend to be more collectivistic than urban areas 
(Göz, Çeven, & Tekcan, 2017; Ma et al., 2015) among collectivistic cultures (where hierarchy 
is emphasised and the interdependent self is predominant). Consequently, hierarchy and reliance 
on social sources of information may be more pronounced in rural collectivistic cultures than 
urban collectivistic cultures.  




Migrating and adapting in a new cultural environment may impact behaviour and 
cognition (Berry et al., 2006; Hsu, 2010; Wang, 2008). For that reason, findings reported in 
Chapter 2, as well as Chapters 4 and 5, should be generalised with caution to witnesses with a 
collectivistic cultural background who have lived in an individualistic culture for an extended 
period of time. Indeed, the results presented in Chapter 3 suggest that as migrants adapt in 
their host culture, their eyewitness memory reports may differ from those of individuals in 
their home culture. In particular, it is worth noting that these initial results suggest that 
migrants with longer durations of residence in an individualistic culture provided more 
elaborate memory reports. Thus, the results described in Chapter 3 on the misinformation 
effect, and Chapter 4 on the authority effect might have limited generalisability to migrants 
with longer durations of residence in the host culture. However, it is possible that the content 
of eyewitness memory reports of migrants who have lived in the host culture for a relatively 
short period might be more similar to those of individuals living in their home culture, as the 
former have not spent a significant amount of time adapting in the host culture. The level of 
migrants’ adaptation may also depend on the extent to which they engage with the host 
culture (Chioneso, 2008). During investigative interviews, it may be helpful to assess 
migrants' adaptation to the host culture, using a cultural adaptation inventory, to determine 
the extent of acculturation.  
The current programme of research concerns applied memory performance and is 
located within the forensic context. Previous research on cross-cultural cognition has been 
conducted outside the forensic context. Specifically, in previous research, scenes used 
included animated vignettes of underwater scenes (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Senzaki et al., 
2014), layouts of coloured blocks (Boduroglu et al., 2009), artistic representations (Istomin et 
al., 2014; Masuda, Gonzalez, et al., 2008), pictures of streets (Miyamoto et al., 2006), and 




Facebook profile photographs (Huang & Park, 2013). Thus, the majority of previous research 
typically used neutral scenes as stimuli, and results generally show cultural differences in 
holistic-analytic cognition. Specifically, it has been suggested in those studies that individuals 
from individualistic cultures attend and report more focal details than individuals from 
collectivistic cultures, who attend to and report more contextual details than those from 
individualistic cultures (Gutchess & Indeck, 2009; Istomin et al., 2014). In the current 
programme of research, crime scenes and incidents constituted the experimental stimuli. 
Interestingly, and in contrast to research using neutral stimuli, the results reported in Chapters 
2 to 4 showed that compared to contextual details, central details for crime scenes and events 
are reported the most, irrespective of a witness’ cultural background. The unusual, negative 
and perhaps threatening nature of crime scenarios makes it more likely that memory reports 
about such events should consist of central details. Hence, from what we have learned from 
studies in a forensic context and what studies involving non-forensic scenarios show us, it 
would be safe to conclude that previous research using neutral scenes does not generalise 
well to the forensic context and vice versa.  
Methodological considerations and future research 
In this programme of research, I undertook an important step to examine whether 
there are cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports. Four experiments were 
conducted to address the overarching research question. It is important to mention that these 
experiments are not without limitations. In this section, I discuss limitations associated with 
the current programme of research and also make recommendations for future research.  
Sample. It is important to note that some of the experiments reported consisted only 
of student samples. For instance, the experiments reported in Chapters 4 (misinformation 
effect) and 5 (authority) were conducted with university students in Ghana, the Netherlands, 




and the United Kingdom. While it was important to ensure that the sampled population in the 
three different countries were matched in terms of educational level, it could be argued that 
the student sample may not be representative of the general population (Hanel & Vione, 
2016). Nevertheless, the finding for the experiments conducted solely with student samples 
was consistent with findings for experiments where participants were sampled from the 
general population (e.g., Experiments 1 and 2). It would still be necessary for future research 
to examine the misinformation effect as well as the authority effect across cultures, with 
samples drawn from the general population.  
Ecological validity. The stimuli used in the current programme of research involved 
static stimuli and video recordings. The dynamics of real-life events may not necessarily be 
the same as a mock witness situation. For example, it is possible that a mock crime paradigm 
may not have the same emotional impact as in a real-crime situation (Christianson, 1992). It 
should be noted, however, that previous research mimicking real-life scenarios has shown the 
possibility of cultural differences within the forensic setting. For example, in research 
examining the forensic accounts of Native American (Navajo) children and mainstream-
culture American children, researchers enacted a staged event with the children (Lindstedt, 
2000). The findings from that research suggest that the content of forensic narratives of 
native American children differ from that of mainline American children. Nevertheless, it 
would be necessary for future research to extend the experiments reported in this programme 
of research to field settings. Future work should also include archival research involving 
witness statements to examine cultural differences in the content of eyewitness memory 
reports across cultures.  
Also inherent in mock witness scenarios is a short retention interval which may not 
mimic real-life situations. Participants in this programme of research provided memory 




reports of witnessed incidents a few minutes after exposure to the stimuli. In real-world 
scenarios, eyewitnesses may be interviewed about the witnessed event after an extended 
period of time. However, in research on autobiographical memory reports that involved 
recounting personally experienced childhood events, cultural differences were observed 
(Wang & Ross, 2005). Retention interval in such autobiographical memory studies span from 
the time of the childhood personal life experience to the period those studies were conducted 
(adulthood). Hence, individuals from different cultures may still differ in their memory 
reports even after longer retention intervals. In fact in the research by Lindstedt (2000), 
differences in the children’s forensic narratives were still observed, even after months of 
experiencing the staged event. Thus, even though the mock witness paradigm used in the 
current programme of research may not mimick real-life scenarios in view of the short 
retention interval, findings from this programme of research replicate findings of previous 
research with longer retention intervals. Future research examining eyewitness memory 
reports across cultural groups should use longer retention intervals.  
It is also important to mention that the use of a mock witness paradigm helped in 
achieving control that would not have otherwise been attained in a field setting. Using an 
experimental design in this programme of research helped hold constant variables that could 
have confounded results, across cultural groups. Also, the use of the same procedure and 
instructions across cultural groups helped to achieve experimental control. Nevertheless, it is 
important for findings from this programme of research to be replicated in field settings.  
Comparing groups. The experiment on acculturation compared migrants from eight 
sub-Saharan African countries with migrants from a specific sub-Saharan African country 
(i.e., Ghana). Because those migrant participants were from different sub-Saharan African 
countries, it could be argued that it is problematic comparing them with participants from a 




specific sub-Saharan African country. However, our cultural dimension of focus was the 
individualism-collectivism cultural dimension (Hofstede, 2011; Hofstede, Hofstede, & 
Minkov, 2010; Kim & Kim, 2016). Countries in Western Europe, North America, and 
Australia have been shown to be more individualistic in character, whereas countries in Asia, 
sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America have a more collectivistic orientation (Hofstede et al., 
2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 1999; Matsumoto et al., 2008). Thus, although 
migrant participants sampled from Western Europe were from different sub-Saharan African 
countries, the countries they originated from fall within the same cultural orientation.  
Previous research on acculturation and cross-cultural psychology focusing on the 
individualism-collectivism cultural dimension has examined countries with similar cultural 
orientation under the same cultural classification (e.g., Amer, Ngo, & Hasher, 2017; Jobson, 
2009; Millar, Serbun, Vadalia, & Gutchess, 2013; Mok & Morris, 2009; Norenzayan, Smith, 
Kim, & Nisbett, 2002; Taylor, Larner, Conchie, & Menacere, 2017; Wang, 2009). For 
example, in research on cultural differences in autobiographical memory reports, participants 
falling under the collectivistic classification originated from Asia, Africa, Middle East, and 
Latin America, whereas those with individualistic classification were from Australia, Western 
Europe, and North America (Jobson, 2009). Thus, our sub-Saharan African sample falls 
within the cultural dimension of interest, as participants had a collectivistic cultural 
background. Future research comparing migrants from a specific country with those living in 
their home country would also shed more light.  
Longitudinal design. Longitudinal design may have been more methodologically 
robust for tracking how culture shapes the content of eyewitness memory reports of migrants 
overtime. It is worth noting, however, that in the absence of longitudinal data, previous 
studies have used either duration of residence in the host culture, age of migrating to the host 




culture, or group differences as a proxy for acculturation (e.g., Berry, Phinney, Sam, & 
Vedder, 2006; Cheung, Chudek, & Heine, 2011; Chudek, Cheung, & Heine, 2015; Wang, 
2013; Wang & Ross, 2005). For example, in their study examining the acculturation of 
immigrants in 13 countries, Berry et al. (2006) used migrants’ duration of residence in the 
new culture as a means of examining differences in adaptation over time. In this dissertation, 
besides group differences, the duration of residence in the individualistic cultural 
environment was used as a proxy for examining acculturation. It will be important, 
nonetheless, for future research to use a longitudinal design to track migrants' acculturation 
and eyewitness memory reports over a time period, from the time of arrival in the host 
culture.  
Within cultural variations. It is also possible that there might be within-country 
differences in the level of the predominant cultural orientation. For instance, it has been 
shown in research that although Cameroon, West Africa, is collectivistic in cultural 
orientation, Northern Cameroon tends to be more collectivistic than Western and Central 
Cameroon (Pirttilä-Backman, Kassea, & Ikonen, 2004). Some have argued such within-
cultural variation may be due to differences in dominant ecocultural practices in different 
regions of a country (Istomin, Panáková, & Heady, 2014). For example, individuals 
socialised in sedentary agricultural settings have been argued to be likely to resort to more 
interdependence, as they require harmonious group collaboration and cooperation for survival 
(Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008). Hence, dominant practices within particular regions in a 
country might lead to within cultural variations in the degree of predominant cultural 
orientation. The experiments reported in this programme of research mostly did not focus on 
within-group comparisons. Hence, it could be argued that the generalisability of the findings 
may be limited. However, in Experiment 1, eyewitness memory reports provided by both 




mock witnesses from rural (farming) and urban centers of the collectivistic cultural group 
were compared. That experiment showed witnesses from urban collectivistic cultures report 
more details than witnesses from rural collectivistic cultures. As the experiments on 
acculturation, misinformation, and the authority effect did not include a rural collectivistic 
sample, it would be interesting for future research to sample from rural collectivistic cultures. 
It is worth noting that even for the experiment in this dissertation where mock witnesses from 
the collectivistic cultural group were sampled from only urban areas, some differences 
between the urban collectivistic sample and the individualistic culture were observed.  
Individual-level differences. Aside from the possibility of different regions of a 
country varying in the degree of the predominant cultural orientation, there could also be 
variations at the individual level in the intensity of cultural variables. Research in cross-
cultural psychology has done little to examine the degree of intensity of cultural variables at 
the individual level. It may be the case that although there are cultural differences in 
behaviour and psychological functioning, the intensity of specific constructs may further vary 
across individuals. For example, the degree of underreporting within the same cultural group 
may vary from person to person. As such, while being sensitive to an interviewee’s cultural 
background, it may also be helpful for investigators not to lose sight of possible differences at 
the individual level and work within groups to identify optimal ways of eliciting memory. 
However, more research is needed to test these propositions. Hence, future research should 
examine the extent to which there are individual variations in the content of memory reports 
within cultural groups.  
Implications of the current research  
In an increasingly globalised world, it is inevitable that eyewitness memory reports 
will be obtained in cross-cultural contexts (De Bruïne, Vredeveldt, & Van Koppen, 2018; 




Hope & Gabbert, 2019). Yet there is limited knowledge about how culture shapes report from 
memory about witnessed events. The experiments reported in this programme of research 
provide a novel contribution in the eyewitness memory literature and show consistent 
evidence that cultures differ in the nature of their eyewitness memory reports. In this 
subsection, I discuss the potential implications of the findings from this programme of 
research for the wider forensic context. Specifically, I discuss the implications these findings 
may have for applied settings including law enforcement contexts, counter-terrorism 
contexts, and asylum seeker contexts.    
Deception detection. Investigators often have to determine whether an interviewee is 
lying or telling the truth. Research on deception detection has shown that amount of details is 
one of the cues in identifying truth-tellers from liars in law enforcement contexts. However, 
findings reported in this dissertation show that using the amount of details reported as a 
diagnostic cue in detecting deception may be weakened in cross-cultural settings. Across four 
studies in the current thesis, mock witnesses from collectivistic cultures provided fewer 
details than mock witnesses from individualistic cultures. In fact, Leal et al. (2018) observed 
that cultural differences in detail provision could lead to incorrectly interpreting such 
differences as cues to deception. They also found in that study that although truth-tellers 
generally provided more details than lie-tellers did, participants from the individualistic 
cultural group provided more details than those from the collectivistic cultural group. Leal et 
al. (2018) argued that while detailed information could help in distinguishing truth-tellers 
from lie-tellers, caution should be exercised when making such determination in cross-
cultural contexts. Similarly, it has been argued that cues to deception deteriorate when made 
cross-culturally (Taylor, Larner, Conchie, & Menacere, 2017). Taylor et al. (2017) provided 
evidence that linguistic cues to deception are not consistent across cultures. Law enforcement 




officials would need to be culturally sensitive when using the amount of details reported as 
credibility indicators during cross-cultural investigative interviews.  
True and false intentions. Besides law enforcement contexts, findings from this 
programme of research may have implications for diagnosing true and false intentions in 
counter-terrorism contexts. Results from previous research show that suspects with true 
intentions also provide more details than those with false intentions (Granhag, Mac Giolla, 
Sooniste, Strömwall, & Liu-Jonsson, 2016; Mac Giolla & Granhag, 2015). It has been 
reasoned that because truth-tellers have experienced the event, they are able to elaborate more 
on details they provide, making them different from lie-tellers, who rehearse ahead about 
what to say. However, findings from this programme of research suggest that the provision of 
fewer details is not always an indicator that an individual has not witnessed or experienced 
the event in question. Detail elaboration may vary depending on the cultural background of a 
target. As shown in the current thesis as well as in research on autobiographical memory 
reports (Ross & Wang, 2010; Wang, 2001; Wang & Ross, 2005), individuals from 
individualistic cultures spontaneously provide more detailed and elaborate information than 
individuals from collectivistic cultures. Hence, there is a need for cultural sensitivity in 
counter-terrorism contexts in the use of detail provision as a marker of true or false 
intentions.  
Fabricated rape allegations. It has also been shown that one of the indicators of 
fabricated rape allegations is the simplicity of the story and the lack of explicit details (De 
Zutter, Horselenberg, & Van Koppen, 2017). False complainants of rape have been argued to 
adopt a strategy of constructing a story that is concise and general (Marshall & Alison, 2006). 
While that might generally be the case, that diagnosticity may be weakened when made in 
cross-cultural settings. Across the experiments in this programme of research, mock 




witnesses with a collectivistic cultural background provided less elaborate memory reports 
than mock witnesses with individualistic cultural background. A rape victim with a 
collectivistic cultural orientation may not spontaneously provide elaborate details when 
recounting their experience. Their story about the abusive incident might be less elaborate, 
concise, and lacking in detail, due to reporting norms in such cultures. It has been argued that 
each culture creates a model of what life history or personal storytelling should look like, 
leading to response bias (Wang & Ross, 2005). Consequently, distinguishing true from false 
allegations of rape in a cross-cultural context might be challenging. Using detail to access the 
credibility of a rape victim’s account in cross-cultural settings may lead to overlooking 
allegations of true abuse and wrongly accusing them of false allegations. Thus, finding from 
this programme of research provides valuable insight for the investigation of rape allegations 
in cross-cultural contexts. It would be necessary for future research to explore the evaluation 
of true and false rape claims in cross-cultural settings.  
Assessing credibility in asylum seeker contexts. The accounts provided by asylum 
seekers are an important piece of evidence in asylum decision making (Jobson, 2009; Van 
Veldhuizen, Horselenberg, Landström, Granhag, & Van Koppen, 2017). Individuals fleeing 
persecution and seeking asylum are interviewed about many aspects of their lives and 
previous experiences, and decisions on their asylum claims may be made on the basis of these 
interviews (Herlihy, Jobson, & Turner, 2012). Among the evidence gathered in such 
interviews are their memory reports pertaining to descriptions about certain landmarks in the 
village or country of origin (Van Veldhuizen et al., 2018). One of the markers of credibility 
in such interviews is the level of detail of the information provided. When an applicants’ 
account lacks sufficient detail, he or she may be deemed uncredible (Jobson, 2009). As most 
migrants are from collectivistic cultures such as Africa and Asia (Birman & Simon, 2013; 




United Nations Population Division, 2019), many migrants may not be spontaneously explicit 
in their reports about their experience. As a result, genuine asylum seekers are at risk of being 
denied asylum on the basis that they do not meet the (culturally insensitive) credibility 
indicator.  
Findings reported in this thesis provide evidence of the need to reconsider detail 
provision as an indicator in assessing credibility in asylum seeker contexts. At the very least, 
it would be necessary to develop effective interview strategies that facilitate detailed 
information provision in asylum seeker contexts. It has been suggested that immigration 
officials should adopt interview strategies that would enable asylum seekers to provide 
elaborate details (Jobson, 2009; Van Veldhuizen, Horselenberg, Landström, Granhag, & Van 
Koppen, 2017). Indeed, strategies to enhance elaborate memory reports in asylum seeker and 
other cross-cultural settings are needed. Future research should examine culturally sensitive 
techniques for eliciting information in cross-cultural contexts. 
Memory elicitation and power distance. It may be necessary to give considerations 
to an interviewees' perceived power distance when eliciting memory reports in cross-cultural 
settings. The current findings seem to suggest that perceived authority may impede 
eyewitness memory reports of witnesses with collectivistic cultural background. Mock 
witnesses with collectivistic orientation seemed to perceive high PD in social relationships 
than mock witnesses with individualistic cultural orientation. Unsurprisingly, the results also 
showed whereas reporting to police detectives enhances information provision among 
witnesses from individualistic cultures, reporting to authority seems to impede information 
provision among witnesses from collectivistic cultures. Hence, interviewing strategies to 
enhance detailed provision in cross-cultural settings may need to take the cultural factor of 
power distance into account. In fact, it has been argued that best practices in police interviews 




may be compromised when that cultural factor (power distance) is not taken into 
consideration (Sumampouw, Otgaar, La Rooy, & De Ruiter, 2020).  
When interviewing witnesses from high PD cultures, it may be necessary for 
interviewers to use techniques that seek to minimise any power imbalance to enhance 
information elicitation. Effective rapport building may help minimise the impact of authority 
in eliciting eyewitness memory reports. When an effective rapport is developed, an 
atmosphere may be created where free and spontaneous communication is facilitated. This 
calls for an understanding of the best ways of building a friendly and effective rapport with 
interviewees with high PD cultural backgrounds. It has been argued that investigators need to 
be sensitive to cultural differences in establishing effective rapport (Evans, Meissner, 
Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010). Insight into culturally specific rapport building 
strategies may prove valuable in eliciting information in law enforcement and counter-
terrorism contexts. It has been noted that in cross-cultural contexts, establishing an effective 
rapport may yield substantial response from the interviewee (Van Veldhuizen, 2018). 
Accordingly, it has been recommended for interrogators to be trained in building effective 
rapport with interviewees from different cultures (Kleinman, 2006). However, there is a 
paucity of research on effective ways of establishing rapport with interviewees with a high 
PD cultural background. Therefore, future research examining how rapport building impacts 
information elicitation across cultures would be a step in the right direction. 
Adapting current best practices for a wider cultural audience. To enhance 
information retrieval in cross-cultural contexts, it may be helpful to pilot retrieval enhancing 
techniques in other cultures, particularly as many so-called ‘best practice’ interviewing 
protocols were developed in western contexts (Fisher, Geiselman, & Amador, 1989; 
Geiselman, 2012). As cognitive processes are not universal, piloting the interviewing 




protocols in other cultures would be beneficial. Recent research has already begun examining 
the effectiveness of the Cognitive Interview (CI) in collectivistic samples. For example, the 
CI was piloted to examine its utility among Arab children (El Asam & Samara, 2015). It was 
found that the CI (compared with the Standard Interview) is effective in enhancing correct 
recall and reducing suggestive influences among the Arab sample. The authors indicate that 
although the Arab children provided generic reports when asked to report everything (free 
recall), they were able to provide elaborate and more specific details when they were 
carefully prompted and questioned. Thus, interview prompts that encourage witnesses to 
report as many details as possible may enhance detailed provision, especially for witnesses 
with a collectivistic cultural background. For example, the report everything phase of the CI 
asks witnesses to report every detail they remember, no matter how insignificant that might 
seem. With such prompt, a tendency to underreport details can be minimized. Specifically, 
and consistent with the notion of ‘transfer of control’ within the CI, it would also be 
beneficial for the interviewer to emphasise to the interviewee, right from the onset of the 
interview, that he or she (interviewer) was not there when the incident occurred so the 
interviewee should provide an elaborate report as possible. 
It may also be helpful for interviewing techniques in cross-cultural contexts to set 
expectations for the level of completeness. This tactic may be helpful because the 
underreporting of details by collectivistic culture mock witnesses seem to suggest different 
expectations of detail completeness across cultures. Indeed, previous work has shown that the 
model for memory reporting across cultures may differ (Wang & Ross, 2005). It is likely that 
in the investigative interview context, an interviewer’s instruction for a witness to ‘report 
everything’ would yield a response consistent with the witness's expectation of the level of 
completeness. In that vein, it would be helpful for investigators to be explicit on the level of 




detail that is expected from witnesses, especially for witnesses with collectivistic cultural 
background. That is to enable the interviewees to have a fair idea of what level of detail is 
expected of them. Future research on interviewing techniques in cross-cultural contexts 
should examine whether seting the level of detail completeness would enhance elaborate 
memory reporting.  
Future work adapting or developing techniques for a wider cultural context should 
also consider how best to minimise the effect of suggested or misleading information. While 
leading questions should always be avoided in investigative interviews, it is especially 
important in the context of cross-cultural interviews. The findings from this programme of 
research suggest reporting of misleading post-event information may be more pronounced for 
individuals with a collectivistic cultural orientation. Hence, investigative interviews in cross-
cultural contexts may take into account the need to ask witnesses about the source of their 
reports. Also, it may be helpful to instruct witnesses from the onset of an interview that the 
details they report should only be about what they witnessed themselves. Suggestive 
influences when interviewing witnesses from collectivistic cultures may also be reduced 
when efforts are made to reduce interviewees' sensitivity to power dynamics during 
investigative interviews. In Chapters 2 and 5, mock witnesses with collectivistic cultural 
backgrounds perceived more power distance, where they endorsed hierarchy in social 
relationships than mock witnesses with an individualistic orientation. This sensitivity may 
make witnesses with a collectivistic cultural orientation more susceptible to suggestive 
influence from the investigator. Future research should explore further on cultural differences 
in susceptibility to suggestive influences from authority figures. 
Methodological challenges in conducting cross-cultural research 




Conducting cross-cultural research comes with its own peculiar challenges. In the 
current programme of research, participants were sampled from cultures in Western Europe 
and sub-Saharan Africa to examine cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports. In this 
section, I share some learning points about challenges involved in conducting cross-cultural 
research. I also propose solutions for consideration in mitigating some of these challenges 
inherent in cross-cultural research. As these challenges seem inevitable in research in cross-
cultural psychology, sharing these insights and proposed solutions may help improve cross-
cultural research in legal psychology. 
Response bias in cross-cultural survey instruments. One of the methodological 
challenges in conducting cross-cultural research has to do with the issue of measurement in 
cross-cultural surveys. Such surveys usually involve asking participants to provide self-
reports about a psychological or attitudinal construct (e.g., individualism, self-construal). 
Patterns of responding across cultures might differ, hence, the possibility of culturally biased 
response styles. Response styles that have been identified to compromise the validity of 
cross-cultural surveys include Acquiescence Response Style (ARS), Extreme Response Style 
(ERS), and Social Desirability Responding (SDR) (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001; 
Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & Shavitt, 2005; Krautz & Hoffmann, 2019). Acquiescence response 
style is the tendency of survey respondents to give upper limit responses when responding to 
a questionnaire (Kemmelmeier, 2016). ARS, thus, reflects a tendency to mostly agree to 
items on a questionnaire, rather than a response that reflects a true personally held opinion. 
Quite similar to ARS, ERS is the tendency to use middle ratings less and overuse either ends 
of a Likert scale (e.g., totally agree or totally disagree; Morren, Gelissen, & Vermunt, 2012). 
Besides ARS and ERS, Social Desirability Responding (SDR) can bias responses on cross-




cultural surveys. SDR is the tendency for survey responders to create a particular impression 
of themselves that may not necessarily be consistent with reality (Kemmelmeier, 2016).  
These biases in responding have been shown to be culturally grounded and may 
confound cross-cultural comparisons in research (Bou Malham & Saucier, 2016; Middleton 
& Jones, 2000). For example, it has been shown that ERS, ARS, and SDR mostly tend to be 
stronger among a collectivistic than among an individualistic sample (Johnson et al., 2005). 
(Hofstede, 2011; Hofstede et al., 2010; Minkov et al., 2017). It has been suggested that one 
way of keeping ARS and ERS in check is using both reverse coded and positively coded 
items when constructing the survey instrument (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001). It has also 
been proposed that SDR may be fixed by using measures that specifically access SDR in 
order to control for it in subsequent analysis (Domínguez Espinosa & Van De Vijver, 2014; 
Kemmelmeier, 2016). In hindsight, these measures to minimise culturally biased responding 
could have been factored into the survey for the current programme of research. Thus, to 
mitigate the challenge of culturally grounded responding patterns, future cross-cultural 
surveys should consider some of the recommended approaches. 
Normative sample of scale. Another major challenge in conducting cross-cultural 
research is that some of the scales developed for cross-cultural surveys were developed with 
samples different from the population for the research. As a result, there could be differences 
in characteristics between the normative sample used in developing the scale and the study 
sample of interest. In fact, others have expressed concern about the use of measures of 
cultural orientation developed in non-African contexts for research in Africa, arguing such 
measures may have low psychometric properties (Pirttilä-Backman et al., 2004). The 
normative sample used in developing the cultural orientation scale by Triandis and Gelfand 
(1998), for example, were East Asian and American samples. While there may be similarities 




to a large extent between East Asian and sub-Saharan African collectivism, there may be 
peculiarities to the respective collectivistic cultures. Indeed others have argued the possibility 
for different versions of collectivism to exist in the respective contexts (Adams & Dzokoto, 
2003; Triandis, 2001; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Hence, items on measures of cultural 
orientation and other attitudinal measures might be context-sensitive. For instance, it has been 
argued that while the inter-correlations of the cultural orientation sub-scale are theoretically 
and conceptually sensible when used with an African sample, the items might not cover other 
topics or content domains needed to tap into African collectivism (Pirttilä-Backman et al., 
2004). Because such scales were developed in different contexts, it could also be that when 
used in other contexts, participants may not comprehend some of the items or expressions 
used on the scale.  
It is also worth noting that previous work shows the cultural orientation scale 
(Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) sometimes yields unexpected ratings, inconsistent with the 
country scores. For example, research on national cultures shows Switzerland is high on 
individualism (Country score of +105), whereas South Africa is low (Country score of –105; 
Minkov et al., 2017). However, in a study validating Triandis and Gelfand’s (1998) cultural 
orientation scale in those two countries, participants from South Africa gave higher ratings on 
both individualism and collectivism than participants from Switzerland (Györkös et al., 
2013).14 Even though that study only sought to validate the scale in the respective countries 
without necessarily making cross-cultural comparisons, the observed differences in mean 
individualism and collectivism when making cross-cultural comparisons show possible lapses 
                                                          
14 The two countries significantly differed in their mean scores on individualism (Switzerland – n = 585, M = 
45.50, SD = 9.49; South Africa – n = 818, M = 48.53, SD = 10.37) and collectivism (Switzerland – n = 585 M = 
55.97, SD = 7.20; South Africa – n = 818, M = 57.15, SD = 9.87). An independent t-test analysis based on these 
means showed participants from South Africa scored significantly higher on individualism than participants 
from Switzerland, t (1401) = 5.59, p < .001, d = .30. South Africa also scored significantly higher on 
collectivism than Switzerland, t (1501) = 2.46, p = .01, d = .14. 




in the use of the scale for cross-cultural surveys (Fiske, 2002). In the current programme of 
research, I found a pattern similar to the data reported by Györkös et al. (2013), as sub-
Saharan Africans in this programme of research gave higher ratings for both individualism 
and collectivism compared to western Europeans. The higher ratings by the African 
participants on self-reported individualism and collectivism may also reflect response bias, as 
argued above. I recommend future studies use other scales on cultural orientation validated 
for making cross-cultural comparisons. It would also be necessary for future work to develop 
a scale for a particular context tapping into the cultural orientation of that context. That would 
help make such measures context-sensitive and cover content domains relevant for tapping 
into the cultural orientation of interest. It may also help address the potential problem of 
comprehending items on the scale.   
Language and meaning. Language is another methodological challenge in the 
conduct of cross-cultural research. That is especially so if the comparison groups are not 
proficient in a common language, for which reason the study has to be conducted in different 
languages. In such situations, translation into a common language may lead to a loss of 
intended meaning or relevant details. It could even be that coding details in the respective 
languages might lead to disparities across groups and results might be confounded. In the 
experiments reported in this thesis, mock witnesses across cultures were proficient in English, 
which was the mode of instruction in the study. The official language in Ghana is English and 
is the medium of instruction and communication, from primary to tertiary level. Nevertheless, 
in Experiment 1 where a few of the rural Ghanaian sample had limited comprehension of 
English, I engaged the service of a linguist who is a doctoral-level student and an expert in 
the local language to help with translation. Also, a bilingual research assistant who is 
indigenous to the locality translated the responses of those rural participants into English for 
coding. While these approaches may not be entirely adequate in ruling out language 




confound, they are very important steps adopted in this programme of research in addressing 
language challenges. Future cross-cultural research might use such an approach in handling 
language challenges.  
Another approach to mitigating language challenge that future cross-cultural research 
might consider is cross-translations. An example of such an approach was used in research 
that examined the context-sensitivity of Japanese and Americans (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). 
Responses in that research were in the English language for American participants and 
Japanese language for Japanese participants. Two bilinguals translated the American (English 
language) data into the Japanese language, and then the Japanese (Japanese language) data 
were also translated into the English language. A bilingual Japanese and American then 
independently checked for the correspondence of these translations to the original languages. 
With regards to coding, two English coders coded the Japanese data that were translated into 
English language and the American (English) data. Two Japanese coders also coded the 
English data that were translated into Japanese and the Japanese data. Thus for each 
language, coding is done in both the original language and for the translated version by 
different coders proficient in the respective languages. In that way, the researchers can assess 
the level of agreement not just across coders but across language versions.  
Demographic differences in rural and urban samples. Due to rural-urban 
migration in collectivistic cultures, the population in rural areas tends to be relatively older 
than the urban areas. That means in cross-cultural comparisons involving a rural sample, 
there is the likelihood that the sample would be relatively older and less educated than the 
urban collectivistic as well as individualistic cultural sample. Indeed, that is one of the 
limitations discussed in Chapter 2 which involved a comparison between rural collectivistic 
and urban collectivistic samples. That challenge may be most likely when the research 




involves a student sample, as they tend to be relatively younger. Hence, cross-cultural 
research focusing on the general population may be one of the ways of mitigating this 
challenge. Another approach could also be carefully matching samples across rural and urban 
populations in such research.  
 
Conclusion 
In this programme of research, I examined whether there are cultural differences in the 
content of eyewitness memory reports. Based on the self-construal theory, I sampled mock 
witnesses from collectivistic (sub-Saharan Africa) and individualistic (Western Europe) 
cultures and compared their memory reports, after exposure to mock crime events. Across 
experiments, I found evidence that the cultural background of witnesses may shape the 
content of their eyewitness memory reports. For example, in all four experiments, the results 
show that witnesses with a collectivistic cultural orientation are more prone to underreport 
details in their reports from memory about witnessed events than witnesses with an 
individualistic cultural orientation. This consistent finding provides a direction for future 
research on how best to elicit eyewitness memory reports in cross-cultural contexts. Overall, 
the programme of research reveals marked cultural differences in eyewitness memory reports 
and highlights some important implications for investigative interviews in law enforcement 
and other cross-cultural settings. This contribution to the literaure is important in light of the 
increasing likelihood that investigative and legal professionals will interview witnesses with a 
cultural background different from theirs. Hence, the findings provide valuable insights into 
investigative interviewing of witnesses in cross-cultural contexts. It is, therefore, crucial that 
practitioners are trained to be sensitive to cultural issues in the elicitation of memory reports. 
Without sufficient training, interviewees may be misunderstood or efforts at eliciting memory 




reports may be impeded. Cultural issues must be incorporated into training modules for 
investigators and legal professionals working in cross-cultural contexts. Meanwhile future 
research must adapt interviewing protocols for a wider cultural context. 
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Appendix 1: Supplementary materials (Chapters 2 and 3) 
Stimuli 
Stimuli A (Dutch scene) Stimuli E (Dutch scene) 
 
 
Stimuli B (Ghanaian scene) Stimuli F (Ghanaian scene) 
 
 
Stimuli C (Dutch scene) Stimuli G (Dutch scene) 











Free and cued recall questions about Stimulus A  
Free Recall 
Your task is to describe what you saw in the photograph. Imagine that you are being asked to 
report about the scene to the police and that any details you give about the scene you saw is 
important.  




Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. 
You have 6 minutes to complete this task.  If you finish your report before 6 minutes have 
elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report about what you saw.  
Cued Recall 
1. What clothes was the man wearing? 
  
2. Who was visible at the scene apart from the man and the woman (victim)? 
  
3. What was the man doing? 
  
4. Who was looking at the direction of the man and woman (victim)? 
  
5. Where was the man looking? 
  
6. Can you describe the colour of the building where the incident occurred?  
  
7. What was the woman holding? 
  
8. What numbers did you notice written inside the building? 
  
9. Which part/ side of the item was she (victim) holding? 
 
10. What was the man in the wheelchair holding? 
  
11. With which hand was the woman victim holding the item? 
  
12. What clothes was the man in the wheelchair wearing? 
  
13. Describe the woman’s (victim) hair? 
  
14. What did you notice behind the man in the wheelchair? 
  
15. What colour earing was the woman victim wearing? 
  
16. What was written at the top of the board behind the woman (victim)? 
  
17. What footwear was the woman (victim) wearing?  
  
18. Where was the tree inside the building located? 
  
19. What clothes was the woman victim wearing?  
  




20. How many people were on the billboard or pull-up flier that stood at the left side of 
the scene? 
  
Free and cued recall questions about stimulus B  
 
Free Recall 
Your task is to describe what you saw in the photograph. Imagine that you are being asked to 
report about the scene to the police and that any details you give about the scene you saw is 
important.  
Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. 
You have 6 minutes to complete this task.  If you finish your report before 6 minutes have 
elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report about what you saw.  
Cued Recall 
1. How many cars in all did you notice at the car park? 
  
2. What was the colour of the car the man was standing by? 
  
3. What was the colour of the roof of the building by the trees? 
  
4. What was the man doing? 
  
5. What colour was the car next to the one the man was standing by? 
  
6. Which of his hands had held the door of the car? 
 
7. On which side of the scene were the people at the background located? 
  
8. Describe the footwear the man was wearing? 
 
9. What were the people at the background doing? 
  
10. What did the man wear on his hand? 
 
11. What colour(s) were the writings on the small boards at the car park? 
  
12. On which side of the car was the man standing? 
  
13. What colour was the building on the left side? 





14. Which side of the car did you notice some dirt? 
  
15. What colour was the building on the right side? 
  
16. Describe the clothes the man was wearing? 
  
17. Where was the dustbin located? 
  
18. Describe any facial feature of the man. 
  
19. Where was the bird at the scene standing? 
  
20. What colour was the side mirror of the car the man was standing by? 
  
 
Free and cued recall questions about stimulus C  
Free Recall 
Your task is to describe what you saw in the photograph. Imagine that you are being asked to 
report about the scene to the police and that any details you give about the scene you saw is 
important.  
Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. 
You have 6 minutes to complete this task.  If you finish your report before 6 minutes have 
elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report about what you saw.  
Cued Recall 
1. Describe the footwear the woman was wearing? 
  
2. Where was the plant (weed/ hedge) on the background located? 
  
3. How many stripes did you see on the woman’s right footwear? 
  
4. How many people were on the background (apart from the woman)? 
  
5. What clothes was the woman (victim) wearing? 
  
6. What colour was the motorcycle? 
 
7. Describe the woman’s (victim) position on the floor? 
  




8. What clothes was the man walking on the right side of the street wearing? 
  
9. What was written (text) on the rear/ back window of the car? 
  
10. What colour was the window frames of the second building on the right? 
  
11. What was the number of the car next to the victim? 
  
12. What image(s)/ sign was on the traffic/ road sign on the right? 
  
13. With what colour was the number of the car written? 
  
14. How many cars were on the background (apart from the car by the victim)? 
  
15. What colour was the car by the woman victim? 
  
16. Where were the bicycles parked? 
  
17. What was written under the left red light of the car? 
  
18. What was the colour of the pole located beside the victim? 
 
19. Describe the woman’s (victim) hair. 
 
20. What colour was the first building on your right? 
  
 
Free and cued recall questions about stimulus D  
Free Recall 
Your task is to describe what you saw in the photograph. Imagine that you are being asked to 
report about the scene (anything you saw on the picture) to the police and that any details you 
give about the scene you saw is important.  
Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. 
You have 6 minutes to complete this task.  If you finish your report before 6 minutes have 
elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report about what you saw.  
Cued Recall 
1. What was on the window at the scene? 
 
2. What was the man wearing on his hands? 





3. What did you see beneath/ below the window? 
 
4. Describe the footwear the man was wearing? 
  
5. What was on the door behind the woman? 
  
6. What was the man doing? 
 
7. Where was the fridge located? 
  
8. What clothes was the man wearing? 
 
9. What was the colour of the fridge? 
  
10. What was the woman doing with her hands? 
  
11. What was written on the fridge? 
  
12. Describe the footwear the woman was wearing? 
  
13. What did you see behind the man? 
  
14. Describe the woman’s hair? 
  
15. On which side of the scene was the TV located? 
  
16. What colour was the writing (text) on the woman’s clothe? 
  
17. What was on the TV screen? 
  
18. On which part of the man’s body was the woman holding? 
 
19. Describe what the woman was seated on? 
 
20. What was the colour of the TV stand? 
 
 
Free and cued recall questions about stimulus E  
Free Recall 
Your task is to describe what you saw in the photograph. Imagine that you are being asked to 
report about the scene to the police and that any details you give about the scene you saw is 
important.  




Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. 
You have 6 minutes to complete this task.  If you finish your report before 6 minutes have 
elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report about what you saw.  
Cued Recall 
1. What clothes was the man wearing? 
  
2. What colour was the car next to the one the man was standing beside? 
  
3. Describe the footwear the man was wearing? 
  
4. What was in front of the car the man was standing beside? 
  
5. What was the colour of the car the man was standing by? 
  
6. How many cars were at the carpark?  
 
7. What was the car number of the car the man was standing by? 
  
8. Where was the lamp stand located? 
  
9. What colours were on the number plate of the car (the one the man was standing 
beside)? 
  
10. What colour was the pole of the lamp (stand)? 
  
11. What was the man doing? 
  
12. What colour was the building at the scene? 
  
13. Describe the hair of the man. 
  
14. What colour was the window frame of the building at the scene? 
 
15. What was written on the car, apart from the car number? 
  
16. What was the colour of the third car? 
  
17. On which side of the car was the man standing? 
  
18. What colour was the poles of the bicycle shed? 
 




19. What was the man wearing on his left hand? 
 
20. Describe the roof of the bicycle shed. 
  
 
Free and cued recall questions about stimulus F  
Free Recall 
Your task is to describe what you saw in the photograph. Imagine that you are being asked to 
report about the scene to the police and that any details you give about the scene you saw is 
important.  
Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. 
You have 6 minutes to complete this task.  If you finish your report before 6 minutes have 
elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report about what you saw.  
Cued Recall 
1. What was the name of the shop the nun was facing? 
  
2. What was the woman (victim) seated on? 
  
3. Who stood in front of the shop the nun was headed? 
  
4. Describe the footwear the woman (victim) was wearing? 
  
5. What was the colour of the shirt of the little boy at the scene? 
 
6. Which of the legs of the woman (victim) had been raised? 
  
7. What was the little boy doing? 
  
8. What was the woman (victim) holding? 
  
9. What was the colour of the little boy’s footwear? 
  
10. Describe the footwear the man (suspect) was wearing? 
  
11. Who was beside the little boy? 
  
12. What clothes was the woman (victim) wearing 
  




13. How many people were in front of the shop behind the woman (victim)? 
  
14. What was the man doing? 
  
15. What is the name of the shop behind the woman (victim)? 
 
16. What clothes was the man wearing? 
  
17. What did you see on the platform beside the little boy? 
  
18. Which side of the woman’s (victim) item had the man held? 
 
19. How many people were in front of the second shop on your left? 
  
20. What jewellery was the woman (victim) wearing? 
  
 
Free and cued recall questions about stimulus G  
Free Recall 
Your task is to describe what you saw in the photograph. Imagine that you are being asked to 
report about the scene to the police and that any details you give about the scene you saw is 
important.  
Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. 
You have 6 minutes to complete this task.  If you finish your report before 6 minutes have 
elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report about what you saw.  
Cued Recall 
1. What was the man who was standing next to the woman doing?  
  
2. What was written (text) above the door on the right? 
 
3. What clothes was he (suspect) wearing? 
 
4. What musical instrument(s) did you see? 
  
5. What colour was his (suspect) belt? 
  
6. How many people were at the scene (apart from the suspect and the victim)? 
 




7. What colour was his (suspect) watch? 
 
8. Where were the people at the scene standing? 
  
9. What clothes was the woman (victim) wearing? 
  
10. What were the people at the background doing? 
  
11. What was the colour of the woman (victim’s) footwear? 
 
12. Where was the telephone on the background located? 
  
13. Where was the woman’s (victim) right hand placed/positioned? 
 
14. What colour was the telephone on the background? 
  
15. Where was the woman’s (victim) left hand placed/ positioned? 
  
16. How many doors did you notice at the scene? 
  
17. Describe what the woman was seated on. 
 
18. What colours did the chairs have? 
  
19. Describe the woman’s hair. 
  
20. How were the people on the background dressed? 
  
 
Free and cued recall questions about stimulus H  
Free Recall 
Your task is to describe what you saw in the photograph. Imagine that you are being asked to 
report about the scene to the police and that any details you give about the scene you saw is 
important.  
Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. 
You have 6 minutes to complete this task.  If you finish your report before 6 minutes have 
elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report about what you saw.  
Cued Recall 
1. Where was the street light located? 





2. Describe how the woman (victim) was lying on the floor? 
  
3. Where was the wall located? 
  
4. On which side of the car was the woman lying? 
  
5. What was the colour of the wall of the building? 
  
6. What was the woman (victim) wearing on her hand? 
 
7. What was the colour of the building? 
  
8. What colour was the item on her hand? 
  
9. How many windows of the building did you see? 
  
10. On which of her hands was she wearing the item? 
 
11. What colour was the window frame of the building? 
  
12. What clothes did she wear? 
 
13. Where was the building located at the scene? 
  
14. Describe the footwear the woman (victim) was wearing? 
  
15. On which side of the building was the window located? 
 
16. What was the colour of the car? 
  
17. How many trees were at the right side of the car? 
  
18. What was the number of the car? 
  
19. Describe the trees on the left side of the car. 
 
20. What colours did you notice on the number plate of the car? 
 
 
The Cultural Orientation Scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) 




For each of the statements below, indicate the extent to which each is true about yourself or the 
view you uphold.  Your response should range between 1 (Never or definitely no) to 9 (Always 
or definitely yes) 
___   1. I'd rather depend on myself than others.   
___   2. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.   
___   3. I often do "my own thing."   
___  4. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.    
___  5.  It is important that I do my job better than others.   
___ 6. Winning is everything.   
___ 7. Competition is the law of nature.  
 ___ 8. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.   
___  9. If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.  
___ 10. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me.  
___ 11. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.  
___ 12. I feel good when I cooperate with others.   
___ 13. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible.   
___ 14. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when 1 have to sacrifice what I want.   
___ 15. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.   
___ 16. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups. 





Twi translation of interview questions 
Ahwɛdeɛ A  
Kae na ka 
Nea yɛɛhwehwɛ afiri wo hɔ ne sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui wɔ mfonin no so no. Fa no sɛ yɛɛbisa wo 
sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui kyerɛɛ apoliisifoɔ na nea wobɛka biaa afa nea wohui no ho hia yie paa. 
Bɔ mmɔden sɛ wobɛka nsɛm a ɛho hia nyinaa wɔ sɛnea wuhuu no faayɛ. Yere wo ho ka no 
sɛnea esii pɛpɛɛpɛ na kyerɛ mu fann. 
Wowɔ sima nsia sɛ wode bedi saa dwuma yi. Sɛ wowie ansa na sima nsia a yɛde ama wo no 
bi aka, wobetumi akɔso akaakae na ɔaka nea wohuuyɛ no. 
Nsɛmmisa ahoroɔ 
1. Ataadeɛ bɛn na na papa no (dea yɛse ɔadi bɔne no) hyɛ? 
2. Whan biom na wohuu no wɔ baabi asɛm no sii no ka papa no ɛne maame (dea asɛm 
ato no no) 
3. Dɛn na na papa no (dea yɛse ɔadi bɔne no) ɛɛyɛ? 
4. Whana na na ɔɔhwɛ baabi a na papa no ne maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) wɔ no? 
5. Ɛhefa na na papa no (dea yɛse ɔadi bɔne no) ɛɛhwɛ? 
6. So wobɛtumi akyerɛ ɛdan a asɛm no sii mu/ho no ahosu?  
7. Dɛn na na maame no kura? 
8. Nɔmɛse bɛn na wohuu sɛ yɛatwerɛ wɔ ɛdan no mu? 
9. Nnoɔma (baage) no hefa na na maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) kura? 
10. Dɛn na na papa no a ɔte abubuafoɔ kaa/akonwa no mu no kura?  
11. Nsa bɛn/dea ɛwɔ he na na maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) de kura nnoɔma no? 
12. Ntaadeɛ bɛn na na papa no a ɔte abubuafoɔ kaa/akonwa no mu no hyɛ? 
13. Kyerɛ sɛdea na maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) tiri nwi teɛ.  
14. Deɛn na wohuuyɛ wɔ papa no a ɔte abubuafoɔ kaa/akonwa no mu no akyi hɔ?   
15. Asomdeɛ a na ɛhyɛ maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) ahosu ne deɛn? 




16. Deɛ bɛn na na wɔatwerɛ wɔ dua a ɛwɔ baabi na maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) gyina 
no akyi hɔ no ho no? 
17. Mpaboa bɛn nan a ɛhyɛ maame no (dea asɛm ato no no)?  
18. Ɛhefa na na dua a na ɛfie/ɛdan no mu hɔ no si?  
19. Ntaadeɛ bɛn na na maame no hyɛ?  
20. Nnipa dodoɔ ahe na na wɔwɔ beebɔdo a na esi benkum so hɔ no so? 
  
Ahwɛdeɛ B   
Kae na ka 
 Nea yɛɛhwehwɛ afiri wo hɔ ne sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui wɔ mfonin no so no.. Fa no sɛ yɛɛbisa wo 
sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui kyerɛɛ apoliisifoɔ na nea wobɛka biaa afa nea wohui no ho hia yie paa. 
 Bɔ mmɔden sɛ wobɛka nsɛm a ɛho hia nyinaa wɔ sɛnea wuhuu no faayɛ. Yere wo ho ka no 
sɛnea esii pɛpɛɛpɛ na kyerɛ mu fann. 
Wowɔ sima nsia sɛ wode bedi saa dwuma yi. Sɛ wowie ansa na sima nsia a yɛde ama wo no 
bi aka, wobetumi akɔso akaakae na ɔaka nea wohuuyɛ no. 
Nsɛmmisa ahoroɔ 
1. Alɔɔre/kaa dodoɔ ahe na wohuuyɛ wɔ baabi yɛpaake kaa no?  
2. Kaa no a na papa no gyina ho no ahosu te sɛn? 
3. Ɛdan a na yɛabɔso no a na dua no si ho no nkyɛnsen no ahosu te sɛn?    
4. Deɛn na na papa no (dea yɛse ɔadi bɔne no) ɛɛyɛ? 
5. Kaa no a na esi dea na papa no gyina ho no ahosu te sɛn? 
6. Ne nsa mu dea ɛhe nan a aso kaa no geeti no mu no? 
7. Ɛhefa nan nipa a na wogyinagyina hɔ no wɔ no? 
8. Kyerɛ mpaboa ko a na papa no (dea yɛse ɔadi bɔne no) hyɛ no. 
9. Deɛn nan a nnipa a wogyinagyina hɔ no eeyɛ? 
10. Deɛn na na ɛbɔ papa no (dea yɛse ɔadi bɔne no) nsa no? 
11. Ntwerɛyɛ a na ɛwɔ nnua nketewa no ho no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 
12. Kaa no hefa na na papa no (dea yɛse ɔadi bɔne no) no gyina no? 
13. Ɛdan a na ɛwɔ benkum so hɔ no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 




14. Kaa no ho hefa na wohuuyɛ sɛ efi wɔ hɔ? 
15. Ɛdan a na ɛwɔ nifa so hɔ no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 
16. Kyerɛ ntaade ko a na papa no (dea yɛse ɔadi bɔne no) hyɛ. 
17. Ɛhefa nan a bɔɔla kyɛnsen no si no?  
18. Kyerɛ nea wokae wɔ papa no anim. 
19. Ɛhefa na na anomaa a ɔwɔ hɔ no si? 
20. Ahwehwɛ a na papa no gyina ho no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 
 
Ahwɛdeɛ D 
Kae na ka 
 Nea yɛɛhwehwɛ afiri wo hɔ ne sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui wɔ mfonin no so no. Fa no sɛ yɛɛbisa wo 
sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui kyerɛɛ apoliisifoɔ na nea wobɛka biaa afa nea wohui no ho hia yie paa. 
Bɔ mmɔden sɛ wobɛka nsɛm a ɛho hia nyinaa wɔ sɛnea wuhuu no faayɛ. Yere wo ho ka no 
sɛnea esii pɛpɛɛpɛ na kyerɛ mu fann. 
Wowɔ sima nsia sɛ wode bedi saa dwuma yi. Sɛ wowie ansa na sima nsia a yɛde ama wo no 
bi aka, wobetumi akɔso akaakae na ɔaka nea wohuuyɛ no. 
Nsɛmmisa ahoroɔ 
1. Kyerɛ mpaboa ko a na maame no hyɛ no. 
2. Ɛhefa na na nwura/mfrawɛse a na ɛwɔ akyiri hɔ no wɔ? 
3. Nsensanyɛ dodoɔ ahe na wohuuyɛ wɔ maame no nan nifa mpaboa no so no?  
4. Sɛ woyi maame no firi mu a, nnipa dodoɔ ahe na wohuuyɛ wɔ akyiri hɔ no? 
5. Ntaadeɛ bɛn na na maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) hyɛ? 
6. Na motosaekere no ahosu te sɛn? 
7. Kyerɛ baabi a na maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) wɔ fam hɔ.  
8. Ntaadeɛ bɛn na na papa no a na ɔnam nifa so wɔ ɔkwan no mu hɔ no hyɛ? 
9. Deɛn na na wɔatwerɛ wɔ kaa no ahwehwɛ a ɛwɔ akyiri hɔ no so no? 
10. Ɛdan a na ɛtɔ so mmienu wɔ nifa so hɔ no mpoma no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn?  
11. Kaa no a na ɛwɔ dea asɛm ato no nkyɛn no nɔma yɛ deɛn? 
12. Nfonin anaa ahyɛnsode bɛn na ɛwɔ ɛkwan no nifa no so hɔ no? 




13. Na wɔde kɔla bɛn na atwerɛ kaa no nɔma no? 
14. Sɛ woyi dea asɛm ato no no kaa no firi mu a, alɔɔre dodoɔ ahe na na ɛwɔ akyiri hɔ 
no?  
15. Kaa no a na ɛwɔ dea asɛm ato no no nkyɛn no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 
16. Ɛhefa na na wɔapaake adadempɔnkɔ/abaasekere no?  
17. Deɛn na na wɔatwerɛ wɔ kaa no a na ɛwɔ benkum so hɔ no kanea kɔkɔɔ no ase no? 
18. Poolu a na ɛwɔ na ɛwɔ dea asɛm ato no no nkyɛn hɔ no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 
19. Kyerɛ sɛdea na maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) tiri nwi teɛ? 
20. Ɛdan a na edi kan wɔ nifa so hɔ no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 
 
Ahwɛdeɛ E 
Kae na ka 
Nea yɛɛhwehwɛ afiri wo hɔ ne sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui wɔ mfonin no so no. Fa no sɛ yɛɛbisa wo 
sɛ kyerɛ nea wohuuyɛ (wɔ dea esiiyɛ no mu no) kyerɛɛ apoliisifoɔ na nea wobɛka biaa afa 
nea wohui no ho hia yie paa. 
Bɔ mmɔden sɛ wobɛka nsɛm a ɛho hia nyinaa wɔ sɛnea wuhuu no faayɛ. Yere wo ho ka no 
sɛnea esii pɛpɛɛpɛ na kyerɛ mu fann. 
Wowɔ sima nsia sɛ wode bedi saa dwuma yi. Sɛ wowie ansa na sima nsia a yɛde ama wo no 
bi aka, wobetumi akɔso akaakae na ɔaka nea wohuuyɛ no. 
Nsɛmmisa ahoroɔ 
1. Dɛn na na ɛwɔ mpoma no ano wɔ adesuadeɛ no mu no? 
2. Ɛdeɛn nan a ɛbɔ papa no nsa no?  
3. Ɛdeɛn na wohuuyɛ wɔ mpoma no ase no? 
4. Kyerɛ sɛnea na mpaboa na papa no hyɛ no teɛ. 
5. Ɛdeɛn na na ɛwɔ ɛpono/geeti a na ɛwɔ maame no akyi no so no?   
6. Ɛdeɛn na na papa no eeyɛ? 
7. Na asukɔtwea adaka/friigi no si no? 
8. Ntaadeɛ bɛn na na papa no hyɛ?  
9. Na friigi no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 




10. Ɛdeɛn na na maame no de ne nsa ɛɛyɛ?  
11. Ɛdeɛn na na wɔatwerɛ wɔ friigi no ho no? 
12. Kyerɛ mpaboa a na ɛhyɛ maame no. 
13. Ɛdeɛn ade na wohuuyɛ wɔ papa no akyi no? 
14. Kyerɛ sɛdea na maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) tiri nwi teɛ. 
15. Ɛhefa na na TV no si wɔ dea wohwɛɛyɛ/wohuuyɛ no mu no?  
16. Na wɔde kɔla bɛn na atwerɛ ntwerɛyɛ a na ɛwɔ maame no ataadeɛ/ntoma no mu no? 
17. Ɛdeɛn na na wɔɔyi wɔ TV no so no soɔ no? 
18. Papa no hefa na na maame no aso no? 
19. Kyerɛ nea na maame no te soɔ no? 
20. Na adeɛ a yɛde TV no si so no kɔla te sɛn? 
 
Ahwɛdeɛ Ɛ 
Kae na ka 
Nea yɛɛhwehwɛ afiri wo hɔ ne sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui wɔ mfonin no so no. Fa no sɛ yɛɛbisa wo 
sɛ kyerɛ nea wohuuyɛ kyerɛɛ apoliisifoɔ na nea wobɛka biaa afa nea wohui no ho hia yie paa. 
Bɔ mmɔden sɛ wobɛka nsɛm a ɛho hia nyinaa wɔ sɛnea wuhuu no faayɛ. Yere wo ho ka no 
sɛnea esii pɛpɛɛpɛ na kyerɛ mu fann. 
Wowɔ sima nsia sɛ wode bedi saa dwuma yi. Sɛ wowie ansa na sima nsia a yɛde ama wo no 
bi aka, wobetumi akɔso akaakae na ɔaka nea wohuuyɛ no. 
Nsɛmmisa ahoroɔ 
1. Ntaadeɛ bɛn na na papa no hyɛ? 
2. Kaa no a na ɛwɔ papa no nkyɛn no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 
3. Kyerɛ mpaboa a na ɛhyɛ papa no. 
4. Deɛn na na ɛwɔ kaa a papa no gyina ho no anim no? 
5. Kaa no a na papa no gyina ho no ahosu/kɔla te sɛn? 
6. Alɔɔre/kaa dodoɔ ahe na wohuuyɛ wɔ baabi a yɛpaake kaa no? 
7. Kaa no a na ɛwɔ papa no nkyɛn no nɔma yɛ deɛn? 
8. Ɛhefa na na kanea no dua no si? 




9. Kɔla bɛn na na kaa no nɔma pleti no so no? 
10. Na kanea dua no yɛ kɔla bɛn? 
11. Ɛdeɛn na na papa no eeyɛ?  
12. Na ɛdan a na ɛwɔ hɔ no kɔla te sɛn? 
13. Kyerɛ sedea a na papa no tiri nwi teɛ. 
14. Na ɛdan no mpoma no dua no yɛ kɔla bɛn wɔ dea wohwɛɛyɛ no mu no? 
15. Sɛ woyi kaa no nɔma a wɔatwerɛ wɔ ho no, ɛdeɛn biom na na wɔatwerɛ wɔ kaa no 
ho?  
16. Na kaa a ɛtɔ so mmiɛnsa no yɛ kɔla bɛn? 
17. Kaa no fa bɛn na na papa no gyina no? 
18. Baasekere no dan/hyɛɛde no nan no yɛ kɔla bɛn? 
19. Ɛdeɛn na na ɛbɔ papa no nsa no? 
20. Kyerɛ sɛdea nea wɔde akuru baasekere no dan no so no teɛ 
 
Ahwɛdeɛ F 
Kae na ka 
Nea yɛɛhwehwɛ afiri wo hɔ ne sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui wɔ mfonin no so no. Fa no sɛ yɛɛbisa wo 
sɛ kyerɛ nea wohuuyɛ wɔ dea esiiyɛ no mu no) kyerɛɛ apoliisifoɔ na nea wobɛka biaa afa nea 
wohui no ho hia yie paa. 
 Bɔ mmɔden sɛ wobɛka nsɛm a ɛho hia nyinaa wɔ sɛnea wuhuu no faayɛ.Yere wo ho ka no 
sɛnea esii pɛpɛɛpɛ na kyerɛ mu fann. 
Wowɔ sima nsia sɛ wode bedi saa dwuma yi. Sɛ wowie ansa na sima nsia a yɛde ama wo no 
bi aka, wobetumi akɔso akaakae na ɔaka nea wohuuyɛ no. 
Nsɛmmisa ahoroɔ 
1. Sotɔɔ a na Roman sista no anim kyerɛ no din de sɛn?  
2. Deɛ bɛn so na na maame no (dea asɛm at no no) teɛ no?  
3. Whan na na ogyina sotɔɔ a na Roman sista no eekɔ mu no? 
4. Kyerɛ mpaboa a na maame no (dea asɛm at no no) hyɛ no. 
5. Ataadeɛ a na ɛhyɛ akwadaa ketewaa no wɔ dea wohwɛɛyɛ no mu no kɔla yɛ deɛn?  




6. Maame no (dea asɛm at no no) nan mu dea ɛwɔ he nan a yɛama soɔ no? 
7. Na akwadaa no eeyɛ deɛn? 
8. Ɛdeɛn na na maame (dea asɛm at no no) no kura no? 
9. Na mpaboa a ɛhyɛ akwadaa ketewaa no kɔla yɛ deɛn? 
10. Sɛn na na mpaboa a na papa no (dea yɛse ɔayɛ bɔne no) hyɛ no teɛ?  
11. Whan na na ogyina abofra ketewa no nkyɛn? 
12. Ntaadeɛ bɛn na na maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) hyɛ? 
13. Nnipa dodoɔ ahe na na wɔgyina sotɔɔ no ano wɔ maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) akyi 
no?  
14. Deɛn nan a papa no (dea yɛse ɔayɛ bɔne no) no eeyɛ? 
15. Sotɔɔ no a ɛwɔ maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) akyi no din de sɛn? 
16. Ntaadeɛ bɛn na na papa no (dea yɛse ɔayɛ bɔne no) hyɛ no?  
17. Ɛdeɛn na ɛwɔ akwadaa ketewaa no nkyɛn wɔ hɔ no?  
18. Maame no (dea asɛm ato no no) nnoɔma no hefa na na papa no aso no? 
19. Nnipa dodoɔ ahe na na wɔwɔ sotɔɔ no anim wɔ wo benkum so no? 
20. Agudeɛ bɛn na na ɛhyɛ maame no? 
 
Ahwɛdeɛ G 
Kae na ka 
Nea yɛɛhwehwɛ afiri wo hɔ ne sɛ kyerɛ nea wohui wɔ mfonin no so no. Fa no sɛ yɛɛbisa wo 
sɛ kyerɛ nea wohuuyɛ (wɔ dea esiiyɛ no mu no) kyerɛɛ apoliisifoɔ na nea wobɛka biaa afa 
nea wohui no ho hia yie paa. 
 Bɔ mmɔden sɛ wobɛka nsɛm a ɛho hia nyinaa wɔ sɛnea wuhuu no faayɛ. Yere wo ho ka no 
sɛnea esii pɛpɛɛpɛ na kyerɛ mu fann. 
Wowɔ sima nsia sɛ wode bedi saa dwuma yi. Sɛ wowie ansa na sima nsia a yɛde ama wo no 
bi aka, wobetumi akɔso akaakae na ɔaka nea wohuuyɛ no. 
Nsɛmmisa ahoroɔ 
1. Na papa no a ɔgyina maame no nkyɛn no reyɛ dɛn? 
2. Ɛdɛn nan a wɔatwerɛ agu ɛpon no atifi wɔ ninfa fam no? 




3. Ɛdɛn ataadeɛ na na papa (a yɛɛka ne ho asem no) hyɛ?  
4. Nsɛnku bɛn na wohuuyɛ no? 
5. Na papa (a yɛɛka ne ho asem no) no bɛlɛte no yɛ kɔla bɛn?  
6. Nnipa ahe na na wɔwɔ faako a bɔne no kɔɔso no (sɛ woyi nea odii bɔne no ne nea 
yɛyɛɛ no bɔne no firi hɔ aa)?  
7. Na papa a ɔdii bɔne no bɔ wɔɔkye kɔla bɛn? 
8. Ɛhe na na nipa a wɔhuu nea ɛkɔɔso no gyina? 
9. Ɛdɛn ataadeɛ na na maame (a wɔdii no bɔne no) no hyɛ?  
10. Ɛdɛn nan a nnipa a wɔwɔ hɔ no ɛɛyɛ? 
11. Na maame (a yɛɛka n’asem no) hyɛ mpaboa kɔla bɛn? 
12. Na ahomatorofoɔ no a ɛwɔ baabi a asem no siiyɛ no wɔ he pɔtee?  
13. Ɛhe na na maame (a w’adi no bɔne no) nsa ninfa da?  
14. Na ahatorofoɔ a ɛwɔ hɔ no kɔla yɛ dɛn? 
15. Ɛhe nan a maame (a yɛɛka n’asem no) nsa bɛnkum da? 
16. Ɛpon ahe na wohuuyɛ wɔ faako a asem no siiyɛ? 
17. Kyerɛkyerɛ adeɛ a na maame no te so no. 
18. Na akongua no kɔla yɛ dɛn? 
19. Kyerɛkyerɛ sɛ deɛ na maame no ntiri nwi teɛ? 
20. Nnipa a na wɔwɔ faako a asem no siiyɛ no, na ntaadeɛ bɛn nan a wɔhyɛ? 
 
Ahwɛdeɛ H 
Kae na ka 
Wo dwumadie ne sɛ wobɛkyerɛkyerɛ nea wo hu wɔ mfonin no mu. Susu sɛ woobɔ w’amaneɛ 
wɔ nea wohuuyɛ no ho akyerɛ poliisini enti nkyerɛkyerɛmu biara a wode ka ho a ɛbɛboa no, 
bɔ mmɔden fa ka ho. 
Nsɛm dodoɔ biara a ɛhohia sɛ wodebɛka ho no, fa ka ho. Bɔ mmɔden sɛ wobɛbɔ w’amaneɛ 
wɔ pɛpɛɛpɛyɛ ɛne nsenhia so. 
 Wode sima nsia na ɛbɛdi wodwuma no. Sɛ wotumi wie ansa na wo mmerɛ no aso a, 
wobɛtumi de sima a aka no akaekae na w’aka nea wohuuyɛ no nyinaa.  
Nsɛmmisa ahoroɔ 




1. Ɛhe na kanea a ɛwɔ kwan no so no wɔ?  
2. Kyerɛ kwan a na maame (no a asem ato no) no nam so da fam hɔ? 
3. Na mfɛsene no wɔ he pɔtee? 
4. Na kaa no afa he na na maame no da? 
5. Na ɛdan no (mfɛnsene no)yɛ kɔla bɛn? 
6. Ɔbaa/Maame (a wɔwea no) no na ɛdɛn nan a ɛda ne nsa? 
7. Na ɛdan no ahosuo/kɔla yɛ dɛn? 
8. Na adeɛ a ɛda ne nsa no yɛ kɔla bɛn? 
9. Ɛdan no mpoma ahe na wohuuyɛ? 
10. Na ne nsa bɛn nan a adeɛ no hyɛ? 
11. Na ɛdan no mpoma no dadeɛ no yɛ kɔla bɛn? 
12. Ataadeɛ bɛn na ɔhyɛyɛ? 
13. Ɛhe pɔtee na na ɛdan no si wɔ faako a asem no sii no? 
14. Kyerɛkyerɛ mpaboa ko a na maame no (a wɔyɛɛ no bɔne no) hyɛ? 
15. Na ɛdan ne fa he na na mpoma no wɔ? 
16. Na kaa no kɔla yɛ dɛn? 
17. Nnua ahe na na esi kaa no ninfa soɔ? 
18. Na kaa no nɔma yɛ sɛn? 
19. Kyerɛkyerɛ dua no a ɛsi kaa no bɛnkum so no bɔbere/bɔbea. 
20. Kɔla bɛn na wo hu wɔ kaa no nɔma pereti no so? 
 
 
Twi translation of Cultural Orientation Scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) 
Wɔ nsɛm a yeatimtim wɔ aseɛ hɔ no, kyerɛ sɛdeɛ esi fa wo ho anaa ɛsɛ wo nsusuyɛ. Ɛwɔ  sɛ 
wo nsusuyɛ efi baako (Daabida) ɛkɔsi nkron (Daa anaa nokware torodoo). 
___   1..  Ɛbɛyɛ paa sɛ me de me ho bɛto me so sen sɛ me de bɛto afoforɔ so. 
___   2. Me taa de me ho to me ho so mpɛn dodoɔ no aa; ɛyɛ den paa sɛ mede me ho bɛto 
afoforɔ so.   
___   3. Me taa yɛ me aa m’adeɛ.   




___  4. Ɛdin a mɛpɛ ama me ho aa, ɛbɛma me ada nson wɔ afoforɔ mu hia me paa anaa yɛ me 
adehiadeɛ anaa som me bo paa. 
___  5.  Ɛhohia sɛ meadi me dwuma yiye akyɛn memfɛfoɔ/afoforɔ. 
___ 6. Nkunimdie ɛne/yɛ biibiaa. 
___ 7. Akansie yɛ Ɔbɔɔadeɛ nhyehyɛyɛ anaa abrabɔ mu adeɛ. 
 ___ 8. Sɛ me yɔnko/obi bɔ mmɔden sen me a, me yɛ basaa. 
___  9. Se yɛbɔ me yɔnko odwumayɛfoɔ aba so a, m’ani bɛgye ama no. 
___ 10. Me yɔnko adwumayɛfoɔ mpuntuo yɛ me adehiadeɛ paa.  
___ 11. Me deɛ, me nteaseɛ wɔ anigye ho/mu ne sɛ, me ne afoforoɔ ɛɛhwe abɔmu 
___ 12. Sɛ mene afoforɔ ntɛm yɛ aa, me koma tɔ me yam anaa me ho tɔ me/m’ani gye.  
___ 13. Sɛ ɛbɛtumi aa, ɛwɔ sɔ awofoɔ ne wɔn mm aka wɔn ho bɔ mu.   
___ 14. Ɛyɛ m’asode sɛmɛhwɛ m’abusuafoɔ yiye, sɛ mpo ɛkɔba no sɛ me yɛ atuhoakyɛ koraa.  
___ 15. Ɛwɔ sɛ abusua mu nnipa nyinaa kabɔmu a ɛnfa ho ne atuhoakyɛ a ɛbɛhia. 
___ 16. Ɛyɛ adehiadeɛ ma me sɛ mɛbu adwen a me kuo mu nnipa afa. 
 
Number of participants that viewed each stimulus (In relation to counterbalancing) 
 GROUP 
STIMULUS Rural Ghana Urban Ghana The Netherlands 
Stimulus 1 38 35 25 
Stimulus 2 38 35 25 
Stimulus 3 38 35 25 
Stimulus 4 
 
38 35 25 
Stimulus 5 37 35 30 




Stimulus 6 37 35 30 
Stimulus 7 37 35 30 




Supplementary analysis on education level (Study 2) 
To determine whether the education level of the migrant sampled had an effect on our key 
dependent variable, we conducted an additional analysis comparing migrants with bachelor’s 
education and those with post-graduate education with respect to the amount of details 
provided. Although, sub-Saharan African migrants with bachelors education level (n = 27, M 
= 29.33, SD = 17.76) reported more correct central details than those with postgraduate 
education level (n = 20, M = 20.60, = 9.94), this difference did not reach the threshold for 
significance, t (45) = 1.98, p = .054, d = .61.  Among participants from Ghana, those with 
bachelor's education level (n = 54, M = 19.20) did not significantly differ from those with 
postgraduate education level (n = 5, M = 28) in the number of correct central details reported, 
t (57) = 1.95, p = .056, d = .84. This exploratory analysis suggests it is less likely the 
education level of participants could have accounted for the difference between Africans in 





















Appendix 2: Supplementary materials (Chapter 3) 
Free recall 
Your task is to provideinformation about what you saw in the video event, in your own 
words. Please be as accurate and detailed as possible and avoid guessing. You have five 
minutes to provide your account. When you finish before time has elapsed you can still use 
the remaining time to report what you saw. 
Recognition test 
 
Please provide the answer to the following. Your response to all questions should be based on 
what you saw in the video you just watched.  
1. The courier stole a ………………… from the office 
a. Yellow-coloured laptop 
b. Blue-coloured laptop 
c. Grey-coloured laptop  
d. I don’t know 
2. The courier was wearing a ……………….. 
a. Brown jacket 
b. Black jacket  
c. Blue jacket  
d. I don’t Know 
3. When the courier entered the office 
a. She shook hands with the office employee 
b. She removed her helmet 
c. She did not shake hands with the office employee 
d. I don’t know 
4. As the office employee signed for the parcel 
a. The courier brought out her mobile phone 
b. The courier removed her helmet 
c. The courier looked on 
d. I don’t know 




d. I don’t know 
6. The woman the courier crashed into was holding 
a. Green shopping bag 




b. Yellow shopping bag 
c. Blue shopping bag 
d. I don’t know 
7. When the courier was running away she first run pass… 
a. A man wearing a cap 
b. A woman wearing black cloth 
c. Two school children 
d. I don’t know 
8. What was beside the entrance to the travel agency 
a. Cat 
b. Bicycle  
c. Dog 
d. I don’t know 
  
 
9. The name of the travel agency was …………………….. 
a. RKT Travel 
b. AKT Travel 
c. ATR Travel 
d. I Don’t Know 
10. The courier was wearing a ……………….  
a. Green helmet 
b. Red helmet 
c. Black helmet  
d. I don’t know 
11. When the courier got out of the office, standing across the street were 
………………… who were looking towards the office. 
a. 2 men  
b. A man and a woman  
c. 2 women 
d. I Don’t Know 
12. The courier threw the helmet ………………………….. 
a. In a dustbin 
b. In a garden 
c. On the pavement of the street 
d. I Don’t Know 




Post-event narrative 1            
Police investigation into Theft at Travel Centre 
 
Police have begun investigations into a theft that occurred at AKT Travel. CCTV footage 
released on Monday shows a courier walking towards the travel agency, AKT Travel, at 
about 3:00pm last Friday afternoon. She was wearing a brown jacket and a black helmet. 
Upon arriving at the entrance, she pressed the doorbell and waited for a response. Just 
beside the entrance was a bicycle. After a few moments, the office door was opened and the 
courier entered the building.  
 
The travel agency secretary was seated at a black desk near the door when the courier 
entered the office. The courier delivered a parcel to the secretary. As the secretary signed for 
the parcel, the courier was seen pulling out her mobile phone. After signing for the parcel, the 
secretary went to fetch a glass of water for the courier in another room. While she was gone, 
the courier took a grey-coloured laptop off the desk and quickly left the office. 
  
When she returned with the glass of water, the secretary realised the courier had stolen the 
laptop. She quickly sounded an alarm as she followed the courier out of the building. When 
she realised that the secretary was chasing her, the courier started running. She first ran 
past two school children. As she continued to run, she bumped into a woman who was 
carrying two yellow shopping bags. When the courier bumped into her, the shopping bags fell 
on the ground. Her identity remains unknown as she was wearing a helmet. 
 
The stolen laptop contained the personal information, including financial and passport 
details, of thousands of previous customers of AKT Travel and is the latest in a series of 
serious data security breaches in the city. 
 
Police have appealed to the public to volunteer any information that could lead to the arrest 










Post-event narrative 2 
Police investigation into Theft at Travel Centre 
 
Police has begun investigations into a theft that occurred at AKT Travel. CCTV footage 
released on Monday shows a courier walking towards the travel agency, AKT travel, at about 
3:00pm last Friday afternoon. She was wearing a black jacket and black helmet. Upon 
arriving at the entrance, she pressed the doorbell and waited for a response. Just beside the 
entrance was a dog.  After a few moments, the office door was opened and the courier 
entered the building.  
 
The secretary was seated at a white desk near the door when the courier entered the office. 
When she entered, the courier shook hands with the office employee and delivered the 
parcel to her. The courier looked on as the secretary signed for the parcel. After signing for 
the parcel, the secretary went to fetch a glass of water for the courier in another room. While 
she was gone, the courier took a blue-coloured laptop on the desk and quickly left the office.  
 
When she returned with the glass of water, the secretary realised the courier had stolen the 
laptop. She quickly sounded an alarm as she followed the courier out of the building. When 
she realised that the secretary was chasing her, the courier started running. She first ran 
past a woman wearing black clothes. As she continued to run, she bumped into a woman 
who was carrying two green shopping bags. When the courier bumped into her, the 
shopping bags fell on the ground but she kept running until she could not be traced. Her 
identity remains unknown as she was wearing a helmet.  
 
The stolen laptop contained the personal information, including financial and passport 
details, of thousands of previous customers of AKT Travel and is the latest in a series of 
serious data security breaches in the city. 
 
Police have appealed to the general public to volunteer any information that could facilitate 


























Appendix 3: Supplementary material (Study 4) 
Interview Questions  
Free Recall (Police condition) 
Assuming you are an eyewitness to the incident and reporting what happened in the video to 
a DETECTIVE FROM THE LOCAL POLICE, what would you report?  
Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. You have 10 minutes to write what you saw.  If you finish your report 
before 10 minutes has elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report more about 

















































Cued Recall (Police Condition) 
After reporting the incident you just recounted, THE DETECTIVE FROM THE LOCAL 
POLICE has some specific questions to ask you about the incident. Again, you should 
provide as many details as you can. Try to be as accurate and detailed as possible in your 
responses to each question. Please do not guess. If you do not know the answer to a question, 
kindly indicate as such. 





















6. What did the office employee (receptionist) do when she realized she could not 










Free Recall (Peer condition) 
Assuming you witnessed the incident in the video and reporting about it to YOUR FRIEND, 
what would you say? Please write what you would say to your friend in the space below.  
Provide as much information as you can in your own words. Try to be as accurate and 
detailed as possible. You have 10 minutes to write what you saw.  If you finish your report 
before 10 minutes has elapsed, you still can use the time to remember and report more about 




















































Peer condition (Cued Recall) 
After reporting the incident you just recounted, YOUR FRIEND has some specific questions 
to ask you about the incident. Again, you should provide as many details as you can. Try to 
be as accurate and detailed as possible in your responses to each question. Please do not 
guess. If you do not know the answer to a question, kindly indicate as such. 























6. What did the office employee (receptionist) do when she realized she could not 









Confidence rating – Free Recall 





        Very 
sure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
Confidence rating – Cued Recall 





        Very 
sure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 














Power and inequality dimensions 
For each of the statements below, indicate with an X the extent to which each statement is 
true about yourself or the view you uphold. Your response should range between 1 (strongly 



















       
1. I find it hard to disagree with 
authority figures. 
       
2. It is difficult for me to refuse 
a request if someone senior 
asks me. 
       
3. I easily conform to the wishes 
of someone in a higher 
position than mine. 
       
4. I tend to follow orders 
without asking any questions. 
       
5. A person’s social status 
reflects his or her place in the 
society. 
       
6. It is important for everyone to 
know their rightful place in 
the society. 
       
7. It is difficult to interact with 
people from different social 
status than mine. 
       
8. Unequal treatment for 
different people is an 
acceptable way of life for me. 
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